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VII. Constitutional Law  
 
In This Section: 
 
New Case: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York  
“SUPREME COURT ACCEPTS FIRST GUN CASE IN NEARLY A DECADE” 
Jess Bravin  
“FEARING SUPREME COURT LOSS, NEW YORK TRIED TO MAKE GUN CASE VANISH” 
Adam Liptak  
“NEW YORK EASED GUN LAW HOPEFUL SUPREME COURT WOULD DROP SECOND 
AMENDMENT CASE – BUT THAT HASN’T HAPPENED YET” 
Robert Barnes  
“NRA, GUN RIGHTS GROUP USING NEW YORK CITY RULE TO SEEK EXPANSION OF SECOND 
AMENDMENT IN SUPREME COURT”  
Richard Wolf 
“A CALL TO ARMS AT THE SUPREME COURT: CONSERVATIVE JUDGES WORRY THAT THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT HAS BECOME ‘A SECOND-CLASS RIGHT.’” 
Linda Greenhouse  
“TRUMP SAYS NRA IS ‘UNDER SIEGE BY CUOMO’ AFTER NEW YORK AG OPENS 
INVESTIGATION INTO GUN GROUP”  
Tucker Higgins  
“NEW YORK CITY LAW SURVIVES GUN RIGHTS GROUP’S LEGAL CHALLENGE” 
Jonathan Stempel  
 
New Case: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue  
“SUPREME COURT TO HEAR SCHOOL CHOICE CASE” 
Lauren Camera  
“RELIGIOUS-SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIPS DRAW U.S. SUPREME COURT REVIEW” 
Greg Stohr  
“IF THE SUPREME COURT HEARS THIS CASE, IT COULD CHANGE THE FACE OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION” 
PETER GREENE  
“THE SUPREME COURT HAS A CHANCE TO UPHOLD SCHOOL CHOICE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY” 
Jamie Gass and Ben Degrow  
“MONTANA SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN TAX-CREDIT PROGRAM FOR PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS” 




New Case: June Medical Services v. Gee  
“SUPREME COURT ON 5-TO-4 VOTE BLOCKS RESTRICTIVE LOUISIANA ABORTION LAW” 
Robert Barnes  
“SUPREME COURT BLOCKS LOUISIANA ABORTION LAW” 
Adam Liptak  
“ABORTION CASE PROVIDES AN UNEXPECTED QUICK TEST FOR SUPREME COURT 
CONSERVATIVES” 
Robert Barnes  
“A TEMPORARY WIN FOR ABORTION RIGHTS” 
Garrett Epps  
“WHEN JUDGES DEFY THE SUPREME COURT” 
Linda Greenhouse  
“SUPREME COURT ISSUES A GO-SLOW SIGNAL IN ITS FIRST ABORTION DECISION OF THE 
YEAR” 
David Savage 
“NEW LOUISIANA ANTI-ABORTION LAW ON HOLD AS DOCTORS CHALLENGE RECENT COURT 
RULING” 
Mark Ballard  
“SUPREME COURT WILL NOT HEAR BID TO REVIVE ALABAMA ABORTION BAN” 
Adam Liptak  
“SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS ABORTION QUESTION IN RULING ON INDIANA LAW” 























New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. City of New York, New York 
 
Ruling Below: New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 
2018) 
 
Overview: The plaintiffs were prohibited from transporting their handguns for shooting 
competitions by New York State Rule. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the restrictions 
imposed by the rule was unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. The plaintiffs 
also claim that the rule violates their Second Amendment rights, Commerce Clause, First 
Amendment right of expressive association, and fundamental right to travel.   
 
Issue: Whether New York City’s ban on transporting a licensed, locked and unloaded handgun to 
a home or shooting range outside city limits is consistent with the Second Amendment, the 
commerce clause and the constitutional right to travel. 
THE NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC., ROMOLO 





THE CITY OF NEW YORK and THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT-
LICENSE DIVISION, Defendants-Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
 
Decided on February 23, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
Gerard E. LYNCH, Circuit Judge:  
 
Plaintiffs New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Association, Romolo Colantone, Efrain 
Alvarez, and Jose Anthony Irizarry 
(collectively, "the Plaintiffs") brought suit 
against Defendants City of New York and the 
New York Police Department-License 
Division (collectively, "the City"), 
challenging a provision of a New York City 
licensing scheme, Title 38, Chapter Five, 
Section 23 of the Rules of the City of New 
York ("RCNY"), under which an individual 
with a "premises license" for a handgun 
may ot remove the handgun "from the 
address specified on the license except as 
otherwise provided in this 
chapter."  Under Rule 5-23 ("the Rule"), the 
licensee "may transport her/his handgun(s) 
directly to and from an authorized small arms 
range/shooting club, unloaded, in a locked 




The New York Police Department-License 
Division ("License Division") has defined 
"authorized" facilities, among other 
requirements, to be "those located in New 
York City." App. 38. The Plaintiffs sought to 
remove handguns from the licensed premises 
for the purposes of going to shooting ranges 
and engaging in target practice outside New 
York City as well as, in the case of one 
Plaintiff, transporting the handgun to a 
second home in upstate NewYork. The 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York denied the Plaintiffs' 
motions for summary judgment and for a 
preliminary injunction, and granted the City's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. The 
district court held that the restrictions in 
premises licenses do not violate the Second 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the 
fundamental right to travel, or the First 
Amendment. The Plaintiffs appeal that 
judgment. 
 




New York State law prohibits possession of 
"firearms" absent a license. Section 400.00 of 
the Penal Law establishes the "exclusive 
statutory mechanism for the licensing of 
firearms in New York State." Licenses can be 
held by individuals at least twenty-one years 
of age, of good moral character, and 
"concerning whom no good cause exists for 
the denial of the license," among other 
requirements. 
 
To obtain a handgun license, an individual 
must apply to his or her local licensing 
officer. "The application process for a license 
is rigorous and administered locally. Every 
application triggers a local investigation by 
police into the applicant's mental health 
history, criminal history, [and] moral 
character."  The licensing officers "are vested 
with considerable discretion in deciding 
whether to grant a license application, 
particularly in determining whether proper 
cause exists for the issuance of a carry 
license."  The New York Penal Law specifies 
that in New York City, the licensing officer 
is the City's Police Commissioner The 
License Division exercises the 
Commissioner's authority to review 
applications for licenses, and issues handgun 
licenses.  
 
The Penal Law establishes two primary types 
of handgun licenses: "carry" licenses and 
"premises" licenses. A carry license allows 
an individual to "have and carry [a] 
concealed" handgun "without regard to 
employment or place of possession . . . when 
proper cause exists" for the license to be 
issued.  
 
"Proper cause" is not defined by the 
Penal Law, but New York State 
courts have defined the term to 
include carrying a handgun for target 
practice, hunting, or self-defense. 
When an applicant demonstrates 
proper cause to carry a handgun for 
target practice or hunting, the 
licensing officer may restrict a carry 




Generally, a carry license is valid throughout 
the state except that it is not valid within New 
York City "unless a special permit granting 
validity is issued by the police 
commissioner" of New York City. 
 
A premises license is specific to the premises 
for which it is issued. The type of license at 
issue in this case allows a licensee to "have 
and possess in his dwelling" a pistol or 
revolver. Under the RCNY, a "premises 
license - residence" issued to a New York 
City resident is specific to a particular 
address, and "[t]he handguns listed on th[e] 
license may not be removed from the address 
specified on the license except" in limited 
circumstances, including the following: 
 
(3) To maintain proficiency in the use 
of the handgun, the licensee may 
transport her/his handgun(s) directly 
to and from an authorized small arms 
range/shooting club, unloaded, and in 
a locked container, the ammunition to 
be carried separately. 
 
(4) A licensee may transport her/his 
handgun(s) directly to and from an 
authorized area designated by the 
New York State Fish and Wildlife 
Law and in compliance with all 
pertinent hunting regulations, 
unloaded, in a locked container, the 
ammunition to be carried separately, 
after the licensee has requested and 
received a "Police Department - City 
of New York Hunting Authorization" 
Amendment attached to her/his 
license. 
 
Under Rule 5-23(a)(3), an "authorized small 
arms range/shooting club" is one that, among 
other requirements, is located in New York 
City, as the License Division notified 
Plaintiff Colantone in a letter dated May 15, 
2012. When this challenge was brought, there 
were seven such facilities in New York City, 
including at least one in each of the City's five 
boroughs. The New York Police Department 
("NYPD") also previously issued "target 
licenses" that allowed the licensee to 
take   his or her handgun to shooting ranges 
and competitions outside New York City. 
These target licenses were not mandated by 
state law, but were issued by the NYPD in its 
discretion as the licensing agency for New 
York City. The NYPD received reports that 
licensees were using target licenses to carry 
weapons to many other locations, and not in 
the requisite unloaded and enclosed 
condition. In part because of these issues, the 
NYPD eliminated the target license in 2001. 
 
Plaintiffs Colantone, Irizarry, and Alvarez 
hold premises licenses issued by the License 
Division that allow them to possess handguns 
in their residences in New York City. They 
seek to transport their handguns outside the 
premises for purposes other than the ones 
authorized by Rule 5-23. All three Plaintiffs 
seek to transport their handguns to shooting 
ranges and competitions outside New York 
City. In addition, Colantone, who owns a 
second home in Hancock, New York, seeks 
to transport his handgun between the 
premises for which it is licensed in New York 
City and his Hancock house. These plaintiffs, 
along with the New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Association, filed suit in the Southern District 
of New York, seeking a declaration that the 
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restrictions imposed by the Rule were 
unconstitutional and an injunction against its 
enforcement.  
 
The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment 
and for a preliminary injunction, and the City 
cross moved for summary judgment. The 
district court granted the City's cross-motion 
for summary judgment and dismissed the 
complaint. The district court determined that 
the Rule "merely regulates rather than 
restricts the right to possess a firearm in the 
home and is a minimal, or at most, modest 
burden on the right."  Accordingly, the 
district court held that the Rule did not violate 
the Plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights. 
The district court also found that the Rule did 
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, 
the First Amendment right of expressive 





The Plaintiffs argue on appeal, as they did 
below, that by restricting their ability to 
transport firearms outside the City, Rule 5-
23 violates the Second Amendment, the 
dormant Commerce Clause, the First 
Amendment right of expressive association, 
and the fundamental right to travel.  We 
review a district court's decision on summary 
judgment de novo, construing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. "We also review de novo the district 
court's legal conclusions, including those 
interpreting and determining the 
constitutionality of a statute." Pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 
judgment is appropriate where "there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” For the reasons explained below, we 
reject each of the Plaintiffs' arguments. 
 
 I. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the Second 
Amendment. 
 
The Second Amendment provides: "A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed." In District of Columbia v. Heller, 
the Supreme Court announced 
that the Second Amendment "guarantee[s] 
the individual right to possess and carry 
weapons in case of 
confrontation.” In McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, the Court held that this right is 
incorporated within the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore 
binds the States as well as the Federal 
Government. However, the Court remarked 
that its holding should not "be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools 
and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms." 
"Neither Heller nor McDonald . . . delineated 
the precise scope of the Second 
Amendment or the standards by which lower 
courts should assess the constitutionality of 
firearms restrictions. 
 
A. Analytical Framework 
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Following Heller,  this Circuit adopted a 
"two-step inquiry" for "determining the 
constitutionality of firearm 
restrictions." First, we "determine whether 
the challenged legislation impinges upon 
conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment," and second, if we "conclude[] 
that the statute[] impinge[s] upon Second 
Amendment rights, we must next determine 
and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny."  
 
1. First Step: Whether the Second 
Amendment Applies 
 
At the first step, the Plaintiffs argue that Rule 
5-23 impinges on conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment. We need not decide 
whether that is so, because, as explained 
below, the Rule "pass[es] constitutional 
muster" under intermediate scrutiny. Thus, as 
in New York State Rifle, we "proceed on the 
assumption that [the Rule restricts activity] 
protected by the Second Amendment." 
 
2. Second Step: Level of Scrutiny 
 
At the second step, we consider whether to 
apply heightened scrutiny.  In Second 
Amendment cases, our Circuit has 
recognized at least two forms of heightened 
scrutiny — strict and intermediate. Our 
Circuit has also recognized that a form of 
non-heightened scrutiny may be applied in 
some Second Amendment cases. This 
recognition is limited by the Supreme Court's 
indication in Heller that rational basis review 
may be inappropriate for certain regulations 
involving Second Amendment rights. But we 
need not determine here which types of 
regulations may be subject only to rational 
basis review, or whether some form of non-
heightened scrutiny exists that is more 
exacting than rational basis review. As 
explained below, we find that the Rule does 
not trigger strict scrutiny and that it survives 
intermediate scrutiny. 
 
In determining whether some form of 
heightened scrutiny applies, we consider two 
factors: "(1) 'how close the law comes to the 
core of the Second Amendment right' and (2) 
'the severity of the law's burden on the right.' 
Laws that neither implicate the core 
protections of the Second Amendment nor 
substantially burden their exercise do not 
receive heightened scrutiny."  As relevant to 
the individual right to possess a firearm 
recognized in Heller, a statute can "implicate 
the core of the Second Amendment's 
protections by extending into the home, 
'where the need for defense of self, family 
and property is most acute.'" Thus, in Heller, 
the Supreme Court struck down the District 
of Columbia's ban on handgun possession in 
the home because it completely prohibited 
"an entire class of 'arms' that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society 
for th[e] lawful purpose [of self-
defense].” The Court found that this 
prohibition, which extended into the home, 
would fail constitutional muster under any 
standard of scrutiny.  
 
As to the second factor, we have held that 
"heightened scrutiny is triggered only by 
those restrictions that (like the complete 
prohibition on handguns struck down 
in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on 
the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess 
and use a firearm for self-defense (or for 
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other lawful purposes)." "The scope of the 
legislative restriction and the availability of 
alternatives factor into our analysis of the 
degree to which the challenged law burdens 
the right." For example, since Heller, we 
have found New York's and Connecticut's 
prohibitions of semiautomatic assault 
weapons to be distinguishable from the ban 
struck down in Heller, because under those 
statutes, "citizens may continue to arm 
themselves with non-semiautomatic 
weapons or with any semiautomatic gun that 
does not contain any of the enumerated 
military-style features." Even where 
heightened scrutiny is triggered by a 
substantial burden, however, strict scrutiny 
may not be required if that burden "does not 
constrain the Amendment's 'core' area of 
protection."  Thus, the two factors interact to 
dictate the proper level of scrutiny. 
 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule violates 
the Second Amendment in two ways: first, 
by preventing Plaintiff Colantone from 
taking the handgun licensed to his New York 
City residence and transporting it to his 
second home in Hancock, New York, and 
second, by preventing the Plaintiffs from 
taking their handguns licensed to New York 
City premises to firing ranges and shooting 
competitions outside the City. We address 
these arguments in turn. 
 
In Kachalsky, we applied intermediate 
scrutiny and affirmed New York's "proper 
cause" requirement for the issuance of a carry 
license, despite finding that such a 
requirement "places substantial limits on the 
ability of law-abiding citizens to possess 
firearms for self-defense in public."In 
comparison to the regulation considered 
in Kachalsky, the restrictions complained of 
by the Plaintiffs here impose at most trivial 
limitations on the ability of law-abiding 
citizens to possess and use firearms for self-
defense. New York has licensed the 
ownership and possession of firearms in their 
residences, where "Second 
Amendment guarantees are at their 
zenith,"  and does nothing to limit their 
lawful use of those weapons "in defense of 
hearth and home"—the "core" protection of 
the Second Amendment. 
 
Strict scrutiny does not attach to Rule 5-23 as 
a result of Colantone's desire to transport the 
handgun licensed to his New York City 
residence to his second home in Hancock, 
New York. Even if the Rule relates to "core" 
rights under the Second Amendment by 
prohibiting Colantone from taking his 
licensed firearm to his second home, the Rule 
does not substantially burden his ability to 
obtain a firearm for that home, because an 
"adequate alternative[] remain[s] for 
[Colantone] to acquire a firearm for self-
defense." This case is easily distinguished 
from Heller, in which the Supreme Court 
considered, and deemed unconstitutional, an 
outright ban on the possession of handguns in 
the home.  Here, New York City imposes no 
limit on Colantone's ability to obtain a license 
to have a handgun at his second residence in 
Hancock; if he wants to keep a handgun at his 
Hancock house, he can apply to the licensing 
officers in Delaware County. The Rule 
restricts only his ability to remove the 
handgun licensed by New York City 
authorities from the City premises for which 
it is specifically licensed. 
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Colantone presents no evidence that the 
costs, either financial or administrative, 
associated with obtaining a premises license 
for his house in Hancock, or acquiring a 
second gun to keep at that location, would be 
so high as to be exclusionary or 
prohibitive. In Kwong v. Bloomberg, we 
assumed that intermediate scrutiny applied to 
New York City's $340 application fee for 
a premises license and upheld that fee. We 
noted that otherwise-proper costs associated 
with a state's regulation of firearms could be 
impermissible "if [they] were so high as to be 
exclusionary or prohibitive.” But "the fact 
that the licensing regime makes the exercise 
of one's Second Amendment rights more 
expensive does not necessarily mean that it 
substantially burdens that right." Here, 
Colantone does not even estimate the amount 
of money or time potentially at issue by the 
requirement of obtaining a premises license 
and second firearm for his second home, and 
he does not allege that the Rule restricts in 
any way his ability to obtain such a firearm. 
 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 
imposes a substantial burden on their 
core Second Amendment rights by 
prohibiting them from taking their licensed 
handguns to firing ranges and shooting 
competitions outside the City. The Plaintiffs' 
primary argument is that the right to possess 
and use guns in self-defense suggests a 
corresponding right to engage in training and 
target shooting, and thus restrictions on the 
latter right must themselves be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. Their argument relies on 
the Seventh Circuit's observation that the 
core right of the Second Amendment to use 
firearms in self-defense, particularly in the 
home, "wouldn't mean much without the 
training and practice that make it effective."  
 
To the extent that the Plaintiffs argue that 
firearms practice is itself a core Second 
Amendment right, and that even minimal 
regulation of firearms training must survive 
heightened scrutiny to pass constitutional 
muster, we reject that argument. It is 
reasonable to argue as did the plaintiffs 
in Ezell I, that restrictions that limit the 
ability of firearms owners to acquire and 
maintain proficiency in the use of their 
weapons can rise to a level that significantly 
burdens core Second 
Amendment protections. Possession of 
firearms without adequate training and skill 
does nothing to protect, and much to 
endanger, the gun owner, his or her family, 
and the general public. Accordingly, we may 
assume that the ability to obtain firearms 
training and engage in firearm practice is 
sufficiently close to core Second 
Amendment concerns that regulations that 
sharply restrict that ability to obtain such 
training could impose substantial burdens on 
core Second Amendment rights. Some form 
of heightened scrutiny would be warranted in 
such cases, however, not because live-fire 
target shooting is itself a core Second 
Amendment right, but rather because, and 
only to the extent that, regulations amounting 
to a ban (either explicit or functional) on 
obtaining firearms training and practice 
substantially burden the core right to keep 
and use firearms in selfdefense in the home. 
Indeed, if the Plaintiffs' broader argument 
were accepted, every regulation that applied 
to businesses that provide firearms training or 
firing-range use would itself require 
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heightened scrutiny, a result far from 
anything the Supreme Court has required. 
 
Our analysis puts the focus where it belongs: 
on the core right of self-defense in the 
home. Rule 5-23 imposes no direct restriction 
at all on the right of the Plaintiffs, or of any 
other eligible New Yorker, to obtain a 
handgun and maintain it at their residences 
for self-protection. All of the individual 
Plaintiffs hold licenses to maintain handguns 
for that purpose. The Plaintiffs do not allege 
that the City's regulatory scheme imposes any 
undue burden, expense, or difficulty that 
impedes their ability to possess a handgun for 
self-protection, or even their ability to engage 
in sufficient practice to acquire and maintain 
the skills necessary to keep firearms safely 
and use them effectively. 
 
We are further unpersuaded by the Plaintiffs' 
attempts to analogize the Rule to the 
restrictions held unconstitutional in Ezell I, as 
those restrictions are easily distinguishable 
from the ones at issue in this case. Ezell 
I concerned a Chicago ordinance that flatly 
banned firing ranges within city limits. We 
can assume, without deciding, that the 
Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that such 
a dramatic ban on target shooting 
substantially limits the right of law-abiding 
citizens to engage in the training and practice 
that would enable them to safely and 
effectively make use of firearms for 
defensive purposes in the home. Under the 
Chicago ordinance, residents could not 
engage in firearms activities without leaving 
the city. At a minimum, such a limitation 
imposes significant inconvenience, and we 
can accept, for purposes of the argument in 
this case, that the imposition of such a burden 
comes close to prohibiting gun training and 
practice altogether. Particularly when 
coupled with a training requirement, such a 
limitation would impose a considerable 
obstacle to gun ownership in the home. New 
York's rule, however, imposes no such 
limitations. Rule 5-23 allows a holder of a 
premises license to take the handgun licensed 
for his or her New York City premises to an 
authorized firing range in the City to engage 
in practice, training exercises, and shooting 
competitions. 
 
Nor does the City take away with one hand 
what it gives with the other, by using its 
power to regulate firing ranges so 
restrictively that as a practical matter, firing 
ranges are unavailable. That was the route 
taken by Chicago in response to the Ezell 
I ruling. In Ezell v. City of Chicago ("Ezell 
II"), the Seventh Circuit confronted zoning 
restrictions that "severely limit[ed] where 
shooting ranges may locate," and which were 
justified by nothing more than "sheer 
speculation about accidents and theft." In 
finding that the restrictions acted as a 
functional ban on firing ranges, the Ezell 
II Court cited calculations produced by the 
plaintiffs showing that only about 2.2% of the 
city's acreage could even theoretically be 
used to site a shooting range. Additionally, 
the court referenced testimony from two 
experts, presented by the plaintiffs, indicating 
that other jurisdictions made available 
significantly more land for use by shooting 
ranges.  
 
In this case, by contrast, the Plaintiffs present 
no evidence demonstrating that the Rule 
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serves to functionally bar their use of firing 
ranges or their attendance at shooting 
competitions. In fact, the Plaintiffs concede 
that seven authorized ranges are available to 
them, including at least one in each of the 
City's five boroughs. What the Plaintiffs seek 
is the inverse of what the Ezell I plaintiffs 
sought: they do not complain that they are 
required to undertake burdensome journeys 
away from the city in which they live in order 
to maintain their skills, but rather they 
demand the right to take their handguns to 
ranges and competitions outside their city of 
residence. While the Plaintiffs make passing 
reference to the possibility that some New 
York City residents might find a firing range 
located outside the City more convenient to 
use, or closer to their residence, than the 
nearest facility within their home borough or 
an adjoining borough, they offer no evidence 
that the burden imposed by having to use a 
range within the City is in any way 
substantial.  
 
As with absolute limitations on the ability to 
engage in firearms training, laws that limit 
such opportunities by imposing excessive 
costs could in principle impose a substantial 
burden entailing heightened scrutiny. But the 
test, again, is whether core rights are 
substantially burdened. As we noted 
in Kwong, a "hypothetical licensing fee could 
be so high as to constitute a 'substantial 
burden,'" nevertheless, we concluded that the 
permit fee charged by New York City did not 
impose such a substantial burden.  
 
Furthermore, a law that "regulates the 
availability of firearms is not a substantial 
burden on the right to keep and bear arms if 
adequate alternatives remain for law-abiding 
citizens to acquire a firearm for self-
defense." An analysis of the evidence in this 
case reveals that, contrary to the Plaintiffs' 
assertions, the Plaintiffs have sufficient 
opportunities to train with their firearms 
without violating the Rule. 
 
The record evidence demonstrates that seven 
firing ranges in New York City are available 
to any premises license-holder. One range, 
Olinville Arms in the Bronx, is open to any 
member of the public for an hourly fee. Six 
of the firing ranges require payment of a 
membership fee, although at least one of 
those six is open to non-members for weekly 
shooting competitions. The Plaintiffs argue 
that they should not be relegated to joining 
"private clubs" in order to engage in firearms 
competitions, Appellants' Br. 51, but the 
record does not support any claim that these 
"clubs" are exclusionary in any way. Like 
privately owned gyms and other athletic 
facilities, they are places of public 
accommodation, open to anyone who pays 
their fees. The Plaintiffs do not argue that the 
fees charged by the available firing ranges are 
prohibitively expensive, still less that their 
cost is driven up by any burdensome or 
unreasonable City regulations. That some 
portion of the fee is charged in the form of an 
annual or monthly "membership," rather than 
a per-hour usage fee, does not put the 
facilities out of reach for license holders. Nor 
does it warrant a conclusion that New York 
City has imposed an unreasonable burden on 
a resident's ability to pursue firearms training 
— which may be a somewhat costly pursuit 
in any event — thereby raising constitutional 
concerns. 
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Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not argue that the 
facilities located within the City are 
inadequate to provide the necessary 
opportunities for practice shooting. Indeed, 
the record reflects that some of these facilities 
are quite substantial. For example, the 
Richmond Boro Gun Club advertises a "100-
yard rifle range with 30 covered and enclosed 
stations for Benchrest, Prone, and Bench 
shooting, [and an] outdoor 24 station 50-yard 
pistol range with covered and enclosed 
shooting bench with turning targets at 25 
yards" among its many shooting facilities. 
"Various rifle and pistol matches are held 
each week all year," according to their 
website, and these matches are open to non-
members.  
 
Finally, nothing in the Rule precludes the 
Plaintiffs from utilizing gun ranges or 
attending competitions outside New York 
City, since guns can be rented or borrowed at 
most such venues for practice purposes. New 
York state law expressly allows individuals 
to use a gun that is not their own at a shooting 
range if the license holder is present. We 
recognize that the Plaintiffs may prefer to 
practice with their own weapon — something 
that the Rule makes fully possible within the 
City. That the Rule restricts practicing with 
their own firearms to ranges within the City 
does not make practicing outside the City or 
with their own firearms impossible, just not 
the two together. 
 
In short, nothing in this record suggests that 
the limitations challenged by the 
Plaintiffs significantly inhibit their ability to 
utilize training facilities to obtain and 
maintain firearm skills, let alone that the Rule 
operates as a substantial burden on the right 
to keep and use firearms for self-defense in 
the home. Assuming arguendo that a total 
ban on firing ranges within the limits of a 
large city (as was at issue in Ezell I) or a 
functional ban on firing ranges through 
onerous zoning regulations (along the lines 
of Ezell II) would impose a substantial 
burden on the core Second Amendment right 
of residents to maintain firearms for self-
defense in the home, we are not confronted 
with such a case here. Unlike the plaintiffs 
in Ezell II, the Plaintiffs here do not allege 
that any of the City's regulations, 
including Rule 5-23, serve to deter the 
construction or existence of firing ranges 
within city limits. Furthermore, given the 
existence of ample facilities for live-fire 
training and practice available at market 
prices within reasonable commuting distance 
from the homes of all City residents, the 
restrictions imposed by the Rule do not 
impose a substantial burden on the 
core Second Amendment right to own and 
possess handguns for self-defense. 
 
It is clear, based on the essentially undisputed 
facts recited above, that strict scrutiny is not 
triggered by the Rule, either as applied to 
Colantone's second home or to the Plaintiffs' 
desire to take their handguns outside the City 
for shooting competitions or target practice. 
However, some form of heightened scrutiny 
may still be required. We have applied 
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing 
regulations that substantially 
burdened Second Amendment rights or that 
encroached on the core of Second 




Because we assume, arguendo, that the Rule 
approaches the Second Amendment's core 
area of protection as applied to Colantone's 
second home, though it does not impose a 
substantial burden, we find that intermediate 
scrutiny is appropriate to assess the Rule in 
that instance. As to the Plaintiffs' access to 
firing ranges and shooting competitions, the 
Rule does not approach the core area of 
protection, and we find it difficult to say that 
the Rule substantially burdens any protected 
rights. "But we need not definitively decide 
that applying heightened scrutiny is 
unwarranted here," because we find that the 
Rule would survive even under intermediate 
scrutiny. Accordingly, we proceed to assess 
the Rule by applying intermediate scrutiny. 
 
B. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny 
 
When applying intermediate scrutiny under 
the Second Amendment, "the key question is 
whether the statute[] at issue [is] substantially 
related to the achievement of an important 
governmental interest. 
 
To survive intermediate scrutiny, the 
fit between the challenged regulation 
[and the government interest] need 
only be substantial, not perfect. 
Unlike strict scrutiny analysis, we 
need not ensure that the statute is 
narrowly tailored or the least 
restrictive available means to serve 
the stated governmental 
interest. Moreover, we have observed 
that state regulation of the right to 
bear arms has always been more 
robust than analogous regulation of 
other constitutional rights. So long as 
the defendants produce evidence that 
fairly supports their rationale, the 
laws will pass constitutional muster. 
 
The Rule seeks to protect public safety and 
prevent crime, and "New York has 
substantial, indeed compelling, 
governmental interests in public safety and 
crime prevention." "[W]hile the Second 
Amendment's core concerns are strongest 
inside hearth and home, states have long 
recognized a countervailing and competing 
set of concerns with regard to handgun 
ownership and use in public." "There is a 
longstanding tradition of states regulating 
firearm possession and use in public because 
of the dangers posed to public safety."  
 
The City has presented evidence supporting 
its contention that the Rule serves to protect 
the public safety of both license-holding and 
non-license-holding citizens of New York 
City. In a detailed affidavit, the former 
Commander of the License Division, Andrew 
Lunetta, discussed why taking a licensed 
handgun to a second home or a shooting 
competition outside the City, even under the 
restrictions imposed by the Rule for 
permitted transportation, constitutes a 
potential threat to public safety. He explained 
that premises license holders "are just as 
susceptible as anyone else to stressful 
situations," including driving situations that 
can lead to road rage, "crowd situations, 
demonstrations, family disputes," and other 
situations "where it would be better to not 
have the presence of a firearm." Accordingly, 
he stated, the City has a legitimate need to 
control the presence of firearms in public, 
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especially those held by individuals who 
have only a premises license, and not a carry 
license. He went on to discuss how "public 
safety will be compromised" unless the 
regulations concerning when and where 
premises licensees can transport their 
firearms "can be effectively monitored and 
enforced, and are not easily ignored or 
susceptible to being violated."  
 
Indeed, the City produces evidence that it 
has, in the past, had difficulty monitoring and 
enforcing the limits of the premises license. 
Lunetta's affidavit documented "abuses" that 
occurred when, prior to adoption of the 
current Rule, the City did allow licensees to 
carry their handguns to shooting ranges out 
of the City. "Examples included, licensees 
travel[]ing with loaded firearms, licensees 
found with firearms nowhere near the 
vicinity of an authorized range, licensees 
taking their firearms on airplanes, and 
licensees travel[]ing with their firearms 
during hours where no authorized range was 
open." Based on these abuses, Lunetta 
explained, the New York Police Department 
was concerned that allowing premises 
licensees to transport their firearms anywhere 
outside of the City for target practice or 
shooting competitions made it "too easy for 
them to possess a licensed firearm while 
traveling in public, and then if discovered 
create an explanation about traveling for 
target practice or shooting competition."  
 
According to Lunetta's affidavit, the New 
York Police Department concluded that 
officers cannot be expected to verify whether 
a licensee stopped with a firearm was, in fact, 
traveling to a firing range outside of the City. 
Based on that specific experience, the 
License Division restricted the scope of the 
premises license to allow for the 
transportation of the licensed handgun only 
to a firing range within New York City (or, 
with the proper additional authorization, to a 
designated hunting area). Lunetta explained 
the reasoning for the License Division's 
decision: "When target practice and shooting 
competitions are limited to locations in New 
York City the ability to create . . . a fiction[al 
legal purpose] is limited." Thus, the City 
asserts, limiting the geographic range in 
which firearms can be carried allows the City 
to promote public safety by better regulating 
and minimizing the instances of unlicensed 
transport of firearms on city streets. 
 
In contrast to the City's evidence supporting 
the Rule's rationale, the Plaintiffs have 
produced scant evidence demonstrating any 
burden placed on their protected rights, and 
nothing which describes a substantial burden 
on those rights. The Plaintiffs have submitted 
individual affidavits expressing their desire 
to travel to additional locations with their 
handguns, and their decision not to 
participate in certain shooting competitions 
outside of the City. But, as we have stated, 
the Plaintiffs are still free to participate in 
those shooting competitions with a rented 
firearm, and to obtain licenses for handguns 
in their second homes, and the Plaintiffs have 
presented no evidence indicating that this 
understanding is mistaken. Additionally, the 
Plaintiffs present no evidence that the firing 
ranges that they wish to access outside the 
City are significantly less expensive or more 
accessible than those in the City. Even if the 
Plaintiffs did provide this evidence, they 
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would still need to demonstrate that 
practicing with one's own handgun provides 
better training than practicing with a rented 
gun of like model, and the Plaintiffs fail to 
even assert this fact. 
 
In light of the City's evidence that the Rule 
was specifically created to protect public 
safety and to limit the presence of firearms, 
licensed only to specific premises, on City 
streets, and the dearth of evidence presented 
by the Plaintiffs in support of their arguments 
that the Rule imposes substantial burdens on 
their protected rights, we find that the City 
has met its burden of showing a substantial fit 
between the Rule and the City's interest in 
promoting public safety. 
 
Constitutional review of state and local gun 
control will often involve difficult balancing 
of the individual's constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms against the states' obligation to 
"prevent armed mayhem in public places." 
This is not such a case. The City has a clear 
interest in protecting public safety through 
regulating the possession of firearms  in 
public, and has adduced "evidence that fairly 
supports [the] rationale" behind the Rule. The 
burdens imposed by the Rule do not 
substantially affect the exercise of 
core Second Amendment rights, and the Rule 
makes a contribution to an important state 
interest in public safety substantial enough to 
easily justify the insignificant and indirect 
costs it imposes on Second 
Amendment interests. Accordingly, Rule 5-
23 survives intermediate scrutiny. 
 
II. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate 
the Commerce Clause. 
 
The Plaintiffs next argue that Rule 5-
23 violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it hinders interstate 
commerce. However,  the Supreme Court has 
"recogniz[ed] that incidental burdens on 
interstate commerce may be unavoidable 
when a State legislates to safeguard the health 
and safety of its people."  Our inquiry "must 
be directed to determining whether [the 
challenged statute] is basically a protectionist 
measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed 
as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, 
with effects upon interstate commerce that 
are only incidental." We laid out the 
framework for this inquiry in Town of 
Southold v. Town of East Hampton: 
 
In analyzing a challenged local law 
under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, we first determine whether it 
clearly discriminates against 
interstate commerce in favor of 
intrastate commerce, or whether it 
regulates evenhandedly with only 
incidental effects on interstate 
commerce. . . . We then apply the 
appropriate level of scrutiny. A law 
that clearly discriminates against 
interstate commerce in favor of 
intrastate commerce is virtually 
invalid per se and will survive only if 
it is demonstrably justified by a valid 
factor unrelated to economic 
protectionism. A law that only 
incidentally burdens interstate 
commerce is subject to the more 
permissive balancing test under Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., and will be 
struck down if the burden imposed on 
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interstate commerce clearly exceeds 
the putative local gains. 
 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule 
discriminates against interstate commerce by 
prohibiting them "from engaging in the 
interstate commercial activity of traveling 
with their handguns to patronize firing ranges 
in states beyond the borders of New York 
City." "A clearly discriminatory law may 
operate in three ways: (1) by discriminating 
against interstate commerce on its face; (2) 
by harboring a discriminatory purpose; or (3) 
by discriminating in its effect." In our view, 
the Rule does not offend in any of these ways. 
 
The Rule does not facially discriminate 
against interstate commerce, as it does not 
prohibit a premises licensee from patronizing 
an out-of-state firing range or going to out-
of-state shooting competitions. The Plaintiffs 
are free to patronize firing ranges outside of 
New York City, and outside of New York 
State; they simply cannot do so with their 
premises-licensed firearm. 
 
The Plaintiffs also present no evidence that 
the purpose of the New York City rule was to 
serve as a protectionist measure in favor of 
the City's firing-range industry. To the 
contrary, as discussed above, the Rule is 
designed to protect the health and safety of 
the City's residents. It is therefore directed to 
legitimate local concerns, with only 
incidental effects upon interstate commerce. 
 
Finally, the Plaintiffs have not convinced us 
that the Rule violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause by creating a discriminatory effect on 
interstate commerce. We note, first, that the 
Plaintiffs have offered no evidence of 
discriminatory effect aside from their 
statements that they, personally, have 
"refrained from attending any shooting 
events with [their] handgun[s] that take place 
outside of the City of New York." They do 
not assert, for example, that they have 
refrained from attending all shooting events 
outside the City; they aver only that (in 
compliance with the Rule) they have 
refrained from attending such events with 
their premises-licensed handguns. 
Even if we were to assume for the sake of 
argument, however, that the Plaintiffs have 
offered sufficient evidence of a 
discriminatory effect to raise a substantial 
dormant Commerce Clause question, we 
would nonetheless conclude that the Rule is 
"demonstrably justified by a valid factor 
unrelated to economic protectionism."  The 
Plaintiffs themselves offer a useful 
comparison, arguing that the Rule functions 
in the same way as a law requiring New York 
City residents to use their tennis rackets only 
at in-City tennis courts. Of course, tennis 
rackets present none of the public safety risks 
that firearms do, and against which states 
have a legitimate interest in protecting 
themselves. Thus, there could be no public 
health justification for a law limiting the 
transportation of tennis rackets, whereas here 
the Rule clearly focuses on minimizing the 
risks of gun violence and "prevent[ing] 
armed mayhem in public places.” While such 
a justification might theoretically be shown 
to be pretextual, the Plaintiffs have provided 
no evidence that the true intent or function of 
the Rule was protectionist. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Rule does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce.  
 682 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that Rule 
5-23 has an impermissible extraterritorial 
effect because it attempts to control 
economic activity that is fully outside of New 
York City. But Rule 5-23 does not govern 
extraterritorial conduct in any way. As noted 
above, the Plaintiffs are free to patronize out-
of-state firing ranges and to use firearms for 
target practice or competitive sporting events 
anywhere in the country or beyond; they 
simply may not transport the firearm licensed 
to them for possession at a particular New 
York premises to such locations. To the 
extent that the Rule has any effect on conduct 
occurring outside the City, "[t]he mere fact 
that state action may have repercussions 
beyond state lines is of no judicial 
significance so long as the action is not within 
that domain which the Constitution 
forbids." An ordinance may be 
unconstitutional when it regulates commerce 
that takes place fully outside its borders.  But 
"the Commerce Clause's ban on 
extraterritorial regulation must be applied 
carefully so as not to invalidate many state 
laws that have permissible extraterritorial 
effects."  Here, the Rule directly governs only 
activity within New York City, in order to 
protect the safety of the City's residents. Any 
extraterritorial impact is incidental to this 
purpose and thus "is of no judicial 
significance."  
 
III. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the Right 
to Travel. 
 
The Plaintiffs next invoke the constitutional 
right to travel interstate. "The constitutional 
right to travel from one State to another, and 
necessarily to use the highways and other 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in 
doing so, occupies a position fundamental to 
the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right 
that has been firmly established and 
repeatedly recognized." This Court has 
"acknowledge[d] a correlative constitutional 
right to travel within a state." However, that 
local regulations "[m]erely hav[e] an effect 
on travel is not sufficient to raise an issue of 
constitutional dimension."  The 
constitutional right is implicated only when 
the statute "actually deters such travel, or 
when impedance of travel is its primary 
objective, or when it uses any classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right.” 
 
The Plaintiffs' right to travel argument fails 
for much the same reasons as does their 
parallel invocation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Nothing in the Rule prevents the 
Plaintiffs from engaging in intrastate or 
interstate travel as they wish. The Plaintiffs 
may go where they like, and in particular may 
attend and participate in shooting 
tournaments or similar events held outside 
the City of New York. The regulation 
concerns only their ability to remove the 
specific handgun licensed to their 
residences from the premises for which they 
hold the license. The Constitution protects 
the right to travel, not the right to travel 
armed. 
 
The Rule was not designed to impede 
interstate travel and the history behind it 
"demonstrates that its purpose was not to 
impede travel but to protect the welfare of 
[city] residents." Nor does the Rule impose a 
significant disincentive to travel, any more 
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than any other regulation that limits the 
possession in one jurisdiction of items that 
may be more broadly permitted in 
another. Any incidental impact on travel does 
not create a constitutional violation because 
"[i]f every infringement on interstate travel 
violates the traveler's fundamental 
constitutional rights, any governmental act 
that limits the ability to travel interstate, such 
as placing a traffic light before an interstate 
bridge, would raise a constitutional 
issue." State and local regulations that have 
an indirect effect on some travel impose 
merely "minor restrictions on travel [that] 
simply do not amount to the denial of a 
fundamental right."  
 
IV. Rule 5-23 Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment. 
 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Rule violates 
their First Amendment right to expressive 
association by (1) curtailing their ability 
to join the gun club of their choice and (2) 
forcing them to join a gun club in New York 
City. We disagree. 
 
The Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how the 
ability to join a specific gun club, or the 
ability to transport their licensed firearms to 
a shooting club outside of New York City, 
qualifies as expressive association. " The 
Constitution does not recognize a generalized 
right of social association. The right 
generally will not apply, for example, to 
business relationships; chance encounters in 
dance halls; or paid rendezvous with 
escorts."  "It is possible to find some kernel 
of expression in almost every activity a 
person undertakes - for example, walking 
down the street or meeting one's friends at a 
shopping mall - but such a kernel is not 
sufficient to bring the activity within the 
protection of the First 
Amendment.” "Typically a person 
possessing a gun has no intent to convey a 
particular message, nor is any particular 
message likely to be understood by those who 
view it."  The Plaintiffs fail to identify what 
expressive activity they would engage in with 
their guns and argue instead that they seek 
"participation in recreational and competitive 
shooting events." Gathering with others for a 
purely social and recreational activity, 
whether it is dancing, Sanitation & Recycling 
Indus., or shooting guns, does not constitute 
expressive association under the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the ability to join 
a specific gun club is not protected 
association under the First Amendment. 
 
Even if we were to assume that engaging in 
firearms training or competition qualifies as 
expressive association, as repeatedly 
discussed above, the Plaintiffs are not 
prevented from engaging in such activities, 
wherever or with whomever they choose to 
do so. 
 
First, nothing in the Rule forbids the 
Plaintiffs from joining and associating with 
gun clubs outside the City. The Plaintiffs 
claim that the Rule "impedes their right to 
associate with whom they choose," but the 
Rule does nothing of the sort. The Plaintiffs 
remain free to associate with whomever they 
choose. They may join any club they like 
outside of New York City. To the extent that 
the gun clubs the Plaintiffs wish to join "take 
positions on public questions or perform any 
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of the other similar activities" characteristic 
of expressive association, the Plaintiffs are 
not inhibited from joining in those activities. 
The Rule limits only their ability to carry the 
handgun that is licensed for a specific 
premises outside of those premises. 
 
The Plaintiffs also contend that the Rule 
constitutes "forced association" because it 
"effectively coerce[s]" them to join clubs that 
they "may prefer not to join." That "effective" 
coercion is not coercion at all: the Rule does 
not require the Plaintiffs to join a gun club in 
New York City. The licensing scheme does 
not require the Plaintiffs to complete firearms 
training, and even if it did, they have access 
to Olinville Arms, which is open to the 
public, and the Richmond Boro Gun Club, 
which is available to non-members for 
weekly shooting competitions. 
 
Regardless, the Plaintiffs are incorrect that 
there is any constitutional injury at stake in 
the question of "membership" in a firing 
range or gun club. As noted above, the 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that their 
firearms training is expressive association, 
and actually concede that it is recreational 
activity. Moreover, the decision of whether to 
charge a membership fee or a fee based on 
hourly usage is a business decision of the club 
or range. The Plaintiffs have offered no 
evidence that the firing ranges in New York 
City that structure themselves as clubs 
requiring "membership" either engage in (or 
require their members to engage in) 
expressive activity of any kind, let alone 
activity to which the Plaintiffs object. Nor 
have the Plaintiffs shown that these ranges 
have selected their particular fee structures as 
a byproduct of the Rule, or that their fee 
structures reflect any ideological or 
expressive content to which the Plaintiffs, by 
utilizing the range, can be taken as assenting. 
 
Accordingly, the Rule does not violate 




For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the 















“Supreme Court Accepts First Gun Case in Nearly a Decade” 
 
 
The Wall Street Journal  
 
Jess Bravin  
 
January 22, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court waded into the debate 
over gun rights for the first time in nearly a 
decade, agreeing Tuesday to hear a case over 
whether—and to what degree—lawmakers 
can restrict the right to carry guns outside the 
home. 
 
The case, a review of New York City 
regulations that curtail the transportation of 
guns, offers the court’s newly bolstered 
conservative majority an opportunity to 
expand the constitutional right to bear arms 
beyond a pair of decisions that, beginning in 
2008, found the Second Amendment allows 
individuals to keep handguns in the home for 
self-defense. Although New York City’s 
ordinance is unusual—gun advocates behind 
the suit call it an “extreme outlier”—the 
implications could stretch beyond the city’s 
five boroughs. 
 
At issue is “the right to have a gun in public. 
It’s the biggest open question in Second 
Amendment law today,” said Adam Winkler, 
a law professor at the University of 
California, Los Angeles, and author of 
“Gunfight,” a history of firearms regulations. 
 
In other court developments on Tuesday, the 
justices intervened to allow Trump 
administration restrictions on military 
service by transgender individuals to be put 
in place as lower-court proceedings continue. 
Separately, the court took no action for now 
on an administration appeal of 
rulings blocking Republican President 
Trump’s planned cancellation of the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
program, or DACA, an initiative of former 
President Obama, a Democrat, that benefited 
illegal immigrants who came to the U.S. as 
children. 
 
The gun case is expected to be heard in the 
court’s next term, which begins in October as 
the 2020 presidential campaign comes into 
focus. The spotlight is expected to turn to Mr. 
Trump’s two appointees, Justices Neil 
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, who were 
strongly backed by the National Rifle 
Association and other gun advocacy groups. 
These organizations have been frustrated as 
the high court largely ignored lower court 
rulings upholding the vast majority of state 
and local gun regulations. 
 
On a closely divided court, the pivotal vote 
could rest with Chief Justice John Roberts, 
who backed the expansion of gun rights in 
prior opinions but kept silent as other 
conservatives, including Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel Alito, fumed over the 
court’s refusal in recent years to review other 
weapons regulations upheld by lower courts. 
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But the spotlight may shine particularly 
bright on Justice Kavanaugh, whose 
expansive view of gun rights while a lower-
court judge came into play during 
confirmation hearings last fall. In 2011, while 
serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, then-Judge 
Kavanaugh dissented from an opinion 
upholding a D.C. law prohibiting 
semiautomatic rifles it classified as “assault 
weapons” within city limits and barring 
large-capacity ammunition magazines. 
 
The majority opinion by Judge Douglas 
Ginsburg found the D.C. law a justifiable 
policy for “protecting police officers and 
controlling crime.” Judge Kavanaugh, 
however, wrote that “the Constitution 
disables the government from employing 
certain means to prevent, deter, or detect 
violent crime.” 
 
New York City issues two kinds of gun 
licenses, “carry” permits that allow 
individuals to bring along their weapons, and 
“premises” permits that are specific to a 
location. Individuals with premises permits 
can take their weapons from home only for 
limited purposes, such as target practice at a 
shooting range within city limits or to a 
designated in-state hunting area. 
 
“We believe that our gun laws protect people 
in this city, and law enforcement in this city 
believes that, too, so we’ll fight vigorously to 
protect what we have,” said New York City 
Mayor Bill de Blasio, a Democrat, at a 
Tuesday press conference. “I’m absolutely 
concerned because anything that takes away 
our right to protect our own people would 
hurt this city deeply.” 
Tom King, president of the New York Rifle 
& Pistol Association, which brought the 
appeal, characterized the city’s rules as 
almost senseless. “This is more of a restraint-
of-travel case than it is a Second Amendment 
case,” he said. “The city of New York will 
not allow a licensed gun owner to travel 
outside the five boroughs” with a pistol. 
According to the petition, there are seven 
shooting ranges in NYC available to the 
public. Mr. King said hundreds more are 
located in nearby New Jersey and New York 
state. 
 
Last year, the Second U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in New York, upheld the city 
ordinance from a challenge filed by several 
gun owners and the state rifle group, which is 
affiliated with the NRA. 
 
The opinion, by Judge Gerard Lynch, said the 
city provided evidence that its rules promote 
public safety, including an affidavit from a 
police commander that “premises license 
holders ‘are just as susceptible as anyone else 
to stressful situations,’ including driving 
situations that can lead to road rage, ‘crowd 
situations, demonstrations, family disputes,’ 
and other situations ‘where it would be better 
to not have the presence of a firearm.’” 
 
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, gun 
owners argued that the city’s law, while 
predating recent precedents expanding access 
to weapons, exemplified state and local 




“Unable to flatly ban the possession of 
handguns in the home, many 
local governments have responded by 
erecting obstacles to acquiring them,” they 
said. The petition lists other measures they 
consider improper, including a $25 tax on 
firearms sales imposed in Chicago and 
Seattle and a $5 fee California collects from 
gun purchasers to fund police. 
 
The Second Amendment was ratified in 
1791, but it took more than two centuries 
before the Supreme Court, with 
conservatives prevailing in a 5-4 vote along 
ideological lines, found that the right to “keep 
and bear Arms” extended to individuals for 
self-defense, rather than falling within 
service in a state’s “well regulated Militia.” 
 
The 2008 opinion, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, by the late Justice Antonin Scalia, 
struck down an effective ban on handgun 
possession within Washington’s city limits. 
Two years later, in 2010, the court expanded 
that holding beyond the federal enclave to 
limit states’ power to regulate firearms. 
Armed with the Heller precedent, gun-rights 
advocates launched a fusillade against state 
and local weapons regulations, filing more 
than 1,000 lawsuits seeking to expand access 
to guns and ammunition. But lower courts 
found nearly all such measures fell within 
Heller’s allowance for reasonable weapons 
regulations. According to a study published 
last year in the Duke Law Journal Online, less 
than 10% of such challenges prevailed in 
state and federal courts. 
 
A co-author of the study, Duke University 
law professor Joseph Blocher, said lower-
court opinions display “a remarkable amount 
of consistency in how they evaluate gun 
regulations.” Typically, he said, they employ 
a two-part test, first evaluating whether a rule 
burdens a Second Amendment right and, if 
so, whether that burden can be justified. 
 
For jurists, the most important decision the 
high court may make is whether that 
approach passes muster. Justice Kavanaugh, 
for one, has urged a different method, 
focusing instead on whether a law is 
consistent with the “text, history and 
















 “Fearing Supreme Court Loss, New York Tried to Make Gun Case Vanish”   
 
 
The New York Times  
 
Adam Liptak  
 
May 27, 2019 
 
A couple of weeks ago, the New York Police 
Department held an unusual public hearing. 
Its purpose was to make a Supreme Court 
case disappear. 
 
In January, the court agreed to hear a Second 
Amendment challenge to a New York City 
gun regulation. The city, fearing a loss that 
would endanger gun control laws across the 
nation, responded by moving to change the 
regulation. The idea was to make the case 
moot. 
 
The move required seeking comments from 
the public, in writingand at the hearing. Gun 
rights advocates were not happy. 
 
“This law should not be changed,” Hallet 
Bruestle wrote in a comment submitted 
before the hearing. “Not because it is a good 
law; it is blatantly unconstitutional. No, it 
should not be changed since this is a clear 
tactic to try to moot the Scotus case that is 
specifically looking into this law.” 
 
David Enlow made a similar point. “This is a 
very transparent attempt,” he wrote, “to move 
the goal post in the recent Supreme Court 
case.” 
 
The regulation allows residents with so-
called premises licenses to take their guns to 
one of seven shooting ranges in the city. But 
it prohibits them from taking their guns to 
second homes and shooting ranges outside 
the city, even when the guns are unloaded and 
locked in containers separate from 
ammunition. 
 
The city’s proposed changes, likely to take 
effect in a month or so, would remove those 
restrictions. Whether they would also end the 
case is another matter. 
 
Until the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
dispute, the city had defended the regulation 
vigorously and successfully, winning in two 
lower courts. In inviting public comments on 
the proposed changes, the Police Department 
said it continued to believe the regulation 
“furthers an important public-safety interest.” 
 
Still, the city seems determined to give the 
plaintiffs — three city residents and the New 
York State Rifle and Pistol Association — 
everything they had sued for. The plaintiffs, 
in turn, do not seem to want to take yes for an 
answer. 
 
There is a precedent for the city’s strategy, 
from a surprising source. The National Rifle 
Association tried a similar tactic in 
connection with the 2008 Supreme Court 
case that ended up revolutionizing Second 
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Amendment law, District of Columbia v. 
Heller. 
 
The N.R.A. was initially skittish about the 
case, which was brought by a scrappy group 
of libertarian lawyers led by Robert A. Levy. 
 
“The N.R.A.’s interference in this process set 
us back and almost killed the case,” Mr. 
Levy said in 2007. “It was a very 
acrimonious relationship.” 
 
As Mr. Levy and his colleagues were 
persuading a federal appeals court to strike 
down part of Washington’s tough gun control 
law, the N.R.A. tried to short-circuit the case. 
 
“The N.R.A.’s next step was to renew its 
lobbying effort in Congress to repeal the D.C. 
gun ban,” Mr. Levy wrote in 2008 in a 
Federalist Society publication. “Ordinarily 
that would have been a good thing, but not 
this time.” 
 
“Repealing D.C.’s ban would have rendered 
the Heller litigation moot,” he wrote. “After 
all, no one can challenge a law that no longer 
exists.” 
 
Only an intensive countereffort kept the case 
alive, Mr. Levy wrote. 
 
“After expending considerable time and 
energy in the halls of Congress, we were able, 
with help, to frustrate congressional 
consideration of the N.R.A.-sponsored bill,” 
he wrote. 
The N.R.A. came around in the end. In the 
Supreme Court, it supported the suit, working 
closely with the lawyers who had brought it. 
The court’s decision in the Heller case 
established an individual right to own guns, 
imperiling gun control laws around the 
nation. But aside from one follow-up case in 
2010, the court has not elaborated on the 
scope of the right. 
 
With the departure of Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy and the arrival of Justice Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, the court seems ready to start. It 
agreed to hear the New York case, New York 
State Rifle and Pistol Association v. City of 
New York, No. 18-280, just months after 
Justice Kavanaugh joined the court. Unless 
the case is dismissed, it will be argued in the 
fall. 
 
The question of whether the changes to the 
city’s gun regulation will make the case moot 
is a hard one. The city lost an initial skirmish 
at the court last month when the justices 
turned down its request to suspend the filing 
of briefs while changes to the regulation were 
considered. 
 
The plaintiffs opposed that request. “To state 
the obvious, a proposed amendment is not 
law,” they wrote. 
 
The changes to the regulations will happen 
soon enough, though, and the Supreme Court 
will then have to consider whether there is 
anything left to decide. 
 
The court has said the “voluntary cessation” 
of government policies does not make cases 
moot if the government remains free to 
reinstate them after the cases are dismissed. 




To hear the plaintiffs tell it, the court should 
not reward cynical gamesmanship. 
 
“The proposed rule making,” they wrote, 
“appears to be the product not of a change of 
heart, but rather of a carefully calculated 




























“New York eased gun law hopeful Supreme Court would drop Second Amendment 
case – but that hasn’t happened yet” 
 
 




August 11, 2019 
 
As the nation renews debate over gun control, 
the Supreme Court must decide whether to 
press ahead with a Second Amendment case 
it has accepted for the coming term, its first 
in a decade.  
Gun-control groups operate under a no-news-
is-good-news approach to the Supreme 
Court, leery of giving what they view as a 
strengthened conservative majority the 
chance to expand gun rights and weaken 
restrictive laws.  
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Association 
v. City of New York, which the court accepted 
in January, the city and state of New York 
appear to agree. They have essentially 
surrendered, changing the restrictions at issue 
even though the city successfully defended 
them before a district judge and a federal 
appeals court.  
New York says it has given those who hold 
licenses to have guns on their premises 
exactly what they asked for — a greater 
ability to transport their weapons through and 
outside the city — and there no longer is a 
controversy for the Supreme Court to settle.  
“New legislation or regulations giving 
plaintiffs all they seek moots the case,” wrote 
Zachary W. Carter, corporation counsel for 
New York City. He cited Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts Jr.’s dissenting opinion on a 
mootness question in an unrelated case in 
2016, in which he said the court may not rule 
on a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief simply 
because he “won’t take ‘yes’ for an answer.’”  
Those who brought the challenge said the city 
should not be allowed to get rid of the case 
and the constitutional questions it raises by 
making a last-minute change after years of 
resistance.  
The court has told both sides to continue 
filing briefs and that it will consider New 
York’s request to dismiss the case on Oct. 1, 
a week before the new term begins.  
Any Supreme Court decision on guns will be 
magnified in a presidential election year and 
with the backdrop of the mass shootings that 
have plagued the country. Whether the recent 
attacks in El Paso and Dayton, Ohio, will 
affect the justices’ decision is anyone’s 
guess, experts say.  
“They’re human beings and this can’t help 
but color a little bit how they see this case,” 
said Adam Winkler, a UCLA law professor 
who has written extensively about Second 
Amendment litigation.  
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On how to decide when a case is moot, he 
said, “I think the Supreme Court has enough 
wiggle room to go in either direction.”  
The New York restrictions were unique — no 
other jurisdiction has such strict rules on 
transporting a weapon. But the case is 
significant because it marked the first 
accepted challenge since the Supreme Court 
recognized an individual right to gun 
ownership in 2008’s District of Columbia v. 
Heller and ruled two years later that the 
Second Amendment governed state and local 
gun laws as well as those adopted by the 
federal government.  
Since then, the court has declined to hear 
challenges to all manner of gun-control 
measures, such as bans on certain military-
style weapons and state restrictions that make 
it extremely difficult to obtain a permit to 
carry a gun outside the home.  
In some cases, it has upheld gun restrictions, 
prompting complaints chiefly from Justice 
Clarence Thomas about the way his 
colleagues consider the Second Amendment. 
“We treat no other constitutional right so 
cavalierly,” he wrote in 2016.  
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch has joined Thomas 
in saying the court should take more Second 
Amendment cases. But the momentum really 
has increased since Justice Brett M. 
Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy last year.  
Kennedy was part of the five-member Heller 
majority, but his vote was a shaky one, 
according to the late justice John Paul 
Stevens’s memoir. Stevens said he believed 
Kennedy insisted on language in the opinion 
that has been cited by lower courts in 
upholding state and municipal restrictions.  
Kavanaugh, by contrast, was strongly 
endorsed by the National Rifle Association. 
In 2011, as a judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, he dissented 
from a decision upholding the District’s ban 
on some semiautomatic rifles and a gun 
registration requirement.  
He reasoned that while the Heller decision 
agreed that government may prohibit 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons not in 
common use, the guns at issue did not meet 
that definition.  
“It follows from Heller’s protection of semi-
automatic handguns that semi-automatic 
rifles are also constitutionally protected and 
that D.C.’s ban on them is unconstitutional,” 
Kavanaugh wrote.  
New York’s approach to get rid of the case is 
similar to what some gun-control advocates 
had hoped the city of Washington would have 
done with its restrictive handgun policy that 
led to the Heller decision. The District’s 
mayor at the time, Adrian Fenty, decided to 
press ahead after the D.C. Circuit ruled 
against the city, resulting with the Supreme 
Court finding an individual right to gun 
ownership for protection in one’s home.  
The gun violence reform movement thought 
D.C. should amend the law rather than take it 
to the Supreme Court, Winkler said. “The 
result was disastrous for them,” he said.  
If the court proceeds with the New York case, 
it could decide it very narrowly, or it could 
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resolve long-standing questions about the 
right to a gun outside the home.  
The New York gun association, represented 
by Paul D. Clement, who was solicitor 
general during the George W. Bush 
administration, said the city’s “undisguised 
effort to avoid a precedent-setting loss and to 
frustrate this court’s discretionary review 
falls short by every measure.”  
The city battled for years and relented only 
when the Supreme Court took the case, the 
association argues. New York officials said 
the gun owners should simply acknowledge 
that they won.  
“A primary purpose of litigation like this [is] 
to pressure the governmental actors to agree 
to a demand,” the city wrote. “All that matters 
is whether the plaintiffs’ purported injuries 
have been redressed. If so, there is no longer 
a case or controversy.”  
If the court decides there is no longer a reason 
to hear the New York case, there are others in 
the wings. 
Some more clearly present the issue of the 
right to carry a weapon outside the home. 
There are still legal challenges to President 
Trump’s  
decision to ban bump stocks. There is a case 
challenging California’s Unsafe Handgun 
Act.  
Recently, Remington Arms asked the court to 
review a Connecticut Supreme Court ruling 
that a lawsuit brought against the company by 
a survivor and relatives of victims of the 
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting 
could go forward. The company says it is 





















 “NRA, gun rights group using New York City rule to seek expansion of Second 
Amendment in Supreme Court” 
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Gun rights groups are using New York City 
restrictions that may be repealed as a rallying 
cry to press the Supreme Court for a 
major expansion of its Second Amendment 
precedents. 
The effort is based on the hope that the 
court's new, five-member conservative 
majority will be more sympathetic to gun 
rights, in much the same way that anti-
abortion groups are hoping for a high court 
crackdown on reproductive rights. 
Conservatives' efforts extend beyond guns 
and abortion to other pet peeves, such as 
affirmative action and immigrant rights. In all 
of those areas, activists are pushing lawsuits 
in the court's direction with renewed vigor. 
While most of the legal action began before 
President Donald Trump's thus far successful 
effort to appoint conservative judges to 
federal courts – including Associate Justices 
Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court – the chances for victory have 
vastly improved. 
“People who want to have test cases and 
advance a certain legal agenda were 
definitely emboldened by Donald Trump's 
election and his ability to appoint two 
justices," says Ilya Shapiro of the libertarian 
Cato Institute.  
It's been more than a decade since the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Second 
Amendment protects the right of citizens to 
keep guns at home for self-defense. The 
justices later extended that right to states and 
localities. 
But Associate Justice Antonin Scalia's most 
famous opinion in District of Columbia v. 
Heller never defined the breadth of that right. 
He acknowledged the ruling did not uphold 
“a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and 
for whatever purpose." 
Gun rights groups, led by the National Rifle 
Association, have sought for years to win the 
next battle: a broad right to carry weapons 
outside the home. Forty-five states allow that 
to some degree, though 15 require special 
licenses or permits. But several large states, 
including California, Florida, Illinois and 
New York, have prohibitions. 
The high court has refused for nearly a 
decade to jump back into the gun debate, 
declining at least eight opportunities in recent 
years. It let stand Chicago's semiautomatic 
weapons ban and a variety of prohibitions 
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against carrying guns in public, from New 
Jersey to California. It refused to second-
guess age limits for carrying guns in Texas 
and rules for disabling or locking guns when 
not in use in San Francisco. 
Now gun rights groups hope Kavanaugh's 
replacement of Associate Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, the court's swing vote, could turn 
the tide. 
"The NRA and the challengers won’t be 
satisfied if New York repeals its law," says 
Adam Winkler, a UCLA School of Law 
professor and author of a  book on the gun 
rights battle. "They want the Supreme Court 
to step in and announce stronger protections 
for gun rights under the Second 
Amendment." 
City moves to repeal rules 
Already, the court has scheduled the New 
York City case for next fall. The city's rules 
generally block gun owners with possession 
licenses from transporting their guns outside 
the home, except to one of seven shooting 
ranges inside city limits. The guns must be 
unloaded and locked up, with ammunition 
carried separately. 
Gun owners who sought to take their firearms 
to second homes or shooting ranges outside 
the city challenged the rules in federal court, 
but they were upheld last year by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  
Sensing a losing hand at the Supreme Court, 
gun control groups urged the city to change 
its rules in hopes a quick surrender would 
prompt the justices to drop the case. The 
city's police department held a public hearing 
last week on proposed changes that would 
allow travel outside the city. A decision is 
expected within weeks. 
But gun rights groups argued in court papers 
this month that the justices should not dismiss 
the case even if the restrictions are lifted. 
Instead, they urged an expansion of Second 
Amendment rights. 
"The historical understanding of the right to 
keep and bear arms removes any remaining 
doubt that it extends outside the home," 
the NRA said. 
"The primary need for self defense, 
unquestionably protected by the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments, is typically not in 
the home but outside of the home," attorneys 
general from 24 Republican-led states said. 
They noted that only about one in five violent 
crimes occurs at home. 
The New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Association, which brought the case against 
the city, accused it of a "nakedly transparent 
effort to evade this court’s review" by 
moving to ease the restrictions. The Cato 
Institute warned that the rules could be 
changed "just long enough for the case to be 
dismissed." 
But Winkler notes the challengers only 
sought an injunction to stop New York's law 
from being enforced. If it's repealed, he says, 
"the case should be moot, because the 
challengers will have effectively won."  
Trump administration takes stand 
The Trump administration also urged the 
court to strike down the New York City rules 
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by following the "text, history and tradition" 
of the Second Amendment and gun rights and 
regulations. But in a more conciliatory pose, 
Solicitor General Noel Francisco said 
challengers "do not seek a right to transport 
loaded handguns for self-defense in public." 
Kavanaugh's addition to the court in October 
may have given the other conservatives the 
vote they need to win future cases. As a 
federal appeals court judge, he dissented in 
2011 from a decision upholding the District 
of Columbia's ban on semi-automatic rifles, 
insisting that courts should use the "text, 
history and tradition" test. 
Several gun control groups didn't wait for 
New York City's response, due at the court in 
August. Instead, they filed briefs this month 
"in support of neither party" to urge that the 
justices avoid a broad constitutional ruling 
that expands Second Amendment rights, 
particularly since the city is moving to 
change its rules. 
"Our concern is that petitioners are asking the 
court to issue a broad ruling that would entitle 
people to carry loaded firearms in public to 
use in armed confrontation," says Jonathan 
Lowy, chief counsel at the Brady 
Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. "That 
would have a broad effect on a wide array of 
gun laws around the country." 
The Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence similarly sidestepped taking a 
position on New York City's law. Instead, it 
urged the justices to avoid "adopting a 
standard that would preclude sensible 
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Amendment has become ‘a second-class right.’” 
 
 




January 3, 2019 
A specter is haunting the Supreme Court — 
disrespect for the Second Amendment. 
Perhaps you haven’t realized that the 
Supreme Court’s disinclination to expand on 
its landmark 2008 decision creating an 
individual right to gun ownership means that 
the justices are treating the Second 
Amendment as a “second-class right.” A 
“watered-down right.” A “disfavored right.” 
If you are unaware of these outlandish 
claims, then you haven’t tuned into the rising 
chorus of judicial voices demanding more 
from the Supreme Court than gun fanciers 
already won in that intensely disputed 5-to-4 
decision a decade ago, District of Columbia 
v. Heller. 
Why is this happening, and why now? To 
understand why the “second-class right” 
meme is suddenly penetrating the judicial 
conversation, we have to begin with Justice 
Clarence Thomas. He is not the first member 
of the current Supreme Court to use the 
phrase; Justice Samuel Alito Jr. used it in his 
2010 opinion that extended the analysis of the 
Heller decision, which had applied only to 
Washington, D.C., as a federal enclave, to the 
states. The court was being asked, Justice 
Alito wrote in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
“to treat the right recognized in Heller as a 
second-class right,” which he said the court 
would not do. 
But it is Justice Thomas who has taken up the 
phrase as a weapon, using it in a series of 
opinions over the past four years to accuse his 
colleagues of failing in their duty to keep 
pushing back against limitations on gun 
ownership and use. The opinions were all 
dissents from the court’s decisions not to hear 
particular gun-rights appeals. 
In 2015, for example, he wrote that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit had been wrong to uphold an 
Illinois city’s ban on assault weapons, and 
that by refusing to hear the appeal, his 
colleagues had failed to “prevent the Seventh 
Circuit from relegating the Second 
Amendment to a second-class right.” 
Last year, objecting to the court’s decision 
not to hear a challenge to California’s 10-day 
waiting period for gun purchases, Justice 
Thomas mused that “I suspect that four 
members of this court would vote to review a 
10-day waiting period for abortions.” He 
declared, “The right to keep and bear arms is 
apparently this court’s constitutional 
orphan.” 
In another opinion, this time joined by Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, Justice Thomas said it was 
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“indefensible” and “untenable” for the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have 
upheld California’s ban on carrying 
concealed weapons. By turning down the 
appeal, he wrote, the justices were enabling 
“the treatment of the Second Amendment as 
a disfavored right.” And in a remarkable 
concluding paragraph to his eight-page 
opinion, he added: 
“For those of us who work in marbled halls, 
guarded constantly by a vigilant and 
dedicated police force, the guarantees of the 
Second Amendment might seem antiquated 
and superfluous. But the Framers made a 
clear choice: They reserved to all Americans 
the right to bear arms for self-defense. I do 
not think we should stand by idly while a 
state denies its citizens that right, particularly 
when their very lives may depend on it.” 
By calling attention to Justice Thomas’s 
Second Amendment crusade, I want to make 
four points. 
First, he’s simply wrong. The court decided 
Heller to vindicate what the majority 
described as a “core” Second Amendment 
right — the right of an individual to keep a 
handgun at home for self-defense. That’s all. 
Whatever else the Second Amendment 
enables people to do with their guns was left 
open. As Justice Antonin Scalia observed in 
his majority opinion, “It is not a right to keep 
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any 
manner whatsoever and for whatever 
purpose.” 
Maybe Justice Scalia included that and a few 
other disclaimers in order to stay within the 
comfort zone of a member of his narrowest of 
majorities, probably Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy. Or maybe he was just kicking the 
can down the road. In any event, it’s certainly 
not the case that justices who decline to 
overturn a 10-day waiting period can be 
accurately labeled hypocrites who are content 
to hide in their marble palace while leaving 
the populace unprotected. 
Nor is the Second Amendment absolutism 
that Justice Thomas is calling for reflected in 
the way the Supreme Court interprets most 
other constitutional guarantees. Judge Bruce 
Selya of the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit made this point in a majority opinion 
in November rejecting a challenge to a 
provision of the Massachusetts gun licensing 
statute. “Even though the Second 
Amendment right is fundamental,” Judge 
Selya, an appointee of President Ronald 
Reagan, wrote in his opinion for a unanimous 
panel, “the plaintiffs have offered us no valid 
reason to treat it more deferentially than other 
important constitutional rights.” That 
decision, Gould v. Morgan, will shortly 
be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
My second point is to underscore the role 
Justice Thomas plays in creating this 
rhetorical tidal wave. He is a Federalist 
Society icon and a hero to many young 
conservative lawyers, including the 10 
former Thomas law clerks whom President 
Trump has already appointed to federal 
judgeships. (A dozen other former Thomas 
clerks hold important nonjudicial positions in 
the administration.) They and their 
colleagues among the new Trump judges, 
many of whom clerked for other conservative 
justices, are the ones who are making the 
“second-class right” mantra a standard 
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feature of any Second Amendment dissent — 
in other words, not only that a particular 
majority opinion is incorrect, but that it is part 
of a dangerous trend that the Supreme Court, 
by implication if not explicitly, needs to 
address right now. 
For example, the full 15-member Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently refused 
to reconsider a decision by a three-judge 
panel to uphold the longstanding federal ban 
on interstate sales of handguns. Dissenting 
from that refusal, Judge James C. Ho, a 
former Thomas clerk who joined the Fifth 
Circuit last year, cited Justice Thomas’s 
opinions in observing, “Yet the Second 
Amendment continues to be treated as a 
‘second-class’ right.” 
His dissent included a subtle dig at Chief 
Justice John Roberts, who notably has not 
joined Justice Thomas’s Second Amendment 
choir. The government rationale for the ban 
on interstate handgun sales is that while 
federally licensed firearm dealers can be 
expected to know the laws of their own state, 
they may not be familiar with laws of other 
states and so may not know whether an out-
of-state purchaser is legally entitled to own a 
gun. 
That is not sufficient justification for the ban, 
Judge Ho wrote; if dealers could learn their 
own state’s laws, they could learn other 
states’ laws as well. “Put simply, the way to 
require compliance with state handgun laws 
is to require compliance with state handgun 
laws,” he wrote in a riff on the chief justice’s 
much-discussed line in a 2007 school 
integration case: “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.” 
Judge Ho’s Fifth Circuit colleague Don R. 
Willett, another new member of the court, 
observed in his own dissenting opinion in the 
same case, “The Second Amendment is 
neither second class, nor second rate, nor 
second tier.” An appeal in that case, Mance v. 
Whitaker, is now pending at the Supreme 
Court, and the justices will decide this month 
or next whether to accept it. 
Another new judge, Stephanos Bibas, 
dissented last month from a decision by a 
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit that upheld a New Jersey law limiting 
a firearm magazine to 10 rounds of 
ammunition. He said the state had failed to 
provide sufficient evidence that “specifically 
links large magazines to mass-shooting 
deaths.” Acknowledging that five other 
federal circuit courts have also upheld limits 
on magazine sizes, Judge Bibas observed that 
while judges were understandably concerned 
about gun violence, “they err in subjecting 
the Second Amendment to different, 
watered-down rules and demanding little if 
any proof.” 
“The Second Amendment is an equal part of 
the Bill of Rights,” Judge Bibas wrote. “We 
may not water it down and balance it away 
based on our own sense of wise policy.” That 
case is likely to be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The New Jersey affiliate of the 
National Rifle Association, which brought 
the case, is first seeking review by the full 
Third Circuit. 
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The 49-year-old Judge Bibas, a former law 
professor, won plauditsfor his dissenting 
opinion. “It is easy to see why President 
Trump chose to appoint him,” said an article 
on the website ammoland.com that appeared 
under the headline: “Third Circuit: Second 
Amendment Is a Second Rate Right.” John O. 
McGinnis, a well-known conservative 
professor at Northwestern University Law 
School, writing on the Law and Liberty 
website, called Judge Bibas’s dissent “the 
judicial equivalent of a perfect game, a first-
round knockout, or a checkmate within 10 
moves.” He added, “It will not be the last 
opinion of the Trump appellate judges that 
will shake the judiciary from its dogmatic 
slumber.” 
My third point is this: Professor McGinniss 
may well be right, at least when it comes to 
the Second Amendment. The substitution of 
Brett Kavanaugh for Justice Kennedy may do 
the trick. On his former court, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
Justice Kavanaugh took an aggressive gun-
rights position, dissenting in 2011 from a 
decision that upheld the district’s ban on 
certain assault rifles. 
Calling the majority’s analytical approach to 
the case “especially inappropriate,” then-
Judge Kavanaugh wrote: “A ban on a class of 
arms is not an ‘incidental’ regulation. It is 
equivalent to a ban on a category of speech.” 
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, I 
understand his argument: that a right deemed 
by the Supreme Court to be fundamental, 
whether under the First Amendment or the 
Second, is entitled to the highest level of 
judicial protection. Nonetheless, to analogize 
possession of assault rifles to the right to free 
speech is a provocative move. 
The two conservative judges who made up 
the majority on the three-judge panel, 
Douglas Ginsburg and Karen LeCraft 
Henderson, were sufficiently provoked by 
Judge Kavanaugh’s 52-page dissent that they 
added to their own opinion an unusual six-
page “appendix” for the specific purpose of 
contesting his arguments. “The dissent 
mischaracterizes the question before us,” 
Judge Ginsburg wrote for himself and Judge 
Henderson. “We simply do not read Heller as 
foreclosing every ban on every possible sub-
class of handguns or, for that matter, a ban on 
a sub-class of rifles.” 
Justice Thomas himself has cited Judge 
Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion favorably. It 
would hardly be surprising for Justice 
Kavanaugh to return the favor and join the 
crusade. 
And that brings me to my final point. The 
Supreme Court’s appetite for expanding the 
Second Amendment, if such an appetite 
develops, will be wildly out of sync with the 
mood of the country. As The Times reported 
last month, based on data compiled by a gun-
control advocacy group, public support for 
gun-control measures is surging. State 
legislatures passed 69 gun-control measures 
in 2018, more than three times the number in 
the previous year. More than half the states 
enacted at least one, while 90 percent of bills 
the National Rifle Association backed at the 
state level were defeated. 
Even the Trump administration has caught 
the trend, with its announcement last month 
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of a ban on bump stocks, the cheap 
attachments that turn ordinary rifles into 
something close to machine guns and that the 
Las Vegas killer used to commit mass murder 
a year ago. The ban, to take effect in March, 
has already drawn at least two lawsuits. 
Perhaps these lawsuits will be a step too far 
even for the Second Amendment newbies on 
the federal bench. Or maybe not. 
Does it matter if the public and the Supreme 
Court are running in opposite directions? It’s 
good news to anyone who would like to 
accelerate the collapse of public confidence 
in the one organ of government that at the 
moment seems to stand between us and 
disaster. For the rest of us, it’s one more thing 
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President Donald Trump said Monday the 
National Rifle Association is “under siege by 
Cuomo,” days after New York’s attorney 
general opened an inquiry into the gun rights 
lobbying organization. 
The president also chided the group for a 
leadership fight that has played out in public 
in recent days, saying the NRA “must get its 
act together quickly, stop the internal 
fighting, & get back to GREATNESS - 
FAST!” 
The president’s comments follow the news 
that New York Attorney General Letitia 
James opened an investigation into the group, 
including ordering the preservation of 
internal documents. James said during her 
campaign that she intended to look into the 
New York-chartered group’s nonprofit 
status. 
“The NRA should leave and fight from the 
outside of this very difficult to deal with 
(unfair) State!” the president wrote in a 
subsequent tweet. 
The chaos gripping the NRA spilled into 
public view last week in the midst of its 
annual convention in Indiana, where both 
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence 
delivered remarks. 
Shortly after Trump spoke to the group, The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the NRA’s 
longtime leader, Wayne LaPierre, had 
informed the board that he was being extorted 
and pressured to resign by retired Lt. Col. 
Oliver North, another top NRA official. 
LaPierre wrote in a letter to the 
organization’s board that North was 
threatening to make public “destructive” 
embarrassing information about him and the 
NRA’s financial dealings. 
On Saturday, North announced that he will 
not serve a second term as the group’s 
president. The Iran-Contra figure wrote in a 
letter to NRA members on Saturday that the 
organization faced a “clear crisis” and that, if 
the allegations about financial 
mismanagement were true, “the NRA’s 
nonprofit status is threatened.” 
James’ office has gone after the president’s 
own nonprofit, the Donald J. Trump 
Foundation. The foundation agreed to 
dissolve under judicial supervision last year 
after state’s previous attorney general, 
Barbara Underwood, accused it of “a 
shocking pattern of illegality,” and said her 
office would pursue further investigations. 
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In a March filing, James wrote that the 
foundation broke “some of the most basic 
laws” related to private foundations. Her 
office is seeking nearly $3 million in 
restitution from the foundation. 
Trump foundation attorneys have denied the 
allegations and accused officials in the 
heavily Democratic state of having political 
motivations. 
New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo, a 
Democrat, recently opened up his formidable 
financial support network to Democratic 
presidential contender Joe Biden, the former 
vice president, who is the early front runner 
in the primary race that will determine which 
candidate faces off against Trump in 2020. 
In a statement, Cuomo fired back against the 
president’s tweet. 
“Unlike you, President Trump, New York is 
not afraid to stand up to the NRA. I will 
continue to fight for the children of this state. 
As for the NRA, we’ll remember them in our 
thoughts and prayers,” he said. 
And James’s office said in a statement that 
“we will follow the facts wherever they may 
lead.” 
“We wish the President would share our 
























Jonathan Stempel  
February 23, 2018 
 
A federal appeals court on Friday rejected a 
gun rights group’s constitutional challenge to 
strict New York City limits on how licensed 
handgun owners may use their weapons 
outside the home.  
By a 3-0 vote, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Manhattan said the restrictions on 
people who have licenses to have guns at 
home, known as “premises” licenses, did not 
violate the Second Amendment.  
Backed by the National Rifle Association, 
three gun owners and the New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Association had sought 
permission for holders of premises licenses to 
take guns to shooting ranges outside New 
York City, or other homes in New York 
state.  
Though license holders could take unloaded 
guns to seven ranges within the city, the 
plaintiffs said the city’s restrictions amounted 
to a “near-complete ban” on gun transport.  
Premises licenses are different from “carry” 
licenses, which give holders broader freedom 
to take guns outside the home.  
Writing for the appeals court, Circuit Judge 
Gerard Lynch said the restrictions advanced 
the city’s “substantial, indeed compelling” 
interests in protecting public safety and 
preventing crime, by regulating firearms 
possession in public.  
Lynch said that was enough to “easily justify 
the insignificant and indirect costs” imposed 
on gun owners’ rights, despite a 2008 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to 
own guns.  
The appeals court also rejected claims that 
the city impeded interstate commerce, and 
violated the plaintiffs’ right to travel and First 
Amendment right to “expressive 
association.”  
Neither the Rifle & Pistol Association nor its 
lawyer immediately responded to requests for 
comment.  
“We are pleased the court upheld this 
important rule,” said Nick Paolucci, a 
spokesman for the city’s law department. 
“Limiting public transport of handguns 
licensed for home possession makes us all 
safer.”  
The decision was issued 1-1/2 years after oral 
arguments. 
It upheld a February 2015 ruling by U.S. 
District Judge Robert Sweet in Manhattan.  
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Sweet wrote that there were at the time more 
than 40,000 active handgun licenses in the 
city.  
The case is New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Association Inc et al v. City of New York et 

































































Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue 
 
Ruling Below: Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 2018 MT 306 (Mont. 2018). 
 
Overview: The Montana Supreme Court struck down a Montana law that created tax credits to 
provide scholarships for families who sent their children to private schools, including religious 
ones. The Court claimed that this violated the Constitution because it favored religious institutions. 
This petition was filed by three low-income mothers who used the scholarships to send their 
children to a Christian school. 
 
Issue: Whether it violates the religion clauses or the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution to invalidate a generally available and religiously neutral student-aid program simply 
because the program affords students the choice of attending religious schools.  




MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, and Mike Kadas, in his official capacity as 
Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, Defendants-Appellants 
 
Supreme Court of the State of Montana  
 
Decided on December 12, 2018 
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
MCKINNON, Montana Supreme Court 
Justice:  
 
The Montana Department of Revenue (the 
Department) appeals from an order of the 
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead 
County, granting Kendra Espinoza, Jeri Ellen 
Anderson, and Jaime Schaefer (collectively, 
Plaintiffs) summary judgment. The 
Department is responsible for administering 
§ 15-30-3111, MCA (the Tax Credit 
Program), which provides a taxpayer a 
dollar-for-dollar tax credit based on the 
taxpayer’s donation to a Student Scholarship 
Organization (SSO). SSOs fund tuition 
scholarships for students who attend private 
schools meeting the definition of Qualified 
Education Provider (QEP). The Legislature 
instructed the Department to implement the 
Tax Credit Program in compliance with 
Article V, Section 11(5), and Article X, 
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution. 
Pursuant to that grant of authority, the 
Department implemented Admin. R. M. 
42.4.802 (Rule 1), which it believed was 
necessary to constitutionally administer the 
Tax Credit Program. Rule 1 adds to the 
Legislature’s definition of QEP and excludes 
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religiously-affiliated private schools from 
qualifying as QEPs.  
 
Plaintiffs are parents whose children attend a 
religiously-affiliated private school. Because 
Rule 1 precludes religiously-affiliated private 
schools from the definition of QEP, SSOs 
cannot fund tuition scholarships at the school 
Plaintiffs’ children attend. Plaintiffs filed this 
proceeding challenging Rule 1. The 
Department responded, arguing Rule 1 was 
necessary because the Tax Credit Program as 
enacted by the Legislature violates 
Montana’s Constitution. The District Court 
determined the Tax Credit Program was 
constitutional without Rule 1 and accordingly 
granted Plaintiffs summary judgment. The 4 
Department now appeals, arguing that the 
Tax Credit Program is unconstitutional 
absent Rule 1. We address the following 
issue on appeal:  
 
Does the Tax Credit Program violate 
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana 
Constitution?  
 
We conclude the Tax Credit Program violates 
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana 
Constitution and accordingly reverse the 
District Court’s order granting Plaintiffs 
summary judgment.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2015, the Legislature, through Senate Bill 
410, enacted Title 15, chapter 30, part 31, 
MCA, entitled “Tax Credit for Qualified 
Education Contributions.” Part 31 provides 
two types of dollar-for-dollar tax credits to 
taxpayers who donate to educational 
programs in Montana. A taxpayer may 
receive a tax credit for providing 
supplemental funding to public schools, § 15-
30-3110, MCA, or for donating to the Tax 
Credit Program, § 15-30-3111, MCA. The 
only tax credit at issue in these proceedings is 
the credit a taxpayer receives based on her 
donation to the Tax Credit Program, § 15-30-
3111, MCA. The Tax Credit Program 
provides a taxpayer a  dollar-for-dollar tax 
credit of up to $150 based on her donation to 
an SSO.  
 
An SSO is a charitable organization in 
Montana that is (1) “exempt from federal 
income taxation under [I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)]”; 
(2) “allocates not less than 90% of its annual 
revenue for scholarships to allow students to 
enroll with any [QEP]”; and (3) “provides 
educational scholarships to eligible students 
without limiting student access to only one 
education provider.” The purpose of SSOs “is 
to provide parental and student choice in 
education with private contributions through 
tax replacement programs.”  
 
Taxpayer donors donate to SSOs generally; 
they “may not direct or designate 
contributions to a parent, legal guardian, or 
specific [QEP].” SSOs then use those 
donations to fund student tuition scholarships 
at private schools meeting the definition of 
QEP in § 15-30-3102(7), MCA. SSOs are 
responsible for maintaining “an application 
process under which scholarship applications 
are accepted, reviewed, approved, and 
denied.” Section 15-30-3103(1)(h), MCA. 
After an SSO decides to grant a student a 
tuition scholarship, the SSO pays the 
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scholarship directly to the scholarship 
recipient’s QEP. Section 15-30-3104(1), 
MCA. The Legislature defined QEP as “an 
education provider that”:  
 
(a) is not a public school;  
 
(b) (i) is accredited, has applied for 
accreditation, or is provisionally 
accredited by a state, regional, or 
national accreditation organization; 
or (ii) is a nonaccredited provider or 
tutor and has informed the child’s 
parents or legal guardian in writing at 
the time of enrollment that the 
provider is not accredited and is not 
seeking accreditation;  
 
(c) is not a home school as referred to 
in 20-5-102(2)(e);  
 
(d) administers a nationally 
recognized standardized assessment 
test or criterion-referenced test and: 
 
(i) makes the results available to the 
child’s parents or legal guardian;  
 
(ii) administers the test for all 8th 
grade and 11th grade students and 
provides the overall scores on a 
publicly accessible private website or 
provides the composite results of the 
test to the office of public instruction 
for posting on its website;  
 
(e) satisfies the health and safety 
requirements prescribed by law for 
private schools in this state; and  
 
(f) qualifies for an exemption from 
compulsory enrollment under 20-5-
102(2)(e) and 20-5-109.  
 
Essentially, the Legislature’s definition of 
QEP means “a private school.”  
 
The Department is responsible for 
implementing and administering Part 31. The 
Department must perform extensive 
administrative tasks to ensure Part 31 
functions appropriately. Sections 15-30-
3103, -3105, -3111 to -3113, MCA. The 
Legislature explicitly granted the Department 
rulemaking authority to “adopt rules, prepare 
forms, and maintain records that are 
necessary to implement and administer [Part 
31].” The Legislature also instructed the 
Department to administer Part 31 in 
compliance with Article V, Section 11(5), 
and Article X, Section 6, of the Montana 
Constitution.  
  
Beginning in fiscal year 2016, to accomplish 
these statutorily-mandated responsibilities, 
the Department required additional resources 
and personnel. Senate Bill 410’s Fiscal Note 
[hereinafter Fiscal Note] estimated one-time 
costs to the Department of $420,325 to 
develop new forms and add data processing 
systems. Further, the Department required 
two additional full-time employees: one to 
process and verify credit applications and 
annual reports from SSOs and another to 
verify and audit the new tax credits. 
  
Tasked with constitutionally implementing 
Part 31, the Department identified what it 
saw as a constitutional deficiency: the Tax 
Credit Program aided sectarian schools in 
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violation of Article X, Section 6, of 
Montana’s Constitution. Under the 
Legislature’s definition of QEP, most QEPs 
were religiously-affiliated private schools. 
The Department examined how the Tax 
Credit Program operated and determined it 
unconstitutionally aided those religiously-
affiliated QEPs. To combat the issue, and 
pursuant to the rulemaking authority granted 
by the Legislature, §§ 15-30-3101, -3114, 
MCA, the Department adopted Rule 1.  
 
Rule 1 added to the Legislature’s definition 
of QEP, § 15-30-3102(7), MCA, providing: 
 
(1) A “qualified education provider” 
has the meaning given in 15-30-3102, 
MCA, and pursuant to 15-30-3101, 
MCA, may not be:  
 
(a) a church, school, academy, 
seminary, college, university, literary 
or scientific institution, or any other 
sectarian institution owned or 
controlled in whole or in part by any 
church, religious sect, or 
denomination; or  
 
(b) an individual who is employed by 
a church, school, academy, seminary, 
college, university, literary or 
scientific institution, or any other 
sectarian institution owned or 
controlled in whole or in part by any 
church, religious sect, or 
denomination when providing those 
services.  
 
(2) For the purposes of (1), 
“controlled in whole or in part by a 
church, religious sect, or 
denomination” includes accreditation 
by a faith-based organization.  
 
Simply put, Rule 1 excluded religiously-
affiliated private schools from the 
Legislature’s definition of QEP, § 15-30-
3102(7), MCA.  
  
Plaintiffs are parents whose children attend a 
religiously-affiliated private school in 
Montana. The school qualifies as a QEP 
under the Legislature’s definition, § 15-30-
3102(7), MCA, but does not qualify as a QEP 
under the Department’s definition, Rule 1. 
Plaintiffs challenged Rule 1 in District Court, 
arguing it violated the free exercise clauses of 
the Montana and U.S. Constitution.2 
Plaintiffs further reasoned that Rule 1 was 
unnecessary because the Tax Credit Program 
and the Legislature’s definition of QEP were 
constitutional. The Department responded, 
arguing that the Tax Credit Program is 
unconstitutional and reasoning that Rule 1 
necessarily restricted the Tax Credit Program 
which, absent Rule 1, aided sectarian schools. 
Both sides filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  
 
The District Court narrowly focused its 
analysis on the tax credits themselves, noting 
the credits did not “involve the expenditure 
of money that the state has in its treasury.” 
Instead, it determined the tax credits 
“concern[ed] money that is not in the treasury 
and not subject to expenditure.” For that 
reason alone, the District Court concluded the 
Department incorrectly interpreted Article V, 
Section 11(5), and Article X, Section 6(1), of 
the Montana Constitution. Because it decided 
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the Tax Credit Program was constitutional as 
enacted by the 2015 Legislature, the District 
Court did not further address Rule 1’s 
constitutionality. The District Court granted 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, 
denied the Department’s motion for summary 
judgment, and permanently enjoined the 
Department from applying or enforcing Rule 
1. The Tax Credit Program remained as 
enacted by the 2015 Legislature. The 
Department now appeals the District Court’s 
decision.  
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court exercises plenary review over 
constitutional law questions. A statute is 
presumed constitutional unless it “conflicts 
with the constitution, in the judgment of the 
court, beyond a reasonable doubt.” The party 
challenging the constitutionality of the statute 
bears the burden of proof. If any doubt exists, 
it must be resolved in favor of the statute.  
 
Whether an administrative rule 
impermissibly conflicts with a statute is a 
question of law to be decided by the court. 
We review a district court’s conclusions of 




The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses—
the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause—are “frequently in 
tension.” Yet, “there is room for play in the 
joints” between them. A state’s constitutional 
prohibition against aid to sectarian schools 
may be broader and stronger than the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against the 
establishment of religion. Where a state’s 
constitution “draws a more stringent line than 
that drawn by the United States 
Constitution,” the “room for play” between 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
narrows. The Montana Constitution broadly 
and strongly prohibits state aid to sectarian 
schools, leaving a very limited amount of 
“room for play.” See Mont. Const. art. X, § 6 
(hereinafter, Article X, Section 6).  
Our analysis, therefore, considers Article X, 
Section 6, within a narrower “room for play” 
between the federal Religion Clauses and, 
consequently, we do not address federal 
precedent. We conclude that Montana’s 
Constitution more broadly prohibits “any” 
state aid to sectarian schools and draws a 
“more stringent line than that drawn” by its 
federal 11 counterpart. Therefore, the sole 
issue in this case is whether the Tax Credit 
Program runs afoul of Montana’s specific 
sectarian education no-aid provision, Article 
X, Section 6. For the following reasons, we 
conclude the Tax Credit Program aids 
sectarian schools in violation of Article X, 
Section 6.  
 
I. Article X, Section 6, broadly and strictly 
prohibits aid to sectarian schools. 
 
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana 
Constitution, entitled “Aid prohibited to 
sectarian schools,” provides:  
 
(1) The legislature, counties, cities, towns, 
school districts, and public corporations shall 
not make any direct or indirect appropriation 
or payment from any public fund or monies, 
or any grant of lands or other property for any 
sectarian purpose or to aid any church, 
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school, academy, seminary, college, 
university, or other literary or scientific 
institution, controlled in whole or in part by 
any church, sect, or denomination.  
 
(2) This section shall not apply to funds from 
federal sources provided to the state for the 
express purpose of distribution to non-public 
education. 
 
The Constitutional Convention Delegates’ 
(Delegates) intent controls our interpretation 
of a constitutional provision. We primarily 
discern the Delegates’ intent “from the plain 
meaning of the language used.” However, we 
define the Delegates’ intent “not only from 
the plain meaning of the language used, but 
also in light of the historical and surrounding 
circumstances under which the [Delegates] 
drafted the Constitution, the nature of the 
subject matter they faced, and the objective 
they sought to achieve.” Accordingly, we 
“determine the meaning and intent of 
constitutional provisions from the plain 
meaning of the language used without resort 
to extrinsic aids except when the language is 
vague or ambiguous or 12 extrinsic aids 
clearly manifest an intent not apparent from 
the express language.”  
 
In determining what the Delegates intended 
Article X, Section 6, to mean, we first 
observe that the plain language of the 
provision’s title is expansive and forceful: 
“Aid prohibited to sectarian schools.” The 
title clearly manifests the Delegates’ intent to 
broadly prohibit aid to sectarian schools. The 
provision’s text is equally expansive, 
prohibiting numerous types of state actors, 
including the “legislature, counties, cities, 
towns, school districts, and public 
corporations” from making “any direct or 
indirect appropriation or payment from any 
public fund or monies, or any grant of lands 
or other property for any sectarian purpose or 
to aid any . . . school . . . controlled in whole 
or in part by any church, sect, or 
denomination.”  
 
 The provision’s plain language begs three 
main inquiries, each of which cast a broad net 
clearly intended to prohibit “any” type of 
state aid being used to benefit sectarian 
education. First, the provision’s plain 
language identifies the entity that is 
prohibited from providing the aid: Article X, 
Section 6, prohibits the “legislature, counties, 
cities, towns, school districts, and public 
corporations” from aiding sectarian schools. 
Second, the provision’s plain language 
identifies the type of aid it prohibits: Article 
X, Section 6, broadly prohibits any type of 
direct or indirect aid to sectarian schools—
“any direct or indirect appropriation or 
payment from any public fund or monies, or 
any grant of lands or other property.” Third, 
the provision’s plain language specifies that 
the aid is prohibited “for any sectarian 
purpose or to aid any church, school, 
academy, seminary, college, 13 university, or 
other literary or scientific institution, 
controlled in whole or in part by any church, 
sect, or denomination.”  
 
The Delegates adapted Article X, Section 6, 
of the Montana Constitution from the 1889 
Constitution’s broad and general no-aid 
provision, recognizing that it was already 
“among the most stringent [no-aid clauses] in 
the nation.” Montana Constitutional 
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Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 11, 
1972, pp. 2008, 2011 (hereinafter 
Convention Transcript). 
 
The Delegates’ strong commitment to 
maintaining public education and ensuring 
that public education remained free from 
religious entanglement is evident from the 
Constitutional Convention Transcripts; the 
Delegates wanted the public school system to 
receive “unequivocal support.” Delegate 
Burkhardt noted, “Under federal and state 
mandates to concentrate public funds in 
public schools, our educational system has 
grown strong in an atmosphere free from 
divisiveness and fragmentation.” He further 
emphasized, “Any diversion of funds or effort 
from the public school system would tend to 
weaken that system in favor of schools 
established for private or religious purposes.” 
(emphasis added).  
 
A minority of Delegates sought to delete the 
language prohibiting indirect aid from Article 
X, Section 6. Those Delegates wanted to 
ensure private school students could receive 
federal aid under the United States Supreme 
Court’s child-benefit theory, which allows 
federal aid as long as it directly supports the 
child and not the religious school. Delegate 
Blaylock, however, expressed concern that 
deleting the indirect language would make it 
“fairly easy to appropriate a number of funds 
. . . to some other group and then say this will 
be done indirectly.” The Delegates ultimately 
maintained the indirect language and instead 
added a separate subsection specifically 
addressing federal aid: “[Article X, Section 
6] shall not apply to funds from federal 
sources provided to the state for the express 
purpose of distribution to non-public 
education.” Notably, the Delegates 
understood that Montana could prohibit 
forms of state aid that were otherwise 
permissible as federal aid. Our conclusion 
that Article X, Section 6, more broadly 
prohibits aid to sectarian schools than the 
federal Establishment Clause is consistent 
with the Delegates’ intent of the provision.  
 
It is also worth observing that Montana’s no-
aid provision is unique from other states’ no-
aid provisions. Article X, Section 6’s 
prohibition of “any direct or indirect 
appropriation or payment from any public 
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other 
property for any sectarian purpose or to aid 
any . . . school . . . controlled in whole or in 
part by any church” make it a broader and 
stronger prohibition against aid to sectarian 
15 schools than other states. Even other states 
whose no-aid provisions also contain 
“indirect” language only prohibit aid in the 
form of the direct or indirect taking of money 
from the public treasury. Such language is 
distinct from and less stringent than 
Montana’s prohibition on any type of aid, 
whether it be a “direct or indirect 
appropriation or payment from any public 
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other 
property.”  
 
As a Court, we have not yet interpreted 
Article X, Section 6. However, the 1972 
Constitutional Convention Delegates 
intended Article X, Section 6, to retain the 
meaning of Article XI, Section 8, of the 
Montana Constitution of 1889. Accordingly, 
this Court’s pre-1972 precedent analyzing 
Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana 
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Constitution of 1889 remains helpful to our 
analysis of Article X, Section 6. In State ex 
rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10, the 
Court considered whether a tax levy intended 
to fund general teaching positions at a 
religiously-affiliated private school violated 
Article XI, Section 8, of the Montana 
Constitution of 1889. The Court observed 
that the tax levy permitted a religiously-
affiliated school to unconstitutionally obtain 
teachers at public expense. Even though the 
teachers would have taught general, secular 
subjects, the Court noted that the funding 
nonetheless aided sectarian schools, as there 
was no way to determine “where the secular 
purpose ended and the sectarian began.” 
Accordingly, the Court determined Article 
XI, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution of 
1889 prohibited “a public school board from 
making a levy for, or expending funds for the 
employment of teachers to teach in a 
parochial school.”  
 
The plain language of Article X, Section 6, 
and the Constitutional Convention 
Transcripts demonstrating the Delegates’ 
clear objective to firmly prohibit aid to 
sectarian schools lead us to the conclusion 
that the Delegates intended Article X, Section 
6, to broadly and strictly prohibit aid to 
sectarian schools. 
 
II. The Tax Credit Program aids sectarian 
schools in violation of Article X, Section 6, of 
the Montana Constitution. 
 
Plaintiffs initially filed this action 
challenging Rule 1. The District Court 
focused its analysis on the underlying Tax 
Credit Program, determining the program 
itself was constitutional. Therefore, the 
District Court easily dispelled of Rule 1 after 
concluding it was based on a mistake of law. 
On appeal, the Department argues that the 
Tax Credit Program is unconstitutional and, 
accordingly, Rule 1 is necessary for the 
Department to constitutionally administer the 
program. To properly evaluate the propriety 
of Rule 1, we must first address the 
Department’s contention that the Tax Credit 
Program is unconstitutional. It is clear the 
Department’s contention is a facial challenge 
to the Tax Credit Program, as it asserts the 
Tax Credit Program unconstitutionally aids 
sectarian schools and promulgated Rule 1 to 
cure the constitutional defect. Under United 
States v. Salerno, a party bringing a facial 
challenge must “establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the 
[statute] would be valid”—that is, that the 
law is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications.  
 
To analyze the Tax Credit Program under 
Article X, Section 6, first, we identify the 
entity providing the aid; second, we identify 
the type of aid; and third, we consider 
whether the entity provided the aid “for any 
sectarian purpose or to aid any . . . school . . . 
controlled in whole or in part by any church . 
. . .” We ultimately conclude the Tax Credit 
Program aids sectarian schools in violation of 
Article X, Section 6, and that it is 
unconstitutional in all of its applications.  
 
a. The Legislature aided sectarian schools 
when it enacted the Tax Credit Program. 
 
Article X, Section 6, directly prohibits 
various entities, including the Legislature, 
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from aiding sectarian schools. Preliminarily, 
we recognize that an individual taxpayer may 
give money to any cause she wishes. A 
taxpayer is free to donate to an SSO, a QEP, 
or any other charitable cause of her choice. 
There is no prohibition on a taxpayer giving 
her money away, nor would such prohibition 
be constitutional.   
 
In this case, the action under scrutiny is the 
Legislature’s provision of a tax credit to 
taxpayer donors. The Legislature, by 
enacting the Tax Credit Program, involved 
itself in donations to religiously-affiliated 
private schools. The Tax Credit Program 
provides a dollar-for-dollar incentive of up to 
$150 for taxpayer donations to SSOs. The tax 
credit encourages the transfer of money from 
a taxpayer donor to a sectarian school 
because the taxpayer donor knows she will be 
reimbursed, dollar-for-dollar, for her 
donation to an SSO. SSOs, in turn, directly 
fund tuition scholarships at religiously-
affiliated QEPs. The Legislature, by enacting 
a statute that provides a dollar-for-dollar 
credit against taxes owed to the state, is the 
entity providing aid to sectarian schools via 
tax credits in violation of Article X, Section 
6.  
 
b. The Tax Credit Program permits the 
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at 
private, religiously-affiliated schools. 
 
Article X, Section 6, broadly prohibits any 
type of direct or indirect aid: the Legislature 
may not make “any direct or indirect 
appropriation or payment from any public 
fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other 
property.”  
The Tax Credit Program permits the 
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at 
private, religiously-affiliated schools. 
Parents owe a certain amount of tuition to the 
QEP their child attends. If a child receives a 
tuition scholarship from an SSO, the 
scholarship decreases the amount of tuition 
that child’s parents owe to the QEP. Many of 
the taxpayer donors who would donate to 
SSOs would be parents of children who 
attend QEPs. When parents donate to an 
SSO, they receive a dollar-for-dollar tax 
credit of up to $150. If the parents’ child also 
receives a tuition scholarship from an SSO in 
the amount of, for example, $150, the 
parents’ tuition obligation to the QEP 
decreases by $150—the exact amount the 
parents received as a tax credit for their 
donation to an SSO. The parents donated 
$150 to an SSO, received a dollar-for-dollar 
reimbursement for that donation in the form 
of a tax credit, and subsequently owed $150 
less in tuition to their child’s QEP. The 
Legislature indirectly payed $150 of that 
student’s tuition by permitting his or her 
parents to claim a tax credit instead of paying 
that amount of tuition to the QEP.  
 
The Legislature attempted to sever the 
indirect payment by requiring taxpayer 
donors to donate to an SSO generally and 
prohibiting them from directing or 
designating contributions to specific parents, 
legal guardians, or QEPs. Therefore, parents 
cannot donate to an SSO, claim a tax credit 
for their donation, and then directly designate 
the funds they donated to their own child’s 
scholarship. However, an indirect payment 
still exists, as described above, when a 
student whose parents claimed the tax credit 
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receives a scholarship from an SSO. The 
simple fact that parents who donate to SSOs 
cannot directly designate the scholarship 
funds to their own child or to their child’s 
school does not defeat the fact that the 
Legislature indirectly pays tuition to the 
QEP. Senate Bill 410’s Fiscal Note 
recognized as much, stating that the 
donations to SSOs, the bases for the tax 
credits, “would primarily represent funds that 
would have been used to pay tuition directly 
. . . .” The Tax Credit Program permits the 
Legislature to indirectly pay tuition at QEPs 
by reimbursing parents for donating to SSOs, 
donations funded with money the parents 
would have otherwise used to pay their 
child’s tuition.  
 
The Tax Credit Program permits the 
Legislature to subsidize tuition payments at 
religiously-affiliated private schools. A 
subsidy is a “grant, usu[ally] made by the 
government, to any enterprise whose 
promotion is considered to be in the public 
interest.” “Although governments sometimes 
make direct payments (such as cash grants), 
subsidies are usu[ally] indirect. They may 
take the form of . . . tax breaks . . . .” When 
the Legislature indirectly pays general tuition 
payments at sectarian schools, the 
Legislature effectively subsidizes the 
sectarian school’s educational program. That 
type of government subsidy in aid of 
sectarian schools is precisely what the 
Delegates intended Article X, Section 6, to 
prohibit.  
 
While $150 may seem like a small sum of 
money when compared to the State’s overall 
operating budget, the amount of aid is wholly 
insignificant to an Article X, Section 6, 
analysis. The Legislature violates Article X, 
Section 6’s prohibition on aid to sectarian 
schools when it provides any aid, no matter 
how small. Further, the $150 indirect 
payments certainly add up over time, 
especially as the aggregate limits on the tax 
credits increase from $3 million each year the 
limit is met. The Tax Credit Program creates 
an indirect payment: the program reduces 
“the net price of attending private school . . . 
for students who receive scholarships and 
whose families claim the credit.” Article X, 
Section 6, expressly prohibits that type of 
indirect payment to sectarian schools.  
 
Importantly, for purposes of examining the 
facial constitutionality of the Tax Credit 
Program, the schools meeting the 
Legislature’s definition of QEP may be—
and, in fact, the overwhelming majority are—
religiously affiliated. There is simply no 
mechanism within the Tax Credit Program 
itself that operates to ensure that an indirect 
payment of $150 is not used to fund religious 
education in contravention of Article X, 
Section 6. The Department, in administering 
the Tax Credit Program pursuant to the 
Legislature’s definition of QEP, § 15-30-
3102(7), MCA, has no ability to ensure that 
indirect payments are not made to religious 
schools. Or, as this Court has previously 
cautioned, there is no mechanism within the 
Tax Credit Program to identify “where the 
secular purpose end[s] and the sectarian 
beg[ins].” The Department cannot discern 
when the tax credit is indirectly paying 
tuition at a secular school and when the tax 
credit is indirectly paying tuition at a 
sectarian school. Because the Tax Credit 
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Program does not distinguish between an 
indirect payment to fund a secular education 
and an indirect payment to fund a sectarian 
education, it cannot, under any circumstance, 
be construed as consistent with Article X, 
Section 6.  
 
c. The Legislature provided the tax credits to 
aid schools controlled in whole or in part by 
churches. 
 
Article X, Section 6, prohibits aid used “for 
any sectarian purpose or to aid any . . . school 
. . . controlled in whole or in part by any 
church, sect, or denomination.” In Chambers, 
we explained that public funds could not be 
used to pay teachers’ salaries at a religiously-
affiliated private school, even if those 
teachers provided standard, non-religious 
instruction. In support of that conclusion, we 
reasoned that the school was sectarian as a 
whole, and therefore there was no way to 
determine “where the secular purpose ended 
and the sectarian began.”  
 
Under the Legislature’s definition of QEP, 
the majority of QEPs are private schools 
controlled by churches. SSOs pay 
scholarship funds directly to QEPs and the 
funds offset scholarship recipients’ general 
tuition obligations. General tuition payments 
fund the sectarian school as a whole and 
therefore may be used by the school to 
strengthen any aspect of religious education, 
including those areas heavily entrenched in 
religious doctrine. Religious education is a 
“rock on which the whole [church] rests, and 
to render tax aid to [a religious school] is 
indistinguishable . . . from rendering the same 
aid to the [c]hurch itself.” The Tax Credit 
Program aids schools controlled by churches, 
in violation of Article X, Section 6.  
 
“The most effective way to establish any 
institution is to finance it.” The Legislature’s 
enactment of the Tax Credit Program is 
facially unconstitutional and violates 
Montana’s constitutional guarantee to all 
Montanans that their government will not use 
state funds to aid religious schools. This basic 
notion of separation of church and state is a 
foundation of our Nation’s federal 
Constitution, but is more fiercely protected 
by Montanans through the broader 
prohibitions contained in Article X, Section 
6. Although the Tax Credit Program provides 
a mechanism of attenuating the tax credit 
from the SSO’s tuition payment to a 
religiously-affiliated QEP, it does not 
comport with the constitutional prohibition 
on indirectly aiding sectarian schools. We 
conclude, following consideration of both the 
plain language of the provision and the 
Delegates’ intent as discerned from their 
discussion when drafting Montana’s 1972 
Constitution, that such attenuation remains 
inconsistent with Article X, Section 6’s strict 
and broad prohibition on aid to sectarian 
schools. The Tax Credit Program constitutes 
the precise type of indirect payment the 
Delegates sought to prohibit in their 
formulation of Article X, Section 6. Based on 
the Legislature’s definition of QEP, the 
Department cannot constitutionally 
implement or administer the Tax Credit 
Program. Because Senate Bill 410 contained 
a severability clause,7 we conclude the Tax 
Credit Program, § 15-30-3111, MCA, must 
be severed from the remainder of Part 31, §§ 
15-30-3101 to -3114, MCA.  
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Having concluded the Tax Credit Program 
violates Article X, Section 6, it is not 
necessary to consider federal precedent 
interpreting the First Amendment’s less-
restrictive Establishment Clause. 
Conversely, however, an overly-broad 
analysis of Article X, Section 6, could 
implicate free exercise concerns. Although 
there may be a case where an indirect 
payment constitutes “aid” under Article X, 
Section 6, but where prohibiting the aid 
would violate the Free Exercise Clause, this 
is not one of those cases. We recognize we 
can only close the “room for play” between 
the joints of the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses to a certain extent before 
our interpretation of one violates the other.  
 
III. Rule 1 is unnecessary because the 
underlying Tax Credit Program is 
unconstitutional and, further, the 
Department exceeded its rulemaking 
authority when it enacted Rule 1. 
 
The Department enacted Rule 1 in its efforts 
to constitutionally implement the Tax Credit 
Program, which we have now determined is 
unconstitutional. We severed the Tax Credit 
Program from the remainder of Part 31. As a 
result, Rule 1 is superfluous. However, we 
further note that, in enacting Rule 1, the 
Department exceeded the Legislature’s grant 
of rulemaking authority.  
 
An agency’s authority to adopt rules is 
limited:  
 
Whenever by the express or implied 
terms of any statute a state agency has 
authority to adopt rules to implement, 
interpret, make specific, or otherwise 
carry out the provisions of the statute, 
an adoption, amendment, or repeal of 
a rule is not valid or effective unless 
it is:  
 
(a) consistent and not in conflict with 
the statute; and  
 
(b) reasonably necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the statute.  
 
Accordingly, the Department’s rules 
implementing Part 31 needed to be (1) 
consistent and not in conflict with Part 31 and 
(2) reasonably necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of Part 31.  
 
Rule 1 is inconsistent with the Legislature’s 
definition of QEP. The Legislature broadly 
defined QEP to include all private schools in 
Montana, including religiously-affiliated 
schools. The Department’s Rule 1 
significantly narrowed the scope of the 
schools qualifying as QEPs, excluding all 
schools controlled in whole or in party by any 
church. The Department’s limitation on the 
definition of QEP conflicts with the 
Legislature’s broad definition.  
 
Although we recognize that the Legislature, 
by enacting § 15-30-3101, MCA, granted the 
Department broad authority to implement 
Part 31 consistent with Article X, Section 6, 
an agency may only adopt rules to 
“implement, interpret, make specific, or 
otherwise carry out the provisions of [a] 
statute.” An agency cannot transform an 
unconstitutional statute into a constitutional 
statute with an administrative rule. It is the 
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Legislature’s responsibility to craft statutes in 
compliance with Montana’s Constitution, 
which it failed to do here. Rule 1 is 
superfluous because the underlying Tax 
Credit Program is unconstitutional and, 
additionally, the Department exceeded the 
Legislature’s grant of rulemaking authority in 




We conclude the Tax Credit Program violates 
Article X, Section 6’s stringent prohibition 
on aid to sectarian schools. Because the Tax 
Credit Program is unconstitutional, Rule 1 is 
superfluous and, further, the Department 
exceeded the scope of its rulemaking 
authority when it enacted Rule 1. We 
accordingly reverse the District Court’s order 
granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and 
determine the Tax Credit Program, § 15-30-
3111, MCA, must be severed from the 
remainder of Part 31, §§ 15-30-3101 to -
3114, MCA. 
 
GUSTAFSON, Justice, concurring:  
 
I concur in the Majority’s Opinion and agree 
the Tax Credit Program violates our 
Constitution’s prohibition against providing 
aid to religious schools, and this 
constitutional deficiency cannot be cured via 
administrative rule. I write separately to 
discuss additional grounds upon which the 
Tax Credit Program creates an indirect 
payment under Article X, Section 6(1), of the 
Montana Constitution. Although this Court 
has decided this matter purely on State 
constitutional grounds, I also discuss how the 
Tax Credit Program violates the federal 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 
 
The Tax Credit for Qualified Education 
Contributions is an indirect payment under 
Article X, Section 6(1), of the Montana 
Constitution.  
 
Montana’s definition of “appropriation” is 
“well-established and quite limited,” 
referring only to the authority given to the 
Legislature to expend money from the state 
treasury. However, the plain language of 
Article X, Section 6(1), prohibits more than 
appropriations; as Justice Baker notes in her 
Dissent, it prohibits four actions, including 
indirect payments. In this case, the District 
Court ended its analysis prematurely by not 
considering whether the Tax Credit Program 
constitutes an “indirect payment.”  
 
As to whether the money comes from a public 
fund, when determining whether the Tax 
Credit for Qualified Education Contributions 
(TCQEC) of Title 15, chapter 30, part 31, 
creates a “direct or indirect appropriation or 
payment,” it is necessary to understand that 
while the TCQEC deems the money provided 
to the SSO by a taxpayer to be a “donation,” 
it is not in fact a donation. To donate is to give 
property or money without receiving 
consideration for the transfer. Here, the 
taxpayer “donates” nothing, because for 
every dollar the taxpayer diverts to the SSO, 
the taxpayer receives one dollar in 
consideration from the State in the form of a 
lower tax bill. The taxpayer simply chooses, 
with the State’s blessing, to pay the money he 
or she otherwise owes to the State to an SSO. 
Since religious schools would be eligible to 
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receive tuition payments from these funds, 
this runs afoul of the purpose of Article X, 
Section 6 “to guard against the diversion of 
public resources to sectarian school 
purposes.”  
 
For the “donor,” the difference between a 
dollar-for-dollar tax credit and a typical 
charitable tax deduction is remarkable. The 
former costs them absolutely nothing out of 
pocket. The dollar-for-dollar diversion 
distinguishes this program from other tax 
credit programs, such as the contributions to 
university or college foundations and 
endowment funds codified in § 15-30-2326, 
MCA, which offers taxpayers a tax credit 
equal to 10% of the amount of qualifying 
charitable contributions made. In such 
instances, the State incentivizes charitable 
giving; for example, under § 15-30-2326, 
MCA, for every $10 a taxpayer contributes, 
that taxpayer’s tax liability is decreased by 
$1. The taxpayer, however, still donates $9 
out of his or her own pocket. Here, the 
taxpayer donates none of his or her own 
funds, but instead dictates where and how a 
portion of their tax liability is spent. Our 
first—and currently only—SSO 
acknowledges as much, urging taxpayers to 
make a donation “to direct a portion of your 
taxes to help a student thrive . . . .” 
 
Justice Baker observes that under the 
TCQEC, “[n]o money originates, is deposited 
into, or is expended from the state treasury or 
any public fund.” And since the money is 
never deposited into and then expended from 
a public fund, it is not an appropriation. 
However, the only reason the money is not 
deposited into and then expended from a 
public fund is because the TCQEC diverts it 
before it reaches the public treasury. The 
Legislature recognized this diversion within 
SB410, the bill that created the TCQEC, 
when it set aside $3 million from the State’s 
budget to cover the revenue shortfall the Tax 
Credit Program created.3 Justice Baker 
likewise acknowledges the TCQEC diverts 
funds, although she would deem this “an 
indirect transfer of benefit to the student-
selected school” but not find this to be an 
indirect payment. A “transfer of benefit” is 
simply an oblique way of saying 
“assignment.”4 Allowing a taxpayer to 
assign a portion of his or her tax liability by 
paying the money owed to the State to a third 
party is not a “donation” by the taxpayer. 
 
The TCQEC was explicitly designed as a tax 
expenditure.5 Section 5-4-104(2), MCA, 
defines “tax expenditures” as “those revenue 
losses attributable to provisions of Montana 
tax laws that allow a special exclusion, 
exception, or deduction from gross income or 
that provide a special credit . . . including: . . 
. (d) credits allowed against Montana 
personal income tax or Montana corporate 
income tax.” Indisputably, the Tax Credit 
Program creates a “tax expenditure” under § 
5-4-104(2), MCA. Moreover, many of the 
items enumerated under § 5-4-104(2), MCA, 
while not appropriations, are nonetheless 
expenditures.  
 
Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy 
that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing 
them to become “indirect and vicarious 
‘donors.’” “Both tax exemptions and tax 
deductibility are a form of subsidy . . . . 
Deductible contributions are similar to cash 
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grants of the amount of a portion of the 
individual’s contributions.” Regan further 
held that, by denying a political lobbying 
organization tax-exempt status under § 
501(c)(3), the U.S. Code was not denying the 
organization any independent benefit, but 
“Congress has merely refused to pay for the 
lobbying out of public moneys.” Texas 
Monthly, Bob Jones University, and Regan 
all recognize that deductions and exemptions 
function the same as an appropriation by 
allowing some taxpayers to pay lower taxes 
than they otherwise would. Although Justice 
Rice in his Dissent characterizes DOR’s 
argument on this point as “an utter 
misstatement of the fundamental right of 
private property ownership,” it is, in fact, 
consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holdings. Likewise, Article X, Section 6(1), 
of the Montana Constitution recognizes that 
a tax expenditure may not be an appropriation 
per se but nonetheless may function in the 
same manner. Thus, Article X, Section 6(1), 
prohibits not only appropriations, but also 
payments. 
 
By creating a diversionary scheme whereby 
money otherwise bound for the public 
treasury is diverted, the Legislature has 
created an indirect payment. Moreover, as 
noted above, the TCQEC does require 
“funding,” with the State setting aside $3 
million to cover the anticipated revenue 
shortfall this statutory scheme is expected to 
cause in its first year—in addition to the 
substantial administrative costs described in 
the Majority Opinion.  
 
The funds generated by the Tax Credit for 
Qualified Education Contributions aid 
schools controlled in whole or in part by a 
church, sect, or denomination.  
 
Under the Tax Credit Program, no funds are 
delivered to students, but are paid directly to 
the schools. Section 15-30-3104(1), MCA, 
provides that the SSO delivers the 
scholarship funds “directly to the qualified 
education provider . . . .” Thus, while the 
scholarships aid the students in assisting 
them in covering the cost of tuition, they aid 
the schools in the form of direct monetary 
payments. The economic effect of these 
funds is that of aid given directly to the 
school.  
 
In addition to the Montana cases cited by the 
Majority, federal precedent compels the 
conclusion that these funds aid religious 
schools. In Comm. for Public Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a 
statutory scheme which provided a grant to 
low-income parents who paid private school 
tuition. The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that these grants did not constitute 
aid to a religious school since they went to the 
parents, holding, “By reimbursing parents for 
a portion of their tuition bill, . . . the effect of 
the aid is unmistakably to provide desired 
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian 
institutions.” The Nyquist majority rejected 
the dissenters’ position that “government aid 
to individuals generally stands on an entirely 
different footing from direct aid to religious 
institutions.” Here, by relieving parents of a 
portion of their tuition bill by directly paying 
part of the students’ tuition, the effect of the 
aid is to provide financial support to QEPs, 
including religious schools.  
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Later, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a deaf 
student’s right to the services of a sign-
language interpreter funded by the local 
school district, and pursuant to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., even 
though he attended a Catholic high school. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the funding 
of an individual’s interpreter “creates no 
financial incentive for students to undertake 
sectarian education.” In other words, the 
student would have received the services of a 
district-funded sign-language interpreter 
regardless of which school he attended, and 
providing the interpreter gave no aid to the 
religious school because it did not relieve it 
of any costs it otherwise would have borne to 
educate its students. The interpreter benefited 
the student and not the school. Here, 
however, the tuition payments aid the 
recipient schools because these funds directly 
cover the costs of educating the school’s 
students. They do not, as in Zobrest, provide 
a benefit only to the student and to which the 
student would have been entitled regardless 
of school attended.  
 
Therefore, I agree with the majority that the 
Tax Credit Program unconstitutionally 
creates an indirect payment of public funds 
that aids religious schools.  
 
The Tax Credit Program violates the U.S. 
Constitution’s Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses by compelling taxpayers to 
support religious schools in order to avail 
themselves of the tax credit.   
 
Section 15-30-3111(1), MCA, provides in 
part that “[t]he donor may not direct or 
designate contributions to a parent, legal 
guardian, or specific qualified education 
provider.” Thus, a taxpayer who reduces his 
or her tax liability by up to $150 by sending 
those funds to the SSO has no control over 
which QEP receives the benefit of those 
funds. Those funds may go to pay the tuition 
of a student at a secular school or a religious 
school, but the taxpayer cannot choose which 
school—or which type of school—to 
support. 
 
As explained above, I do not consider this 
diversion of funds to be a genuine 
“donation.” Nonetheless, taxpayers may wish 
to take advantage of the proffered tax credit, 
whether to support a school or schools 
providing instruction consistent with a 
particular religion, to support the secular 
school that is designated as a QEP, or because 
they believe their tax money is better spent 
supporting private schools in general. 
Nonetheless, a taxpayer who desires to 
donate to an SSO in exchange for a tax credit 
may find donating under the constraints of 
the TCQEC untenable as the SSO is free to 
use this money to aid a religious school which 
the taxpayer may prefer not to support 
financially.  
 
As the Majority explains, “The Legislature 
attempted to sever the indirect payment by 
requiring taxpayer donors to donate to an 
SSO generally and prohibiting them from 
directing or designating contributions to 
specific parents, legal guardians, or QEPs.” 
However, in their attempt, the Legislature ran 
afoul of the Establishment and Free Exercise 
 722 
Clauses by compelling taxpayers who seek 
the tax credit to relinquish the choice as to 
whether to support a religious school, and 
whether to support, or decline to support, a 
particular religion.  
 
A. The Tax Credit Program violates the 
Establishment Clause because it prohibits 
the donating taxpayer from choosing 
whether the funds aid a religious school.  
 
The Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State 
from enacting laws that have the “purpose” 
or “effect” of advancing or inhibiting 
religion. In Agostini v. Felton, the U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledged its recent 
cases had undermined the assumptions upon 
which some of its earlier Establishment 
Clause cases had rested. It then took the 
opportunity to reiterate the principles it uses 
to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges: 
“[W]e continue to ask whether the 
government acted with the purpose of 
advancing or inhibiting religion,” and “we 
continue to explore whether the aid has the 
‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion.” 
We apply those principles here.  
 
In Nyquist, the U.S. Supreme Court 
concluded that a state-funded tuition 
reimbursement for nonpublic schools 
violated the Establishment Clause. The 
Supreme Court explained, “[I]f the grants are 
offered as an incentive . . . the Establishment 
Clause is violated . . . . Whether the grant is 
labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a 
subsidy, its substantive impact is still the 
same.” The Supreme Court further held that, 
whether a parent received a cash 
reimbursement for tuition or was allowed to 
reduce his or her tax bill, “in both instances 
the money involved represents a charge made 
upon the state for the purpose of religious 
education.”  
 
In Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390, 103 S. Ct. at 
3064, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 
Minnesota tax scheme which allowed parents 
to deduct certain educational expenses from 
their state income tax. Some Minnesota 
taxpayers had challenged the law, arguing 
that it violated the Establishment Clause by 
providing financial assistance to religious 
schools. The Supreme Court, noting that in 
some instances it had struck down 
“arrangements resembling . . . forms of 
assistance,” while in other instances it upheld 
roughly similar arrangements, analyzed the 
constitutionality of Mueller by comparing its 
facts to Nyquist and the cases Nyquist relied 
upon to determine if the Minnesota statute 
violated the Establishment Clause. First, the 
Supreme Court concluded that a State’s 
decision to defray the educational expenses 
parents bear is a secular and understandable 
purpose, regardless of the nature of the 
school attended. The Mueller court found the 
universality of the tax deduction to be of 
considerable importance in upholding the 
Minnesota tax scheme. It held: In this respect, 
as well as others, this case is vitally different 
from the scheme struck down in Nyquist. 
There, public assistance amounting to tuition 
grants was provided only to parents of 
children in nonpublic schools. Because the 
Minnesota tax scheme was available to the 
parents of all students in any school, public 
or private, the Supreme Court found it 
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distinguishable from Nyquist, and thus 
constitutional. Here, the scholarships 
regulated by the TCQEC bear the purpose of 
defraying the cost of tuition. However, this 
aid is available only for the parents of 
students attending certain non-public 
schools—unlike in Mueller, where parents 
could claim the tax deduction regardless of 
whether their children attended public or 
private schools. The present case is more akin 
to Nyquist than Mueller in this regard. 
 
In Zelman, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered whether an Ohio program that 
provided tuition aid to families violated the 
Establishment Clause. In so doing, the 
Supreme Court found that its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence drew “a consistent 
distinction between government programs 
that provide aid directly to religious schools 
and programs of true private choice, in which 
government aid reaches religious schools 
only as a result of the genuine and 
independent choices of private individuals.” 
Most pertinent to the present case, the 
Supreme Court explained that the amount of 
government aid channeled to religious 
institutions by aid recipients is irrelevant to 
the constitutionality of the scheme. The 
salient point is “whether recipients generally 
were empowered to direct the aid to schools 
or institutions of their own choosing.” 
Relying on Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, 
Zelman held: “[W]here a government aid 
program is neutral with respect to religion, 
and provides assistance directly to a broad 
class of citizens who, in turn, direct 
government aid to religious schools wholly 
as a result of their own genuine and 
independent private choice, the program is 
not readily subject to challenge under the 
Establishment Clause.”  
 
Here, the recipients of the “government aid” 
are not the parents and students; they are the 
taxpayers who donate to the SSO and in 
exchange obtain tax credits. Under §§ 15-30-
3104(1), and -3111(1), MCA, these taxpayers 
get no choice; they are at the mercy of the 
SSO as to where their donations are spent. 
Thus, it cannot be said the donations are 
given “to religious schools wholly as a result 
of their own genuine and individual private 
choice.” 
 
In Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
Arizona taxpayers, as mere taxpayers, lacked 
standing to challenge a tax credit/tuition 
scheme roughly similar to the TCQEC. In 
that instance, the scholarship organization, 
similar to our SSO, was called a “school 
tuition organization,” or STO.. There, the 
Supreme Court held that taxpayers had no 
standing to challenge the scheme because 
they were free to choose not to donate to an 
STO, and because they had no right to dictate 
how other citizens spent, or chose not to 
spend, their own pre-tax money. The 
Supreme Court explained that all Arizona 
taxpayers “remain free to pay their own tax 
bills, without contributing to an STO,” or 
may “contribute to an STO of their choice, 
either religious or secular.” Here, Montana 
taxpayers who wish to take advantage of the 
Tax Credit Program have no such choice, as 
§ 15-30-3111(1), MCA, mandates that the 
donor cannot choose which school receives 
their contribution. Thus, since only one SSO 
exists in Montana, and its QEPs consist of 
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both religious and secular schools, the 
contributor cannot choose whether or not to 
support a religious school and still avail 
himself or herself of the tax credit.  
 
Plaintiffs have litigated this matter in their 
role as parents of children attending 
Stillwater Christian School and not as 
taxpayers seeking a tax credit. The Tax Credit 
Program does not inhibit Plaintiffs’ choice as 
to whether their children attend a religious 
school, but it does inhibit the taxpayers’ right 
to exercise their own “genuine and individual 
private choice[s]” as to whether their 
donations fund a secular or religious 
education. On these grounds, I would hold 
the Tax Credit Program violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
 
B. The Tax Credit Program violates the 
Free Exercise Clause because it compels 
taxpayers to acquiesce in the use of their 
donations to support religious schools in 
order to claim a tax credit.  
 
In Mitchell v. Helms, the U.S. Supreme Court 
commented that it had, in numerous 
decisions, “prohibited governments from 
discriminating in the distribution of public 
benefits based upon religious status or 
sincerity.” Here, however, the TCQEC 
discriminates in its distribution of a tax credit 
for donations to SSOs because donors have 
no choice but to permit the SSO to designate 
a donation to a student attending a religious 
school.  
 
In Trinity Lutheran, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that a policy of the Department of 
Natural Resources of the State of Missouri, 
which barred religious institutions from 
participating in a playground resurfacing 
program, “expressly discriminates against 
otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying 
them from a public benefit solely because of 
their religious character.” Here, contributors 
who wish to claim an otherwise available tax 
credit for donating to an SSO cannot do so 
without being compelled to support a 
religious school. In Trinity Lutheran, the 
Supreme Court stated, “[T]he Department’s 
policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It 
may participate in an otherwise available 
benefit program or remain a religious 
institution.” Here, § 15-30-3111(1), MCA, 
puts the taxpayer to a choice: He or she may 
participate in the Tax Credit Program, but 
only if he or she agrees to relinquish control 
of where that donation is spent, with the 
likely result that the SSO will give those 
funds to a religious school. 
 
The Free Exercise Clause protects religious 
observers from unequal treatment. Denying a 
generally available benefit solely due to 
religious identity imposes a penalty on the 
free exercise of religion that can be justified 
only by a state interest “of the highest order.” 
Here, the Tax Credit Program would deny 
this benefit to taxpayers who wish to avail 
themselves of a tax credit for private-school 
scholarships but prefer not to support 
religious schools, or may prefer to support 
only a specific religion’s schools.  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
exclusion of degrees in devotional theology 
from eligibility in a state scholarship program 
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause 
because the exclusion “does not require 
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students to choose between their religious 
beliefs and receiving a government benefit.” 
Here, however, taxpayers wishing to donate 
to a QEP and claim a tax credit for that 
donation are forced to choose between their 
religious beliefs and a government benefit 
because they cannot control whether the 
donation is used to fund a religious 
education.  
 
Notwithstanding the additional analysis I 
offer here, I concur with and join in this 
Court’s Opinion. 
 
SANDEFUR, Justice, concurring:  
 
I concur in the ultimate result reached by the 
Court and much of its reasoning. However, I 
write separately to clearly state the reasons 
for my concurrence.  
 
As a preliminary aside not at issue, I reject 
and condemn this Court’s continuing use of a 
reasonable doubt standard for reviewing the 
constitutionality of statutes. As it has many 
times before, the Court again begins an 
analysis of the constitutionality of a statue by 
stating as the standard of review that:  
 
[a] statute is presumed constitutional unless it 
“conflicts with the constitution, in the 
judgment of this court, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” The party challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute bears the 
burden of proof. If any doubt exists, it must 
be resolved in favor of the statute.  
 
Certainly, legislative enactments are and 
should be presumed constitutional until 
clearly demonstrated otherwise upon legal 
analysis. However, reasonable doubt is 
inherently and exclusively a standard of 
factual proof. Nothing more. The question of 
whether a statute conflicts with a federal or 
state constitutional provision, whether 
facially or as applied to a certain factual 
scenario, is a pure question of law. Whether 
facially or as applied, a statute either conflicts 
with a constitutional provision as a matter of 
law or it does not. Without reference to 
“reasonable doubt” or “proof,” the proper 
standard for reviewing the constitutionality 
of statutes should be that statutes are 
presumed constitutional until clearly 
demonstrated to conflict with a constitutional 
provision, whether facially or as applied to a 
particular set of facts. The party challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute has the 
burden of demonstrating the asserted 
unconstitutionality by appropriate legal 
analysis.  
 
Turning to the matters at issue, I concur that 
the dollar-for-dollar private school tax credit 
program embodied in §§ 15-30-3101 to -
3114, MCA, is not a direct or indirect 
“appropriation” as referenced in Article V, 
Section 11(5), or Article X, Section 6, of the 
Montana Constitution. In context, the 
constitutional phrase “appropriation” from 
“any public fund or monies” narrowly 
connotes an expenditure or commitment of 
public money in hand. I further concur that 
the program does not effect a direct payment 
from “any public fund or monies” as 
referenced in Article X, Section 6.  
 
I concur, however, that as applied to 
religiously-affiliated private schools, the 
private school tax credit program effects an 
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indirect payment of public monies for a 
sectarian purpose or to aid schools controlled 
in whole or in part by a church, religious sect, 
or religious denomination. Though it does not 
effect a direct or indirect “appropriation” or a 
direct payment, the program nonetheless 
diverts, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, funds 
otherwise earmarked and accrued to the 
public purse in the form of tax liability 
independently imposed by law. As applied to 
religiously-affiliated private schools, the 
undeniable purpose of the diversion is to 
further a sectarian purpose—the proliferation 
of the chosen religious beliefs and values of 
the participating parents—thereby further 
aiding private schools controlled in whole or 
in part by the affiliated church, religious sect, 
or religious denomination. As noted by the 
majority and previously by this Court, “[t]he 
most effective way to establish any 
institution is to finance it.” The private school 
tax program is a clever, even somewhat 
ingenious, attempt by the Legislature to have 
the State provide affirmative financial aid to 
help parents enroll their children in private 
schools, not coincidentally including 
religiously-affiliated private schools. The 
Legislature attempted to accomplish this 
manifest objective through the guise of a 
facially neutral statutory scheme that does 
not reference religion or religiously-affiliated 
schools and which directs an administrative 
agency to administer the scheme in a 
constitutional manner.  
 
Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that the program 
does not violate Article X, Section 6, of the 
Montana Constitution because the purpose 
and effect of the program is not to further a 
sectarian purpose or aid religiously-affiliated 
schools but, rather, merely to facilitate 
parental educational choice without regard 
for the choice made. They assert that any 
secondary benefit to religiously-affiliated 
schools is only incidental or de minimis. 
Despite the superficial appeal of this 
argument, closer examination quickly unveils 
the false distinction on which it is premised. 
Religiously-affiliated schools exist for the 
purpose of providing a quality general 
education, but with a specific emphasis on 
religious beliefs and values not taught in 
public schools. It is certainly conceivable that 
some parents, even though they do not 
subscribe to the affiliated religion, may 
nonetheless choose a religiously-affiliated 
school in pursuit of a quality general 
education perceived to be unavailable in 
public schools. However, the obvious and 
indisputable fact is that most, if not all, 
parents choose to send their children to a 
religiously-affiliated school for the specific 
purpose of educating their children with an 
emphasis on particular religious beliefs and 
values not taught in public schools. Providing 
children with particular religious instruction 
or emphasis incident to general education 
unquestionably aids and benefits the exercise 
and proliferation of those religious beliefs 
and values—the very raison d’être for 
religiously-affiliated schools. Tuition aids 
also help maintain enrollment in religiously-
affiliated schools, thereby helping facilitate 
their continued existence and administration. 
However neutrally characterized, a law 
diverting money otherwise earmarked and 
accrued to the public purse to allow parents 
to choose religiously-affiliated schools is 
clearly tantamount to an indirect payment of 
government monies for a sectarian purpose 
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and aids schools controlled in whole or in part 
by a particular church, religious sect, or 
religious denomination.  
 
As an ancillary matter not necessary to the 
Court’s decision in light of its primary 
holding, I further concur with the majority 
that the Department of Revenue exceeded the 
scope of its administrative rulemaking 
authority in adopting Rule 1. Regardless of 
its general charge to the Department to 
administer the private school tax credit 
program in a constitutional manner, the 
Legislature has long provided that 
administrative agencies have no authority to 
promulgate rules conflicting with or 
otherwise limiting a clear and unequivocal 
statutory provision. The Legislature put the 
Department in a hopelessly untenable 
position—it enacted a facially neutral 
statutory scheme with obvious application, 
inter alia, to an unconstitutional purpose and 
effect, and then inconsistently charged the 
Department with the task of administering 
the scheme in a constitutional manner. The 
only way for the Department to carry out the 
Legislature’s mandate was to administer the 
program in a manner inconsistent with the 
manifest intent and express provision of the 
statute—by declaring the tax credit 
unavailable to help fund the cost of sending 
children to religiously-affiliated schools.  
 
I further concur with the Court’s implicit 
holding, and Justice Gustafson’s express 
concurrence, that as applied to religiously-
affiliated schools, the private school tax 
credit program not only violates Article X, 
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution, but 
also violates the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. As applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Establishment Clause clearly, broadly, and 
unequivocally prohibits state governments 
from “mak[ing]” any “law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .” As applied to 
religiously-affiliated schools, and for the 
same reasons that it violates Article X, 
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution, the 
private school tax credit program constitutes 
a state law “respecting an establishment of 
religion.” Whether viewed objectively or 
through the subjective view of the churches 
or religious denominations that provide and 
control religiously-affiliated schools, the 
provision of government tuition subsidies, 
aids, or incentives to facilitate enrollment in 
those schools is a substantial, if not essential, 
aid to the proliferation of the affiliated 
religions and the continued existence and 
administration of the schools.  
 
Finally, I concur with the majority and 
Justice Gustafson’s concurrence, that as 
applied to the private school tax credit 
program as it applies to religiously-affiliated 
schools, Montana’s constitutional prohibition 
on the indirect payment of public monies for 
sectarian purposes or to aid schools 
controlled in whole or in part by a church, 
religious sect, or denomination does not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. As applied to state governments 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Free 
Exercise Clause does nothing more than 
clearly, broadly, and unequivocally prohibit 
state governments from “mak[ing]” any “law 
. . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. 
 728 
Regardless of the increasingly value-driven 
hairsplitting and overstretching that 
unnecessarily complicates its modern 
jurisprudence, the Free Exercise Clause is 
nothing more than a protective shield against 
government interference in the free exercise 
of a citizen’s chosen religion or religious 
views. The Free Exercise Clause is not, nor 
did the Framers intend it to be, a sword or 
affirmative right to receive government aid—
precisely the manifestly intended purpose 
and effect of the private school tax credit 
program as applied to religiously-affiliated 
schools. Though there may indeed be some 
room for “play” in reconciling the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the 
bottom line is that the Free Exercise Clause 
only prohibits the government from 
interfering with the exercise of religious 
beliefs, practices, and, by extension, related 
activities and operations of religious and 
affiliated entities. As applied to the private 
school tax credit program, Montana’s 
constitutional ban on sectarian aid does not in 
any way interfere with or otherwise 
substantially burden the preexisting First 
Amendment right of parents to send their 
children to religiously-affiliated schools 
without government-imposed interference or 
impediment. Parents who wish to send their 
children to religiously-affiliated schools can 
and will continue to do so without 
government inference or impediment, just as 
they always have. As applied here, Article X, 
Section 6, of the Montana Constitution 
merely prohibits state and local governments 
from affirmatively promoting or facilitating 
the exercise of religious beliefs by diverting 
or foregoing government tax revenue for that 
purpose. The right to freely exercise religious 
beliefs without government interference or 
impediment cannot be reasonably stretched 
to require the state and its taxpayers to help 
pay for the exercise of that right through the 
diversion of otherwise earmarked and 
accrued government tax revenue.  
 
Nor does Montana’s broad constitutional ban 
on sectarian aid unconstitutionally 
discriminate on the basis of religion. Article 
X, Section 6 may well have broader 
application that might be problematic in 
some other context. But, as specifically 
applied to the particular private school tax 
credit at issue and its application to 
religiously-affiliated schools, Article X, 
Section 6 does not discriminate against the 
exercise of religion any more than the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause already 
lawfully does, just as intended and expressly 
provided by the Framers of the United States 
Constitution.  
 
Having greatly benefitted from eight years of 
attendance in a religiously-affiliated 
elementary and middle school, I certainly 
understand the value and import to parents of 
educating their children with an emphasis on 
their chosen religious beliefs and values, 
parents’ desire to further the proliferation of 
those beliefs and values, parents’ 
fundamental right to make that choice for 
their children without governmental 
interference or impediment, and the 
concerted, well-intentioned efforts of 
powerful social and political forces to 
advance the proliferation of their respective 
religious beliefs in our state and country. 
However, the federal and state constitutional 
prohibitions on government aid for sectarian 
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purposes respectively embodied in the First 
Amendment Establishment Clause and 
Article X, Section 6, of the Montana 
Constitution do not conflict, and are perfectly 
consistent, with the fundamental right to 
freely exercise one’s chosen religion. In 
balanced tandem, the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses form one of the 
cornerstones upon which our country and 
federal and state constitutions were founded 
and framed to the benefit and protection of 
all—the clear separation of church and state 
regardless of the will of the majority at any 
given time. The Court today fulfills its 
constitutional oath and duty to neutrally 
recognize, enforce, and maintain that critical 
constitutional balance under our state and 




BAKER, Justice, dissenting:  
 
I agree that the Department overstepped its 
executive authority when it adopted Rule 1 
because the enabling legislation did not 
trump existing statutory limitations on an 
agency’s rulemaking authority. Rule 1 
conflicts with § 15-30-3111, MCA, and was 
an ultra vires act by the Department. I do not 
join the Court’s Opinion, however, because, 
in my view, the Court oversteps its own 
authority in invalidating § 15-30-3111, MCA 
(the Tax Credit Program), as 
unconstitutional.  
 
Cases that test the limits of the government’s 
involvement in matters of religion are 
difficult, in no small part because of the 
constitutional tension between prohibited 
government establishment of religion and the 
restraint against government action 
interfering with its free exercise. The 
Montana Constitutional Convention 
Delegates, seeking to avoid “jeopardiz[ing] 
the precarious historical balance which has 
been struck between opposing doctrines and 
countervailing principles,” Montana 
Constitutional Convention, Committee 
Proposals, Feb. 22, 1972, p. 728, preserved 
the 1889 State Constitution’s protection 
against direct or indirect public funding for 
sectarian purposes. As the Court accurately 
observes, other than stylistic changes, the 
Delegates maintained the language, and thus 
the meaning, of the 1889 Constitution when 
they adopted Article X, Section 6. Opinion, 
¶¶ 21, 25. The Court today seeks to outline a 
logical framework for examining claimed 
violations of Article X, Section 6, of the 
Montana Constitution. But it does not adhere 
to controlling principles of law in analyzing 
§ 15-30-3111, MCA, and Rule 1 within that 
framework. 
 
The Court begins with a fundamental mistake 
that permeates the remainder of the Opinion 
and flaws its conclusions. Relying in part on 
the title of Section 6, the Court makes a 
sweeping statement that the provision 
broadly prohibits “aid” to sectarian schools. 
Recognizing the first principle of statutory 
construction—to examine the plain meaning 
of the words used—it nonetheless skips over 
the words used in Section 6 to divine the 
Delegates’ intent. Throughout the Opinion, 
the Court then applies its broad construct of 
“aid” to draw conclusions on each element 
within its outlined framework. 
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Let’s back up a step. Article X, Section 6, 
says that the government “shall not make any 
direct or indirect appropriation or payment 
from any public fund or monies, or any grant 
of lands or other property for any sectarian 
purpose or to aid any church, . . . or other . . 
. institution, controlled in whole or in part by 
any church, sect, or denomination.” In 
purporting to identify the “three main 
inquiries” required in its analysis, the Court 
applies the sweeping term “aid” instead of the 
textual “appropriation or payment from any 
public fund or monies.” As an established 
principle of statutory construction, we do not 
rely on a provision’s title over the language 
contained within its text. The operative 
language in the text is “direct or indirect 
appropriation or payment from any public 
fund or monies.” Without examining what 
that language plainly means, the Court 
employs a broad meaning of “aid” for its 
analysis. I begin with the plain language.  
 
Article X, Section 6(1) prohibits four actions:  
(1) direct appropriations;  
(2) indirect appropriations;  
(3) direct payments; or  
(4) indirect payments 
 
 from public funds or monies. The first step is 
to examine what is an “appropriation” and 
what is a “payment.” “A long line of Montana 
cases has established that ‘appropriation’ 
refers only to the authority given to the 
legislature to expend money from the state 
treasury.” We discussed the nature of state 
appropriations in Dixon, explaining: 
 
“Appropriation” means an authority from the 
law-making body in legal form to apply sums 
of money out of that which may be in the 
treasury in a given year, to specified objects 
or demands against the state. It means the 
setting apart of a portion of the public funds 
for a public purpose, and there must be 
money in the fund applicable to the 
designated purpose to constitute an 
appropriation. 
 
A “payment” is the “[p]erformance of an 
obligation by the delivery of money or some 
other valuable thing . . . .” The Constitution 
likewise extends this prohibition to “any 
grant of lands or other property”—other 
items of value that the government must own, 
or be entitled to, before it can effectuate a 
delivery to another. Article X, Section 6, 
using the disjunctive “or,” distinguishes an 
“appropriation” from a “payment.” As 
discussed above, an appropriation comes 
“from the law-making body” or the 
“legislature” to “expend” or “apply” money 
“from the state treasury.” A “payment,” in 
contrast, is attenuated from the law-making 
body. The Legislature cannot “appropriate” 
funds “to any private individual, private 
association, or private corporation not under 
control of the state.” “Payments” are made by 
the Executive Branch carrying out its 
appropriated spending authority, for 
example, by spending on contracts or by 
awarding grants. 
  
For illustrative purposes, using the SSO 
Program as an example, the plain language of 
Article X, Section 6, would apply to the 
following:  
1. Direct Appropriation: the Legislature 
appropriates $3 million to QEPs as defined in 
the statute, including religious schools;  
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2. Indirect Appropriation: the Legislature 
appropriates $3 million to SSOs, which then 
award the funds to QEPs, including religious 
schools;  
 
3. Direct Payment: (a) the Office of Public 
Instruction (OPI) implements a grant 
program to award grants from its general 
fund budget to QEPs, including religious 
schools, or contracts with religious schools to 
hire teachers, or (b) the State Land Board 
donates a section of state trust land to a QEP 
on which to build a religious school; 
 
4. Indirect Payment: (a) OPI grants funds to 
SSOs to provide teachers to religious schools, 
or (b) the State Land Board donates a section 
of state trust land to an SSO, which then 
auctions the land to support QEPs, including 
religious schools, or conveys the land for a 
sectarian school building site.  
 
There is little dispute that the Tax Credit 
Program’s tax credit does not constitute a 
direct appropriation or payment. The 
Department argues instead that the District 
Court erred by failing to consider the indirect 
impact that targeted tax breaks have on the 
public fisc. It emphasizes that the tax breaks 
indirectly aid sectarian schools. This 
argument becomes the lynchpin for the 
Court’s holding. The argument may be 
correct, as far as it goes. But a theory based 
upon “indirect impacts” or “indirect effects” 
of the Tax Credit Program diverges from the 
constitutional text. Unambiguous 
constitutional language must be given its 
plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. 
 
In this regard, “we have long adhered to 
ordinary rules of grammar” in construing 
statutes. As the Court observes, the same 
principles of statutory construction apply 
when we interpret constitutional provisions. 
To invalidate the statute on the basis that it 
indirectly impacts sectarian schools to the 
detriment of the public fisc violates ordinary 
rules of grammar, as it requires reading 
“indirect” to modify “aid” rather than 
“appropriation or payment.” The clause, “any 
direct or indirect appropriation or payment 
from any public funds or monies . . . for any 
sectarian purpose or to aid any” sectarian 
institutions, contains at least two modifiers of 
“appropriation or payment.” The first, “direct 
or indirect,” modifies the parallel terms 
“appropriation or payment.” It thus prohibits 
any appropriations or payments, whether 
direct or indirect. What follows are non-
parallel prepositional phrases, which describe 
from where these appropriations or payments 
may not be taken—“any public fund or 
monies”—and for what these appropriations 
or payments may not be used—“any 
sectarian purpose” or “to aid” sectarian 
institutions. The sentence structure means 
that “direct or indirect” modifies 
“appropriation or payment,” and does not 
modify the non-parallel phrases “from public 
funds or monies” or “to aid any” sectarian 
school. 
 
The funds at issue pass from donor to SSO to 
student-selected school; they are accounted 
for in the public fisc by virtue of the dollar-
for-dollar offset. Although this may be an 
indirect transfer of benefit to the student-
selected school, the word “indirect,” by itself, 
does not impose a prohibition upon all tax 
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policies merely because they have that 
indirect effect. Rather, “indirect” modifies 
the subject of the clause, which is the 
“payment.” Thus, the provision prohibits 
government agencies from making payments 
from a public fund or monies to religious 
schools indirectly. In this case, the funds 
eligible for tax credits are not “payment from 
any public fund or monies.” The creation of 
the credit is a government’s determination 
not to collect tax revenues. The statute diverts 
the funds before they ever become public 
monies. This well may result in an indirect 
impact on the “public fund or monies,” but it 
is not an indirect payment.  
 
Under the Tax Credit Program, the funds 
originate with private donors and are donated 
to the SSOs, which in turn direct the funds to 
the student’s chosen school as a credit toward 
the student’s obligation. No money 
originates, is deposited into, or is expended 
from the state treasury or any public fund. 
The State never takes “title” to the donated 
money or otherwise possesses it.  
 
When this Court struck the property tax levy 
for private schools in Chambers, it was 
careful to distinguish its holding from 
property tax exemptions for religious 
institutions that had been upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Walz. This was so even 
though the 1889 Constitution, under which 
Chambers was decided, contained the same 
prohibition on payments “from any public 
fund or moneys whatever” in aid of religious 
schools, whether directly or indirectly, as in 
the 1972 Constitution.  
 
The concern about “indirect payments” that 
undergirded the Delegates’ decision to re-
adopt the subject provisions in the 1972 
Constitution was the possibility that 
government would appropriate funding for 
religious schools through intermediaries, 
necessitating retention of the language 
prohibiting “indirect” payments. “[I]t would 
be fairly easy to appropriate a number of 
funds and then-to [sic] some other group and 
then say this will be done indirectly.” The 
Constitutional Convention was held one year 
after this Court had decided Montana State 
Welfare Board v. Lutheran Social Services, 
in which we rejected the State Welfare 
Board’s argument that payment of medical 
benefits to a woman using a religiously 
affiliated adoption agency would violate the 
Constitution—and two years after this 
Court’s decision in Chambers, in which we 
distinguished property tax exemptions from 
impermissible property tax levies in support 
of religious schools. Delegate Loendorf, 
sponsor of the proposal to retain the 
“indirect” language that the Convention 
ultimately adopted, stated that, under his 
proposal, the provision “will continue to 
mean and do whatever it does now,” 
expressing an apparent desire to preserve the 
status quo so recently stated by this Court. 
Beyond indirect payments, the delegates did 
not discuss tax credits or deductions for 
private donations to religious schools. 
 
The Convention debates on Article X, 
Section 6, thus reflect an intention that is 
consistent with the plain language the 
Delegates ultimately adopted. For this 
reason, the Court’s reliance on Nelson to 
divine a broader meaning is misplaced. The 
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Constitutional Convention record we 
examined in Nelson directly discussed the 
issue before the Court—the retention of 
common-law privileges—and contained 
thorough consideration explaining the 
Delegates’ intention that such privileges 
would survive the broad language of the 
public’s right to know in Article II, Section 9. 
Here, in contrast, the Convention transcript 
contains zero discussion of the use of, or 
prohibition against, tax incentives to 
encourage donations to private schools. The 
transcripts thus do not “clearly manifest an 
intent not apparent from the express 
language.” Rather, as the Court 
acknowledges, the transcripts demonstrate 
the Delegates’ desire to maintain the 1889 
status quo. 
 
Turning its focus to the specific provisions of 
§ 15-30-3111, MCA, the Court strikes the 
statute in its entirety as unconstitutional. The 
Court concludes that the statute is facially 
invalid. But it does not properly address the 
difference between a facial and an as-applied 
challenge, important here because the 
Court’s analysis—and its rationale for 
striking the statute—employs a strictly as-
applied theory.  
 
A party bringing a facial challenge “must 
show that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the statute would be valid or that 
the statute lacks any plainly legitimate 
sweep.” We presume that a statute is 
constitutional, unless the Court is convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute 
conflicts with the constitution. Any doubt 
must be resolved in favor of upholding the 
statute. Importantly, the party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute bears the burden 
of proof. The Court mentions the heightened 
standard that a facial challenge brings, but 
falls short of actually analyzing the statute 
under this standard. Conceivably, the statute 
would not be applied unconstitutionally if a 
student chose to apply her scholarship to a 
non-sectarian private school. In such a case, 
the tax credits offered under the statute would 
not offend Article X, Section 6. The Court 
dismisses any such constitutional 
applications because the statute contains “no 
mechanism” for the Department to determine 
whether the money will be used to indirectly 
pay tuition at sectarian schools. This 
conclusion is problematic for at least two 
reasons. First, no one—not even the 
Department—argued that every application 
of the statute was unconstitutional under 
Article X, Section 6. Rather, the Department 
instituted Rule 1 to prohibit what it saw as 
unconstitutional applications of the statute, 
while still allowing what it saw as 
constitutional applications to continue to 
utilize the Tax Credit Program. Second, the 
Court’s holding transforms almost any as-
applied challenge into a facial challenge; 
challenged statutes rarely have a built-in 
mechanism to sift out unconstitutional 
applications. The Court notably ignores the 
statute’s severability clause until after it 
already has thrown out the entire Tax Credit 
Program.  
 
The Court’s heavy reliance on Chambers, 
e.g., fails because that case involved payment 
from public monies to hire teachers at a 
parochial high school—a plain violation of 
the prohibition against “direct 
appropriations.” Even though the teachers 
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were to give “a standard course of 
instruction” at the sectarian school, the public 
school district had no control over the 
parochial school, and “it of necessity must 
supplement these courses of instruction by 
those required by the doctrines of the 
Church.” Citing a Roman Catholic 
Encyclical, the Court pointed out that every 
subject taught must “be permeated with 
Christian piety.” It was in this context—
public payment of teacher salaries—that the 
Court concluded the lines between secular 
and sectarian purposes were impermissibly 
blurred. The case sheds no light on whether 
Tax Credit Program at issue is facially invalid 
simply because the Department does not 
examine how a taxpayer’s contributions are 
used. 
 
In rejecting any valid application of the 
statute, the Court’s singular focus is on the 
Fiscal Note to Senate Bill 410. The Court 
relies on the Fiscal Note to conclude that 
many donors claiming the tax credit also 
would be parents who send their children to 
QEPs. It cites the Fiscal Note to demonstrate 
“the fact that the Legislature indirectly pays 
tuition to the QEP.” And it cites the Fiscal 
Note in holding that the Tax Credit Program 
“creates an indirect payment” by reducing 
“the net price of attending private school.” 
The Opinion contains no other support for its 
key holding that the Tax Credit Program is an 
indirect payment of tuition at private, 
religiously affiliated schools.  
 
This is a problem. First, fiscal notes are 
prepared by the Governor’s Office of Budget 
and Program Planning, an agency of the 
Executive Branch, not by the Legislature. 
Second, a fiscal note is simply the 
Executive’s estimate of revenue and 
spending impacts based on a series of 
assumptions made by presumably affected 
agencies. The Court relies on the 
Department’s fiscal note assumptions to 
support its conclusion that the statute is 
facially unconstitutional because of how the 
agency surmised the tax credit would be 
used. Those assumptions reflect the 
Department’s advocacy here—that Rule 1 
was necessary to save the statute from 
“aiding” sectarian schools. Whether the 
Department’s assumptions were well-
researched or its predictions accurate is not 
the point of an inquiry into the 
constitutionality of the statute. They do not 
represent the Legislature’s rationale for the 
statute and do not control a facial analysis of 
the statute’s constitutionality. Third, relying 
on the assumption that many donors who 
claim the tax credit also will be parents who 
otherwise would be paying tuition reduces 
the issue to a purely as-applied challenge. It 
overlooks the instances in which the Tax 
Credit Program could constitutionally be 
applied. 
 
Its failure to recognize constitutional 
applications of the statute under Article X, 
Section 6, undermines the Court’s 
severability analysis, because—focusing 
only on Article X, Section 6, as the Court 
does—parts of the law would have valid 
application. Tax credits could be afforded for 
donations to private secular schools without 
running afoul of that section. That said, given 
its conclusion that the Tax Credit Program 
violates the prohibition against aid to 
religious schools, First Amendment 
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considerations may require the Court’s 
ultimate solution here—striking § 15-30-
3111, MCA, in its entirety.  
 
Quite remarkably, the Court dismisses any 
Free Exercise Clause concerns by 
proclaiming simply that “this is not one of 
those cases.” I do not believe this issue so 
easily may be discarded. The Department 
acknowledges this as well, explaining that if 
the Court holds the Tax Credit Program 
unconstitutional, “the only way of respecting 
both constitutional limits on the State is to 
invalidate the private school tax-credit 
program and sever it from the remaining 
curricular innovation program.” A State’s 
interest “in achieving greater separation of 
church and State than is already ensured 
under the Establishment Clause of the 
Federal Constitution [] is limited by the Free 
Exercise Clause.” The exclusion of a group 
“from a public benefit for which it is 
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a 
church, is odious to our Constitution.” Only 
an analysis of both Article X, Section 6, and 
the Free Exercise Clause would eliminate all 
applications of the tax credits, and the 
Opinion offers no such analysis. 
 
The Court today holds that a tax credit—
granted to a private individual for a donation 
that may or may not be directed to a religious 
entity—violates the State Constitution, even 
though it is clear under the law that a direct 
tax exemption by the State to a church does 
not. As discussed above, the Delegates did 
not “clearly manifest” this intent in their 
discussions of Article X, Section 6. Although 
the Court does not mention them, its ruling 
calls into question numerous other state laws 
granting tax credits that may benefit religious 
entities, among them Montana’s College 
Contribution Credit, § 15-30- 2326, MCA, 
and Qualified Endowment Credit, § 15-30-
2328, MCA.  
 
At the end of the day, this case—like others 
involving the religion clauses—may be made 
more difficult by the circuitous path a 
legislative body designs in attempting to 
advance policy within its constitutional 
limits. It is in those instances that the Court’s 
examination must be particularly precise. 
Tax policy is within the Legislature’s 
wheelhouse. Tax laws “that seek to influence 
conduct are nothing new.” Quoting Justice 
Joseph Story’s early treatise on the United 
States Constitution, the NFIB Court pointed 
out that “the taxing power is often, very often, 
applied for other purposes, than revenue.” 
The Montana Constitution does not bar the 
Legislature from setting tax policy to 
encourage any manner of private action, 
including incentivizing individuals to support 
certain philanthropic undertakings, religious 
or otherwise. Precisely because there is “play 
in the joints” between prohibited 
establishment and interference with free 
exercise, the Court should hew closely to the 
constitutional text and uphold statutes unless 
their invalidity is established beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Even if “it differs from our 
idea of wise legislation, . . . with the wisdom 
and policy of legislation, the courts have 
nothing to do.”  
 
I dissent and would affirm the District Court 
on the grounds discussed above. 
 
RICE, Justice, dissenting: 
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I concur in Justice Baker’s dissenting 
opinion, and offer the following further 
thoughts.  
 
First, this case was pled and litigated as a 
challenge brought by the Plaintiffs against 
the Department’s enactment of Rule 1. The 
Plaintiffs gave notice of their challenge, 
stating “the Department of Revenue’s Rule 1 
implementing the [Scholarship] program 
violates Named Plaintiffs’ rights under the 
Montana and U.S. Constitutions” and that 
“the Department of Revenue’s rule is 
inconsistent with the statutory language and 
intent.” In response, the Attorney General 
elected not to defend the Rule. No challenge 
to the constitutionality of § 15-30-3111, 
MCA, was ever made or noticed and, 
therefore, the Attorney General was not 
provided an opportunity to appear and defend 
its constitutionality. While the State is a 
party, and therefore, had notice of the 
proceeding itself, no challenge to the statute 
was made within the proceeding, and, 
consequently, the issue was not noticed, 
briefed, or argued. The Court has raised the 
constitutionality of the statute sua sponte. 
Striking a statute under such circumstances, 
including without notice, briefing or 
argument, and an opportunity for the parties 
and Attorney General to argue the issue, is a 
violation of due process and an inappropriate 
exercise of the Court’s powers.  
 
On the merits of its analysis, the Court’s 
conclusions are largely devoid of supporting 
authority, and I concur with Justice Baker 
that the Court is not interpreting the Montana 
Constitution in accordance with established 
legal principles. Indeed, the Court’s 
interpretation ignores, for the most part, the 
plain language of the Constitution and our 
Constitutional history.  
 
The Court summarily declares that the 
subject Scholarship Program “aids sectarian 
schools” in violation of Article X, Section 6, 
of the Montana Constitution, a conclusion 
that is factually and legally incorrect. First, as 
the Department acknowledges, the Program 
is facially neutral, and does not require any 
benefit to accrue to a particular school, 
religious or otherwise. The Program is 
voluntary, funded by charitable donations, 
and, consistent with its stated legislative 
purpose to promote school choice, is entirely 
directed by private action, without 
government direction, as follows: (1) the 
charitable donor has a choice, first, whether 
to donate, and, second, whether to donate to 
the private or to the public school scholarship 
program, but may not direct contributions to 
specific schools; (2) the student and 
parents/guardians choose the qualifying 
private institution, whether religious or non-
religious, which the student will attend and to 
which a scholarship is directed; and (3) the 
SSO must direct the scholarship to the 
institution, religious or non-religious, chosen 
by the student’s family, and may not 
otherwise reserve or restrict scholarships for 
use at a particular school. Thus, a religiously 
affiliated school cannot be designated by the 
donor, the SSO, or the government—only by 
students and their families.  
 
Further, the beneficiary of the Program is not 
the school, but the student/family receiving 
the scholarship, because they are relieved of 
a portion of their financial obligation for the 
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student’s attendance at a private school. This 
is separate from the private school itself, 
which must be paid the same tuition 
regardless of any assistance from the 
Program. Other courts have widely 
recognized this principle.  
 
Similar to our acknowledgment in Mont. 
State Welfare Bd. v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., of 
the “purely incidental” benefit that inured to 
the private adoption agency under the 
indigent mother’s assistance program, 
Kotterman recognized that programs such as 
the Scholarship Program can have “ripple 
effects” that “radiate to infinity,” but that 
these are not constitutionally significant. Any 
benefit of the Scholarship Program flowing 
from the private donor’s voluntary 
contribution to the SSO, and then, if the 
student and family so chose, to a qualified 
religiously-affiliated school, is incidental and 
attenuated. Indeed, it is even more attenuated 
than the benefit provided by the government 
program in Lutheran Soc. Servs., because the 
Scholarship Program does not involve money 
that issues from a government fund. As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has stated for 
establishment clause purposes, “government 
programs that neutrally provide benefits to a 
broad class of citizens defined without 
reference to religion” are not invalid merely 
“because sectarian institutions may also 
receive an attenuated financial benefit.” The 
Program stands in stark contrast, factually 
and legally, to the levy imposed upon 
taxpayers in State ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. 
Dist., 155 Mont., as Montana taxpayers have 
not been implicated in, or made to support, a 
sectarian or religious activity by way of 
government extraction and expenditure of tax 
dollars, or by other coercive means. 
 
Because the scholarships are directed by 
students and families, and there is no 
government action endorsing or directing 
funds for sectarian or religious purposes, 
there is no significance to the fact that more 
Program options are currently available for 
students choosing to attend private religious 
schools than private non-religious schools. 
The same was true for the private religious 
adoption agencies at issue in Lutheran Soc. 
Servs. Other courts have widely recognized 
this principle. As stated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the “constitutionality of a neutral 
education aid program simply does not turn 
on whether and why, in a particular area, at a 
particular time, most private schools are run 
by religious organizations, or most recipients 
choose to use the aid at a religious school.” 
The Program simply creates a neutral 
opportunity for genuine independent choices 
of donors and scholarship recipients, and 
provides that the beneficiaries of the program 
are the scholarship recipients.  
 
Thus, in my view, the Court’s conclusion that 
the Program “permits the Legislature to 
indirectly pay” sectarian schools, is not 
supported by the facts here, and, as Justice 
Baker’s dissenting opinion also illustrates, is 
not supported by the plain language of the 
Constitution or the history of the 
Constitutional Convention. This conclusion 
follows the Department’s troubling argument 
that the Scholarship Program is a “diversion” 
of “public funds” by the Legislature. The 
argument is premised on the Department’s 
theory that the base tax liability each taxpayer 
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will owe to the State on income that the 
taxpayer will earn should be considered 
“public funds,” and that all tax liability—
even potential liability on potential income, 
before a taxpayer timely completes the tax 
return process and applies deductions and 
credits for the entire year—is the property of 
the State, until such time a proper tax return 
is filed and the state permits a credit for the 
year’s donations to be made against the 
taxpayer’s liability. The Department’s view, 
that “‘[t]ax expenditures’ are monetary 
subsidies the government bestows on 
particular individuals or organizations by 
granting them preferential tax treatment . . . 
the various deductions, credits and loopholes 
[] are just spending by another name,”1 might 
be correct for purposes of internal state 
government budgeting, § 5-4-104, MCA, but 
it is an utter misstatement of the fundamental 
right of private property ownership. A 
citizen’s income—all income of each year, 
every year—belongs to the citizen until such 
time the proper portion thereof becomes 
owed to the government; the government 
does not own all income until the citizen 
demonstrates otherwise. At the time a citizen 
donates to the Scholarship Program, the tax 
year has not ended, the donor’s total income 
may not have been earned, the tax return 
process has not been timely initiated, and the 
donor’s potential tax liability is unknown. 
The government cannot at that time “own” 
the unknown tax liability as a public fund, or 
even an asset, regardless of whether the tax 
credit is “dollar-for-dollar” or otherwise, and 
regardless of the previous year’s tax law. 
“[U]nder such reasoning all taxpayer income 
could be viewed as belonging to the state 
because it is subject to taxation by the 
legislature.”  
 
A study of history reminds us that 
governments have oppressed or 
discriminated against citizens based upon 
their religious faith over millennia. Today, 
courts are to ensure that the citizen’s free 
exercise of religion is not violated by the 
government. As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
stated in a recent religious rights case, “all 
officials must pause to remember their own 
high duty to the Constitution and to the rights 
it secures.” I thus disagree with the Court’s 
determination that it need not entertain the 
Plaintiffs’ pled free exercise claims because 




































June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear oral 
arguments this fall concerning a decision by 
Montana's Supreme Court to halt the 
operation of a tax credit scholarship program 
that allowed students to enroll in private 
schools, including private religious schools.   
 
The announcement Friday breathed new life 
into the private school choice movement, 
which has made little to no headway at the 
federal level despite a tax credit scholarship 
being the No. 1 agenda item of Secretary of 
Education Betsy Devos, herself a private 
school choice supporter.  
 
Private school choice advocates cheered the 
decision by the high court to review Espinoza 
v. Montana Department of Revenue, saying 
they're hopeful the court will provide a 
definitive answer on the constitutionality of 
directing public money or aid to private 
religious schools.  
 
"We are incredibly pleased to learn that the 
Supreme Court will hear oral arguments this 
fall on the Montana tax credit scholarship 
case, which could fundamentally alter the 
landscape for school choice across the 
country," John Schilling, president of the 
American Federation of Children, the school 
choice advocacy organization that DeVos 
formerly led, said in a statement.  
 
"This could be the most impactful Supreme 
Court case since the pivotal Zelman decision 
in 2002, which ruled that state-level voucher 
programs are constitutional," he said. "This 
Montana case has the opportunity to 
definitively establish that religious schools 
cannot be excluded from school choice 
programs by virtue of their religion." 
 
But opponents of private school choice 
programs, including teachers unions, argued 
that the separation of church is a fundamental 
pillar to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
"This long tradition – established to ensure 
the religious freedom of all – should be 
protected by conservatives and liberals 
alike," said Randi Weingarten, president of 
the 1.7-million-member American 
Federation of Teachers. "It's alarming that the 
current Supreme Court would try to revisit 
and undo that precedent, in public schools no 
less, as it sets a dangerous standard and opens 
the door to the dismantling of a basic tenet of 
our nation's democracy." 
 
The specific question the court will consider 
is whether the state of Montana violates the 
 740 
First Amendment by prohibiting students and 
families who choose to enroll in private 
religious schools from participating in the 
state's tax credit scholarship program, which 
provides tuition assistance to students to 
attend private school.  
 
The program was enacted in 2015 and served 
25 students with an average scholarship of 
$500 during the 2016-17 school year. In 
2018, the Montana Supreme Court ruled the 
program unconstitutional, rendering it 
inoperable. The state's Constitution includes 
language that bars direct and indirect aid to 
religious institutions – just one of the 37 
states that's adopted what's known as a Blaine 
Amendment.  
 
The Trump administration has not 
commented on the Montana case, but earlier 
this month the Justice Department lent its 
support to three families seeking to require 
the state of Maine to pay tuition for their 





































June 28, 2019 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court added a new 
religion case to the calendar for its next term, 
agreeing to rule on a Montana tax-credit 
program that generates scholarship money 
for students who attend private schools. 
 
The high court on Friday agreed to hear 
arguments from three parents who have used 
money from the program to send their 
children to a Christian school. 
 
The Montana Supreme Court struck down the 
program as violating a state constitutional 
provision that bars aid to religious schools. 
The parents say that ruling violates the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 
Montana officials say the state court was 
right to invalidate the entire program if any of 
the money would go to religious schools. The 
state Department of Revenue says more than 
90% of the scholarships go to students 
attending religious schools. 
The 2015 scholarship program gives 
individuals and corporations a tax credit for 
contributing up to $150 to an organization 
that funds scholarships to help needy students 
attend private schools. 
 
The only organization formed under the law, 
Blue Sky Scholarships, supports just one 
non-religious school along with 12 religious 
schools, the state says. Big Sky awarded 54 
scholarships during the most recent school 
year, totaling $27,000. 
 
The parents sued after the Department of 
Revenue issued a rule that barred use of 
scholarship money at religious schools. A 
trial judge blocked the rule before the 
Montana Supreme Court threw out the entire 
program. 
 
The case is Espinoza v. Montana Department 

















June 13, 2019 
 
This summer the US Supreme Court is 
expected to decide whether or not to 
hear Espinoza v. Montana Department of 
Revenue. If it hears the case, its decision will 
have huge repercussions for public 
education. To grasp why this case matters 
and why it's coming up now, there are two 
pieces of background you need to understand. 
Tax Credit Scholarships 
 
Tax credit scholarships are yet another 
variation on a school voucher program. With 
vouchers, a family picks the school it wants 
its child to attend, and the state hands that 
child's "share" of education funding to that 
school. The problem is that when a family 
chooses a religious school (as is often the 
case), that can run afoul of the separation of 
church and state in general, and Blaine 
Amendment laws in particular. The Blaine 
Amendment was a failed Constitutional 
amendment that prohibited spending tax 
dollars on sectarian schools; 38 states 
adopted it for their own constitutions. It's not 
an easy law to defend, because it rose out of 
nativist reaction to immigrant Catholics, even 
if does fit with the wall between church and 
state. 
Tax Credit Scholarships do an end run around 
the wall. A business or wealthy individual 
gives a contribution to a special "scholarship" 
organization that then hands out scholarships 
to private schools. The state lets the business 
or wealthy individual count that contribution 
as some or all of their tax liability. Think of 
it this way: I'm the state, and you owe me 
$100. I am not allowed to gamble, but if you 
give that $100 to my bookie instead, I'll 
consider us square. 
 
Rules vary from state to state (in Georgia, for 
example, contributors can actually turn a 
profit on the TCS donation). But one feature 
is constant--whatever money is fed into the 
TCS represents money subtracted from state 
revenue. This, it should also be noted, is the 
model for Betsy DeVos's proposed Education 
Freedom Scholarships. In all cases, these are 
vouchers dressed up with fancy accounting. 
 
A Church Parking Lot In Missouri 
 
The other factor here is Trinity Lutheran v. 
Comer. The case seems like small potatoes; a 
church in Missouri wanted to apply for a 
public monies grant to help resurface its 
playground. It was disqualified because it's a 
church. The case ended its five-year trek to 
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the Supreme Court in 2017, and Chief Justice 
Roberts said, "The exclusion of Trinity 
Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is 
otherwise qualified, solely because it is a 
church, is odious to our Constitution … and 
cannot stand.” This was a big deal because, 
as Bloomberg noted: 
 
It’s the first time the court has used 
the free exercise clause of the 
Constitution to require a direct 
transfer of taxpayers’ money to a 
church. In other words, the free 
exercise clause has trumped the 
establishment clause, which was 
created precisely to stop government 
money going to religious purposes. 
 
Some of the majority tried to rein in the 
implications of the case by noting it was a 
ruling strictly about playground resurfacing. 
Justices Gorsuch and Thomas, however, 
indicated that they believed that 
discriminating against religious practices was 
not okay "on the playground or anywhere 
else." 
 
Meanwhile, In Montana 
 
Montana's legislature tried to get a voucher 
foot in the door with the Montana Tax Credit 
Scholarship Program, which allowed a not-
very-staggering tax credit of $150. There was 
just one problem; the Montana Department of 
Revenue wouldn't implement the program, 
claiming it broke the law. The Montana 
Supreme Court agreed that the tax credit 
benefited religious schools and therefore 
broke the rules. 
 
The case has found its way very quickly to 
the Supreme Court, and the long list of very 
conservative and religious school choice fans 
filing amicus briefs lets us know just how 
much some folks are hoping the Supremes 
will reverse Montana's own high court. Cato 
Institute, EdChoice, Christian Legal Society, 
Liberty Justice Center, Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, Wisconsin Institute for 
Law and Liberty, Georgia Goal Scholarship 
Program, Alliance for Choice in Education, 
and former governor Scott Walker are among 
the many who have been urging SCOTUS to 
take this case and run with it. 
 
The case matters because it could extend the 
Trinity Lutheran notion that free exercise 
beats the establishment clause. The case 
matters because it could open the door wide 
to the use of public tax dollars for private 
religious schools. The court could also drive 
a stake through the heart of voucher programs 
aimed at shuttling public funds to private 
religious schools, no matter how clever and 
convoluted the voucher scheme may be. That 
last possibility seems less likely, because, as 
with many issues beloved by the right, this is 
an issue that may be facing the friendliest 
court in many decades. This is definitely one 












Jamie Gass and Ben Degrow 
 
June 20, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States is 
expected to decide whether to hear Espinoza 
v. Montana Department of Revenue, a case 
that reveals the harm a state constitutional 
amendment marked by religious bias can do 
to families. 
 
Kendra Espinoza, who suddenly became a 
single mom, sought a better education for her 
daughters. In their public schools, one 
daughter was bullied and the other struggled 
academically. Both later would thrive in 
parochial school. 
 
After the Montana Supreme Court struck 
down her state’s education tax credit 
program, Espinoza was denied access 
to scholarships her children badly needed. 
She and two other Montana moms facing 
similar plights have asked the nation’s 
highest court to weigh in.  
 
Nationally, over 250,000 students benefit 
from private-school choice through 
education tax credits. The basis for the 
Montana court’s decision was the state’s 
130-year-old anti-aid, or Blaine, amendment. 
The state constitutional provisions in 
Montana, along with those in our respective 
states of Massachusetts and Michigan, 
represent distinct but formidable legacies of 
a dark, bigoted chapter of history that still 
limit educational opportunities for students 
and families who need them most. 
 
The case offers the U.S. Supreme Court the 
opportunity to reject the last vestiges of 19th 
century, anti-Catholic legal 
discrimination that remain in nearly 40 
states. Massachusetts has the oldest 
discriminatory amendment and Michigan has 
the most recent, but both are considered to be 
among the worst. 
 
In the mid-1850s, in the wake of Irish 
immigration, Massachusetts’ virulently anti-
Catholic Know-Nothing party passed the 
nation’s first anti-aid amendment, which, 
along with a revised amendment added in the 
early 20th century, prohibits any 
governmental unit from disbursing public 
funds to parochial-school parents. 
 
Today, these anti-aid amendments prevent 
more than 100,000 urban Bay State families 
with children in chronically underperforming 
districts from receiving education vouchers 
and tax credits that would grant them greater 
school choice. 
 
In the late 19th century, President Ulysses S. 
Grant proposed an anti-aid amendment to the 
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federal constitution. Maine Congressman 
James G. Blaine’s anti-aid bill followed, 
falling just short of congressional approval. 
Ultimately, his nativist scheming encouraged 
states to adopt anti-aid amendments in their 
own constitutions. 
 
Michigan’s turn came nearly a century later, 
as then-Gov. William Milliken sought to 
direct state aid to private and religious 
schools. While Reformed and Lutheran 
leaders were among those seeking financial 
support, the ensuing backlash took full aim at 
the most prominent target. “There can be no 
doubt in the mind of any informed observer,” 
private school choice opponents wrote in 
1969, “that the goal of the Catholic Church 
hierarchy is complete tax support for its 
schools.” 
 
Resistance to the governor’s proposal, 
referred to as “parochiaid,” stoked the flames 
of bigotry. “I have never witnessed such anti-
Catholic sentiment in my life,” one state 
senator observed. 
 
Some of that sentiment carried over to a 
successful 1970 ballot initiative campaign. 
Advocates for church-state separation joined 
forces with the teachers unions to prohibit 
both direct and indirect state support for 
families paying private school tuition. One 
pro-initiative brochure noted that the measure 
would overwhelmingly deny funds to 
“schools owned by the clergy of one 
politically active church.” 
 
In the half-century since Michigan’s anti-aid 
initiative passed, about half the states — 
including some with less onerous Blaine 
amendments — have adopted some form of 
private school parental choice. Yet harmful 
constitutional language still denies many 
Massachusetts and Michigan families equal 
access to educational options aligned to the 
dictates of their consciences.   
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that 
our Constitution’s First Amendment allows 
states to give families options between 
religious and nonreligious schools. Now the 
justices can take a close look at removing 
additional barriers to choice. 
Thanks to Kendra Espinoza, a determined 
Montana mom, the court has the opportunity 
to take up and strike down the infamous 
legacy of state Know-Nothing and Blaine 
amendments. From Massachusetts to 
Michigan and across the nation, many 
families’ hopes for more educational choice 


















December 13, 2018 
 
Montana's highest court has struck down a 
tuition tax-credit program which, as enacted 
by that state's legislature, allowed tuition 
scholarships to benefit students at private 
religious schools as well as secular schools. 
 
The program, which provides a tax credit of 
up to $150 per year to individuals and 
corporations that donate to tuition 
scholarship organizations, violates the state 
constitution's provision barring government 
aid to "sectarian schools," the Montana 
Supreme Court ruled 5-2. The program could 
not be saved by a rule adopted by the state 
department of revenue that excluded private 
religious schools from participation, the court 
further held. 
 
The state high court ruled that the Montana 
Constitution "more broadly prohibits 'any' 
state aid to sectarian schools and draws a 
more stringent line than that drawn by" the 
U.S. Constitution's prohibition against 
government establishment of religion. 
 
"Therefore, the sole issue in this case is 
whether the Tax Credit Program runs afoul of 
Montana's specific sectarian education no-aid 
provision, Article X, Section 6," Justice 
Laurie McKinnon wrote for the majority on 
Dec. 12 in Espinoza v. Montana Department 
of Revenue.  "The legislature's enactment of 
the Tax Credit Program is facially 
unconstitutional and violates Montana's 
constitutional guarantee to all Montanans that 
their government will not use state funds to 
aid religious schools." 
 
Writing in a dissent joined by one other 
member of the court, Justice Beth Baker said 
the scholarship funds never truly become 
public funds because they are donated to 
private scholarship organizations, and thus 
the inclusion of religious schools as 
beneficiaries does not violate the state 
constitutional bar against indirect aid to 
religion. 
 
A legal organization representing religious 
school families who would have benefited 
from the tax-credit program as enacted by the 
legislature vowed to appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
 
"Not only is the court misinterpreting the 
Montana Constitution, but it is ignoring 
important provisions in the federal 
Constitution," Erica Smith, a lawyer with the 
Arlington, Va.-based Institute for 
Justice, said in a statement. "The U.S. 
Supreme Court has been clear that the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
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prevents the government from discriminating 
against religious individuals in awarding 
public benefits. We plan to immediately 
appeal." 
 
Those families, in their suit that challenged 
the revenue department rule that sought to 
save the tax-credit program by barring 
religious schools, allege that there was anti-
Catholic sentiment behind the inclusion of 
the no-aid-to-sectarian-schools provision in 
Montana's 1889 Constitution. (The state in 
1972 adopted a new constitution, which kept 
language barring direct and indirect aid to 
religious institutions.) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently been 
skeptical of state programs that exclude 
religious institutions from general aid 
programs, but it has left open the question of 





































June Medical Services v. Gee  
 
Ruling Below: June Medical Services v. Gee, 905 F. 3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 
Overview: Louisiana created a law that required doctors who perform abortions to have the 
authority to admit patients at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic that the doctor provides 
abortion care. The Louisiana law was scheduled to go into effect on Monday, February 4, 2019. 
Abortion providers went to the Supreme Court to bar the Louisiana law from going into effect and 
the Supreme Court has put the law on hold indefinitely.   
 
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law 
requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 
 
JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES, L.L.C., Behalf of Its Patients, Physicians, and Staff, Doing 




Doctor Rebekah GEE, Defendant- Appellant 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
 
Decided on September 26, 2018   
 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Louisiana enacted the Unsafe Abortion 
Protection Act ("Act 620" or "the Act"), 
requiring abortion providers to have 
admitting privileges at a hospital located 
within thirty miles of the clinic where 
they perform abortions. On remand for 
consideration in light of Whole Woman's 
Health v. Hellerstedt, ("WWH"), the district 
court invalidated the Act as facially 
unconstitutional. The court overlooked that 
the facts in the instant case are remarkably 
different from those that occasioned the 
invalidation of the Texas statute in WWH. 
Here, unlike in Texas, the Act does not 
impose a substantial burden on a large 
fraction of women under WWH and other 
controlling Supreme Court authority. Careful 
review of the record reveals stark differences 
between the record before us and that which 
the Court considered in WWH. 
Almost all Texas hospitals required that for a 
doctor to maintain privileges there, he or she 
had to admit a minimum number of patients 
annually. Few Louisiana hospitals make that 
demand. Because Texas doctors could not 
gain privileges, all but 8 of 40 clinics closed. 
Here, only one doctor at one clinic is 
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currently unable to obtain privileges; there is 
no evidence that any of the clinics will close 
as a result of the Act. In Texas, the number of 
women forced to drive over 150 miles 
increased by 350%. Driving distances will 
not increase in Louisiana. Unlike the record 
in Louisiana, the record in Texas reflected no 
benefits from the legislation. Finally, because 
of the closures, the remaining Texas clinics 
would have been overwhelmed, burdening 
every woman seeking an abortion. In 
Louisiana, however, the cessation of one 
doctor's practice will affect, at most, only 
30% of women, and even then not 
substantially. 
That is only a summary. As we explain in 
detail, other facts underscore how 
dramatically less the impact is in Louisiana 
than in Texas. Because the Louisiana Act 
passes muster even under the stringent 
requirements of WWH and the other Supreme 
Court decisions by which we are strictly 




Act 620 requires "a physician performing or 
inducing an abortion" to "[h]ave active 
admitting privileges at a hospital that is 
located not further than thirty miles from the 
location at which the abortion is performed or 
induced and that provides obstetrical or 
gynecological health care services." 
"'[A]ctive admitting privileges' means that 
the physician is a member in good standing 
of the medical staff of a hospital that is 
currently licensed by the department, with the 
ability to admit a patient and to provide 
diagnostic and surgical services to such 
patient . . . ." Each violation can result in a 
fine up to $4,000. 
Act 620 is premised on the state's interest in 
protecting maternal health. Introducing the 
Act, Representative Katrina Jackson 
explained, "[I]f you are going to perform 
abortions in the State of Louisiana, you're 
going to do so in a safe environment and in a 
safe manner that offers women the optimal 
protection and care of their bodies." During 
consideration of the Act, the Louisiana 
Senate Committee on Health and Welfare 
heard testimony from women who had 
experienced complications during abortions 
and had been treated harshly by the provider. 
For example, Cindy Collins with Louisiana 
Abortion Recovery testified that when she 
underwent an abortion and began to 
hemorrhage, "the abortion doctor could see 
that something had gone wrong" but, instead 
of assisting her, "told [her] to get up and get 
out." She eventually required an emergency 
dilation and curettage ("D&C"). Testimony 
also established numerous health and safety 
violations by Louisiana abortion clinics. 
In addition to the concern for maternal health 
expressed at the hearing, Louisiana has an 
underlying interest in protecting unborn life. 
The state has codified its intent to "regulate 
abortion to the extent permitted." Its 
longstanding policy is that "the unborn child 
is a human being from the time of conception 
and is, therefore, a legal person . . . entitled to 
the right to life." And, Louisiana enacted a 
trigger law such that "if those decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court [legalizing 
abortion] are ever reversed or modified or the 
United States Constitution is amended to 
allow protection of the unborn then the 
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former policy of this State to prohibit 
abortions shall be enforced."  
A. 
Act 620 was set to become effective 
September 14, 2014, but on August 22, 2014, 
Bossier Medical Suite ("Bossier"), Causeway 
Clinic ("Causeway"), Hope Medical Group 
for Women ("Hope"), and two abortion 
doctors—Doe 1 and Doe 2 — (collectively 
"June Medical") sued to enjoin the Act, 
mounting a facial challenge, claiming that the 
Act placed an undue burden on women's 
access to abortions. The district court entered 
a temporary restraining order allowing the 
doctors to seek privileges during the 
preliminary-injunction proceedings. After a 
bench trial, the court granted a preliminary 
injunction on January 26, 2016, and denied a 
stay pending appeal.  
Louisiana requested and received from this 
court an emergency stay that the Supreme 
Court vacated on March 4, 2016. After the 
Supreme Court decided WWH, we remanded 
"so that the district court can engage in 
additional fact finding required by [WWH]." 
The district court entered final judgment 
April 26, 2017, permanently enjoining the 
Act. The court found "minimal" health 
benefits but "substantial burdens" and ruled 
the Act unconstitutional on its face 
under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, and WWH. Louisiana 
appeals. 
B. 
At the time of enactment, only five abortion 
clinics operated in Louisiana, and only six 
doctors performed elective abortions, of 
whom only one had qualifying admitting 
privileges. Since the enactment, two clinics 
have closed for reasons unrelated to the Act, 
and at least one doctor has obtained 
qualifying privileges. The analysis is fact-
bound, as required by WWH, so we begin 
with a detailed overview of each clinic and 
the abortion doctors it employs. 
1. The Causeway Clinic 
Causeway opened in 1999 and was located in 
Metairie, a suburb of New Orleans. It closed 
February 10, 2016, for reasons not disclosed 
in this record.  It had provided only surgical 
abortions during the first and second 
trimesters. Between 2009 and mid-2014, 
about 10,836 abortions were performed there. 
Causeway employed two abortion doctors, 
Doe 2 and Doe 4, neither of whom held 
admitting privileges at the time of Act 620's 
enactment. Within 30 miles of Causeway's 
former location, there are 10 qualifying 
hospitals. 
a. Doe 2 
Doe 2 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has 
been performing abortions since 1980. He is 
the only doctor in Louisiana willing to 
provide abortions after 18 weeks up to the 
legal limit of 21 weeks, 6 days. At Causeway, 
Doe 2 performed only surgical abortions 
between 6 weeks and 21 weeks, 6 days. He 
worked 2 weekends a month and performed 
25% of the clinic's abortions. In 2014, he 
estimated he performed about 450 abortions 
at Causeway, the majority being first-
trimester terminations. 
From 2009 through mid-2014, Doe 2 had 
only two patients who required 
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hospitalization. In one instance, during a 
second-trimester procedure, the woman 
experienced heavy vaginal and intra-
abdominal bleeding from a rupture of her 
incision from a prior C-Section. Doe 2 called 
9-1-1 and sent her charts and a note 
explaining the situation to the emergency 
room doctor. Doe 2 also called the doctor 
before the woman's arrival to explain the 
situation and visited her in the hospital after 
the surgery. 
The second instance was also a second-
trimester termination. The woman 
experienced some bleeding from uterine 
atony, and though Doe 2 believed it was non-
critical bleeding, he called 9-1-1 to be safe. 
Though he did not have admitting privileges 
before the Act's effective date, Doe 2 has 
since secured limited, non-qualifying 
privileges at Tulane in New Orleans.  
b. Doe 4 
Doe 4 is 82 years old and a board-certified 
OB/GYN with over 51 years' experience. He 
once provided abortions at the Acadian clinic 
but stopped in 2003 when that clinic closed. 
Though he retired from practice in 2012, 
Causeway requested in 2013 that he fill in for 
a doctor who had fallen ill. He agreed and 
provided abortions (for the first time in ten 
years) at Causeway until its closure. Other 
than ensuring that Doe 4 remained board-
certified, had a DEA license, and "was in 
good standing with the medicals," Doe 4 
knows of no other review undertaken, similar 
to hospitals' credentialing process, that 
ensures a doctor has the requisite skills and 
capacity to perform relevant procedures. 
Doe 4 worked Thursdays and every other 
weekend and performed 75% of the abortions 
that were done at the Causeway Clinic; all of 
his were first-trimester terminations. Doe 4 
"imagine[s] [he performs] about a thousand, 
fifteen hundred" abortions annually. He 
explained he would provide from 5 to 15 
abortions per day and that there was not a 
high demand or "a significant volume of 
business" at the Causeway clinic. 
Since resuming his abortion practice in 2013, 
Doe 4 has had one patient experience heavy 
bleeding caused by an atonic uterus. An 
ambulance had to be called, as the woman 
was not responding. Doe 4 thinks he "sent a 
note with her or a copy of her chart went with 
her to the emergency room," then he 
explained the situation to the doctor over the 
phone. 
Doe 4 does not currently possess admitting 
privileges but did apply to Ochsner at 
Kenner. He applied only to Ochsner because 
he "worked at Ochsner before in Baton 
Rouge and [he] had a doctor who had 
privileges at Ochsner who would certify that 
he would back up for" him. Other than a 
request for additional information (which he 
provided) and learning that  Ochsner had 
spoken to one of his references, Doe 4 did not 
receive a decision on his application, though 
he "think[s] he [has] a very good chance of 
getting privileges there." Doe 4 agreed that 
requiring the covering doctor to be an 
OB/GYN is not "an overburdensome 
requirement for admitting privileges." But he 
does not know any OB/GYNs in the area 
because "[a]ll the doctors that [he has] 
known, they've kind of died out. . . . [or] are 
no longer in practice." 
 752 
Upon Causeway's closure, Doe 4 stopped 
performing abortions and no longer intends 
to seek admitting privileges. Nothing in the 
record suggests he has been asked to continue 
at any other clinic or that the Act has caused 
him not to move to another clinic. In fact, 
during his deposition (when still working at 
Causeway) he was asked whether he would 
work at other clinics if requested, and he 
stated he was already "working more than 
enough for [his] age" and "do[es]n't want to 
work more." That would be his "personal 
choice." 
2. The Bossier Clinic 
Bossier Medical Suite opened in 1980 and 
was located in Bossier City in Northwestern 
Louisiana. It closed on March 30, 2017, for 
reasons not reflected in this record. It 
provided both medication and surgical 
abortions during the first and second 
trimesters. Between 2009 and mid-2014, 
about 4,171 abortions were performed there. 
Bossier employed one abortion doctor, Doe 
2, who did not hold admitting privileges at 
the time of the Act's enactment. There are 5 
qualifying hospitals within 30 miles of 
Bossier. 
In addition to his work at Causeway, Doe 2 
provided medical and surgical abortions at 
Bossier, his primary clinic. He worked there 
Tuesday through Saturday when he was not 
going to Causeway and Tuesday, 
Wednesday, and Thursday when he was 
going to Causeway. In 2014, he performed 
about 550 abortions at Bossier, at least 90% 
of which were first-trimester terminations. 
Doe 2 applied for privileges within thirty 
miles of the Bossier clinic. Because he 
already had consulting privileges at 
University Health, Doe 2 inquired about 
upgrading to courtesy privileges. He says that 
the "head of the department [of OB/GYN] . . 
. was very reticent and reluctant to consider 
that because of the political nature of" 
abortion. The department head spoke with the 
Dean and then informed Doe 2 "that [he was] 
not going to go beyond [his] [consulting] 
privileges." 
Doe 2 also applied to Willis Knighton 
Bossier City Hospital ("WKBC") on May 12, 
2014. WKBC sent a letter indicating that 
"applicants must demonstrate they have been 
actively practicing Obstetrics/Gynecology 
(in your case only Gynecology) in the past 12 
months." "In order for the Panel to 
sufficiently assess current clinical 
competence," WKBC requested that Doe 2 
"submit documentation, which should 
include operative notes and outcomes, of 
cases performed within the past 12 months 
for the specific procedures you are requesting 
on the privilege request form." Doe 2 testified 
that "it would have been impossible for [him] 
to submit that information . . . because [he has 
not] done any in-hospital work in ten years, 
so there is no body of hospitalized patients 
that [he has] to draw from." 
Doe 2 sent an email to WKBC indicating that 
"[o]ver the past 12 months [he] performed the 
procedures [he is] requesting privileges for 
several hundred times with no major 
complications" at Bossier. Instead of 
attaching documentation to that email, 
however, he merely invited "any qualified 
person who would like to visit the Clinic and 
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examine the records" to do so. Doe 2 initially 
testified that was his only response, but he 
later vaguely contradicted himself on re-
direct, prompting the district court to 
question him directly to determine whether 
he had submitted any information. In 
response, Doe 2 stated, "I actually called . . . 
and [they] said send 20 representative cases 
and that's what I did." 
It remains unclear whether Doe 2 sent a list 
of cases, as no document supporting that 
contention was ever supplied. Even the 
district court, in its thoroughly documented 
opinion, did not point to any evidence other 
than Doe 2's contradictory testimony. WKBC 
responded via letter that his answer 
(whatever it was) was not satisfactory. 
WKBC stated that the "application remains 
incomplete and cannot be processed" until 
the pertinent list of cases was submitted. 
Thus, Doe 2 has not been able to secure 
privileges at WKBC. 
Doe 2 has not applied, nor does he intend to 
apply, to any other hospital within thirty 
miles of Bossier. For instance, he refused to 
apply to Christus Schumpert. He says 
applying would be fruitless because the 
Catholic hospital would be unlikely to grant 
him privileges on account of the nature of his 
work. 
That assumption is belied by Doe 2's own 
personal history. He previously secured 
privileges at that hospital when he had both 
an OB/GYN practice and an abortion 
practice. Furthermore, as Doe 2 is aware, Doe 
3 maintains privileges at that hospital. 
Doe 2 also said he had no intention of 
applying to Minden Hospital because it was 
"very close to the [geographic] limits," is "a 
smaller hospital," and he "[doesn't] really 
know anyone there." Though a smaller 
hospital and close to the thirty-mile limit, 
Minden is a qualifying hospital under the 
Act. 
3. Delta Clinic 
Delta, in Baton Rouge, has offered abortions 
since 2001. It provides medication and 
surgical abortions up to the seventeenth 
week. Between 2009 and mid-2014, it 
provided about 8,800 abortions. Two of those 
patients required direct hospital transfer, one 
because she "decided during a procedure that 
she no longer wanted to have the abortion," 
and "the physician had already begun the 
process." Delta employs one abortion doctor, 
Doe 5, who does not hold admitting 
privileges within thirty miles of Delta. Four 
qualifying hospitals are located within thirty 
miles of Delta. 
Doe 5 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has 
performed abortions since April 2012, when 
he started working at the Delta and Women's 
clinics. He began working there after 
receiving a letter the clinics sent to all 
licensed physicians in Louisiana advertising 
the open position. Doe 5 is at Delta on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays but works 
additional days when necessary. It does not 
appear that Doe 5 maintains a separate 
OB/GYN practice. 
In 2013, Doe 5 performed approximately 
2,000 abortions at Delta. He has performed 
abortions up to 18 weeks' gestation but will 
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not go beyond that point. By week 18, the 
baby is formed to a certain degree that it is 
beyond what he "feel[s] comfortable looking 
at and dealing with." In a typical week, 
between both clinics, he performs "between 
40 and 60 of the surgical abortions and 20 to 
30 of the medical . . . abortions." Between the 
clinics, he believes he performs about 6 
second-trimester abortions per week. No 
patient has required a direct hospital transfer. 
Doe 5 has not secured qualifying privileges 
in Baton Rouge. He has applied to three 
hospitals: Woman's Hospital, Baton Rouge 
General Medical Center, and Lane Regional 
Medical Center. He has not heard back from 
the latter two but did receive a positive 
response from Woman's Hospital. 
Woman's Hospital indicated that it would 
grant privileges to Doe 5 once he identified a 
doctor willing to cover his service when he is 
unavailable. In fact, Doe 5 explained that 
Woman's Hospital cannot deny him 
privileges once he does that because, "from 
what [he is] told, [he] meet[s] all the 
qualifications. And as long as [he] meet[s] 
those, they can't deny [his application]." 
Delta has a transfer agreement with a 
physician at Woman's Hospital, so Doe 5 
asked that doctor whether he would be his 
covering doctor. That doctor refused because 
he did not want his information or 
relationship with the clinic to become public. 
Doe 5 does not appear to have reached out to 
anyone else, thus his application will remain 
pending until he takes further action. 
Doe 5 has not followed up with the other two 
hospitals on the status of his applications. He 
says he is waiting for a complete denial from 
Woman's Hospital before doing so. But, as 
explained, Woman's Hospital marked his 
application as pending until he finds someone 
to serve as a covering physician. He has 
contrived a situation in which it is impossible 
for him to obtain privileges. Woman's 
Hospital will not grant or deny privileges 
until he takes action to find a covering 
physician—something solely within his 
control. Yet, he refuses to follow up with 
other hospitals until Woman's Hospital takes 
action, something it cannot do until after Doe 
5 provides further information. 
4. The Hope Clinic 
Hope opened in 1980 and is located in 
Shreveport. It provides surgical and 
medication abortions through 16 weeks; it 
performs about 3,000 abortions per year. In 
the past 20 years, 4 patients at Hope required 
hospitalization, with 2 of those occurring in 
the past 5 years. The clinic offers abortions 3 
days a week. On busy days, it provides up to 
30 terminations, but its administrator, 
Kathaleen Pittman, testified that it could 
provide up to 60, though she thought that 
would be "quite a bit." 
At the time of trial, Hope employed two 
doctors, Doe 1 and Doe 3, to perform 
abortions. Following the closures of 
Causeway and Bossier (which occurred after 
the trial concluded), Hope also employs Doe 
2. Because Doe 2 began working at Hope 
post-trial, all estimates in the record for Hope 
encompass only Doe 1 and Doe 3. 
Doe 3 had admitting privileges before the 
enactment of Act 620 and remains Hope's 
only abortion doctor who has privileges. 
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There are 4 qualifying hospitals within 30 
miles of Hope. 
a. Doe 1 
Doe 1 is not an OB/GYN but, instead, is 
board certified in Family Medicine and 
Addiction Medicine. He has worked at Hope 
as a counseling physician since 2006 but 
began providing abortions only in 2008. He 
has never had a family-medicine practice. He 
is at Hope 3 days a week and provides about 
71% of Hope's abortions. In a given month, 
Doe 1 generally performs 250-300 abortions. 
He performs medication abortions up to 8 
weeks and surgical abortions up to 13 weeks. 
Between 2009 and 2014, he has had only one 
woman require hospitalization. 
Doe 1 applied to three of the four qualifying 
hospitals: WKBC, Christus Health, and 
Minden. He originally applied to WKBC to 
receive privileges via their Addiction 
Department, as he maintains a private 
practice in addiction medicine. WKBC could 
not grant him privileges in that field because 
its bylaws require "successfully complet[ing] 
a residency training program . . . in the 
specialty in which" privileges are sought. 
Doe 1 did not complete a residency in 
addiction medicine because no such 
residency program existed when he 
graduated medical school. 
Doe 1 then submitted a new application 
requesting privileges in Family 
Medicine.  WKBC requested that he "submit 
documentation of hospital admissions and 
management of patients 18 years of age or 
older for the past 12 months." It also 
requested him to explain further the types of 
complications he expects to treat at WKBC. 
He responded with a list of all patients he 
treated when working at a hospital from July 
2008 to May 2009. He indicated that he had 
not had to admit any patient for abortion-
related complications in the preceding twelve 
months, though he has referred women to 
other doctors in a few situations. WKBC has 
not responded to that update. 
Doe 1 corresponded with Christus Health at 
length. Christus requested additional 
information, and Doe 1 provided almost all 
such information. Christus requested Doe 1 
come in to receive an ID badge to complete 
the application, but when he tried to do so, he 
was told that he could not receive the badge 
because he was not applying for the right 
privileges. He then received a letter saying 
his application remained incomplete for lack 
of a badge. That letter also said his 
application had been pending for 120 days, 
and applications pending for longer than 90 
days were deemed withdrawn. Doe 1 
admitted he waited until the very end of the 
90-day period to try for the badge. He claims 
he was later told over the phone that he 
qualified only for a caregiver position, which 
would not include admitting privileges. That 
is not supported by documentation. 
Minden Hospital informed Doe 1 that it had 
no "need for a satellite primary care 
physician." The one hospital to which he did 
not apply, University Health, extends 
privileges by invitation only. He spoke to the 
chair of the Family Medicine Department, 
and, although the chair indicated an invitation 
would be forthcoming, Doe 1 was later told 
that there was "resistance" to extending him 
an invitation. 
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b. Doe 2 
Doe 2 provided abortions at Hope for a 
number of years before moving to the Bossier 
and Causeway clinics. Once those clinics 
closed, Doe 2 returned to Hope. He currently 
provides abortions at Hope when Doe 1 or 
Doe 3 is absent. 
c. Doe 3 
Doe 3 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has 
been performing abortions since 1981. He is 
the Chief Medical Officer at Hope. Of note, 
he has trained other doctors to provide 
abortions. Three of those are not OB/GYNs. 
One is a radiologist, another an 
ophthalmologist. The third, Doe 1, 
specialized in general family medicine. Doe 
3 hired all three and was the only one to 
evaluate their credentials. He admits he 
neither performed background checks nor 
inquired into their previous training. 
Doe 3 performs about 29% of the abortions at 
Hope. He provides both surgical and 
medication abortions two days a week. On 
average he sees 20-30 patients a week but has 
seen up to 64. If everything goes well, he can 
perform "about six procedures in one hour." 
Doe 3 says he cannot not devote any more 
time to Hope. 
In the past twenty years, Doe 3 has had three 
patients require hospitalization, and he 
knows of a fourth from Doe 1. One woman 
had a perforated uterus, and Doe 3 
accompanied her to the hospital and 
performed the necessary procedures. Another 
woman had heavy bleeding. The third had 
placenta accrete, "a very dangerous situation 
because you cannot get the bleeding  to stop." 
He implied that he also admitted her and 
performed her procedures. The fourth 
woman, Doe 1's patient, had a perforated 
uterus. Doe 3, who was on call at the hospital, 
admitted her and performed her procedures. 
Doe 3 is active staff, with admitting 
privileges at WKBC and Christus Schumpert 
Hospital. He maintains those privileges on 
account of his private OB/GYN practice. In 
his declaration, Doe 3 stated that  he will 
cease performing abortions "if he is the only 
provider in Louisiana with admitting 
privileges." Curiously, after Doe 5 obtained 
qualifying privileges in New Orleans—such 
that Doe 3 would no longer be at risk of being 
"the only provider in Louisiana"—Doe 3 
testified that he does not "believe [he] will 
continue" if he is "the last physician 
providing abortions in Northern Louisiana" 
(emphasis added). 
5. Women's Health 
Women's Health, in New Orleans, began 
providing abortions in 2001. It performs 
abortions through the seventeenth week of 
pregnancy, and it offers both medication and 
surgical abortions. Between 2009 and mid-
2014, about 7,400 abortions were performed 
there, with 2,300 in 2013 alone. Of those 
patients, 2 required direct hospital transfer. 
Women's employs 2 abortion doctors, Doe 5 
and Doe 6, neither of whom had admitting 
privileges at the time of Act 620's enactment. 
Doe 5 has since secured qualifying privileges 
at Touro Infirmary. There are 9 qualifying 
hospitals within 30 miles of Women's. 
a. Doe 5 
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Doe 5 began working at Women's in 2012. 
He works two days a week unless it is busy, 
in which case he may come in extra days. In 
2013, Doe 5 performed approximately 40% 
of the abortions provided by Women's, all of 
which were surgical procedures. As noted 
previously, Doe 5 has secured qualifying 
privileges at Touro, which is within thirty 
miles of Women's.  
b. Doe 6 
Doe 6 is a board-certified OB/GYN who has 
been performing abortions since 2002. He 
began working at Women's and Delta in 2002 
and has been the medical director of both 
since 2008. In 2013, he provided about 60% 
of the abortions occurring at Women's, which 
represents the percentage of medication 
abortions performed there. In that year, Doe 
6 provided approximately 1,300 medication 
abortions at Women's. In his ten years at 
these clinics, he has had two patients require 
direct hospital transfer. 
Doe 6 has not secured privileges. He applied 
to only one hospital, East Jefferson General 
Hospital ("EJGH"), and has not received a 
response. He inquired at Tulane but claims he 
"was told that [he] should not bother to apply 
because they would not grant privileges to 
[him] because [he has] not had hospital 
admitting privileges since August 2005."  
II. 
On the above facts, the district court found 
that all doctors had put forth a good-faith 
effort to obtain privileges and that Doe 5 
would be the sole remaining abortion 
provider in Louisiana were Act 620 to go into 
effect. Because it concluded that that would 
substantially burden a large fraction of 
women, the court invalidated the law. 
We review the district court's legal 
conclusions de novo and its factual findings 
for clear error. A finding is "'clearly 
erroneous' when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." "If the district court's account of 
the evidence is plausible in light of the record 
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals 
may not reverse it even though convinced 
that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it 
would have weighed the evidence 
differently."  
A. 
First we must resolve the appropriate 
framework for reviewing facial challenges to 
abortion statutes. As a general matter, 
"[f]acial challenges are 
disfavored."  Louisiana says we should 
reverse because the district court used the 
wrong framework for evaluating a facial 
challenge and that we instead should 
follow United States v. Salerno, under which 
plaintiffs "must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [law] 
would be valid." 
June Medical urges, to the contrary, 
that WWH foreclosed using 
the Salerno framework in the abortion 
context. In WWH, the Court, reviewing an as-
applied challenge, reversed and invalidated 
the law in its entirety, finding that a large 
fraction of women would be substantially 
burdened. 
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Before WWH, this court viewed the standard 
for facial invalidation of abortion regulations 
as "uncertain." In Lakey, we explained that a 
plurality in Casey, had concluded that a 
regulation was facially invalid if, "in a large 
fraction of the cases in which it is relevant, it 
will operate as a substantial obstacle." Earlier 
decisions, however, had used the "no set of 
circumstances" standard 
In WWH, the Court eliminated the 
uncertainty and adopted the Casey plurality's 
large-fraction framework. As the Eighth 
Circuit explained, "For [facial] challenges to 
abortion regulations, however, the Supreme 
Court has fashioned a different standard 
under which the plaintiff can prevail by 
demonstrating that 'in a large fraction of the 
cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will 
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's 
choice.'" 
Importantly, the Court in WWH clarified by 
limiting the "large fraction" to include only 
"those women for whom the provision is an 
actual rather than an irrelevant restriction." 
"[C]ases in which [the provision at issue] 
is relevant" is a narrower category than "all 
women," "pregnant women," or even 
"women seeking abortions identified by the 
State." For a law regulating only medication 
abortions, for example, the relevant 
denominator is not all women seeking any 
type of abortion, but only those potentially 
impacted (i.e., those seeking a medication 
abortion). In WWH, the Court treated the 
denominator as all women seeking abortions, 
but only because the statute at issue, 
encompassed all types of abortions.  
Here, too, the relevant denominator to 
determine a "large fraction" is all women 
seeking abortions in Louisiana, as Act 620 
applies to providers of both medication and 
surgical abortions. Accordingly, to sustain 
the facial invalidation of Act 620, we would 
have to find that it substantially burdens a 
large fraction of all women seeking abortions 
in Louisiana. 
B. 
The parties present conflicting interpretations 
of the legal standard for finding an undue 
burden under WWH. June Medical 
frames WWH's analysis as a balancing test: 
"Where an abortion restriction's burdens 
outweigh its benefits, the burdens are 'undue' 
and unconstitutional." Louisiana counters 
that WWH did not alter the well-known 
standard in Casey. 
WWH's analysis is rooted in Casey, which 
defined an "undue burden" as "shorthand for 
the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion of a nonviable fetus." The Court 
in WWH explained that Casey "requires that 
courts consider the burdens a law imposes on 
abortion access together with the benefits 
those laws confer."  
In WWH, the Court relied on Casey's 
analyses of the spousal-notification and 
parental-notification provisions. In 
parentheticals, it describes the decisional 
process as "balancing." Consequently, 
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
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abortion impose an undue burden on the 
right."  
There is no doubt that WWH imposes a 
balancing test, and Louisiana errs in denying 
that. It is not reasonable to read the language 
in WWH, quoted above, as announcing 
anything but a balancing test, especially 
given the Court's express use of the word 
"balancing" to describe Casey.  
Hewing to WWH and Casey, we recognize 
and apply a balancing test. Louisiana, 
however, is correct that it is not a "pure" 
balancing test under which any burden, no 
matter how slight, invalidates the law. 
Instead, the burden must still be substantial, 
as we will explain. 
Quoting Casey as cited above, the WWH 
Court began by emphasizing that to fail 
constitutional scrutiny, a law must place "a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion." Casey expressly allows 
for the possibility that not every burden 
creates a "substantial obstacle." Thus, even 
regulations with a minimal benefit are 
unconstitutional only where they present a 
substantial obstacle to abortion.  
The proper reading of WWH is a combination 
of the views offered by June Medical and 
Louisiana: A minimal burden even on a large 
fraction of women does not undermine the 
right to abortion. To conclude otherwise 
would neuter Casey, and any reasonable 
reading of WWH shows that the Court only 
reinforced what it had said in Casey. Thus, 
we must weigh the benefits and burdens of 
Act 620 to determine whether it places a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a large 
fraction of women seeking abortions in 
Louisiana. 
C. 
We are of course bound by WWH's holdings, 
announced in a case with a substantially 
similar statute but greatly dissimilar facts and 
geography. We begin by summarizing the 
Court's close, fact-bound balancing analysis 
of the benefits and burdens in WWH—an 
analysis that led the Court to conclude that 
Texas's admitting-privileges requirement 
was unduly burdensome. 
1. 
The Court began by examining the benefits 
the admitting-privileges requirement might 
provide. It noted that the purpose of Texas's 
law was to "ensure that women have easy 
access to a hospital should complications 
arise during an abortion procedure." The 
evidence the court examined to determine 
whether the law served its stated purpose 
included expert testimony and studies about 
abortions in the United States generally. The 
Court explained that there was "nothing in 
Texas' record evidence that shows that, 
compared to prior law (which required a 
'working arrangement' with a doctor with 
admitting privileges), the new law advanced 
Texas' legitimate interest in protecting 
women's health."  The Court specifically 
noted that Texas could not point to "a single 
instance in which the new requirement would 
have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment."  
Further, the Court found that the privileges 
had no relationship to a doctor's 
ability. Instead, the privileges provision 
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looked to discretionary factors such as 
clinical data requirements and residency 
requirements. One abortion doctor who had 
practiced for 38 years was unable to obtain 
privileges at any of the 7 hospitals within the 
required 30-mile radius of the 
clinic.  Therefore, "[t]he admitting-privileges 
requirement does not serve any relevant 
credentialing function." 
2. 
WWH identified four burdens imposed by the 
admitting-privileges requirement. Primarily, 
it caused the closure of 80% of Texas's 
abortion clinics. Only 7 or 8 of the 40 
remained. The Court looked to the timing of 
the closures as evidence of causation. When 
H.B. 2 began to be enforced, the number of 
clinics dropped to half, from 40 to 20. The 
day the requirement took effect, 11 more 
clinics closed.  
Part of the reason for the closures was the 
difficulty of obtaining privileges. Many 
Texas hospitals conditioned admitting 
privileges on having a minimum number of 
patient admissions per year. That created an 
almost-universal requirement that physicians 
with privileges maintain minimum annual 
admissions, constituting a per se bar to 
admission for most abortion doctors. The 
president of a Texas hospital testified that no 
doctor could get privileges near El Paso 
because not a single patient seeking an 
abortion had required transfer to a hospital in 
the past ten years. Thus, "doctors would be 
unable to maintain admitting privileges or 
obtain those privileges for the future."  
Closures in Texas caused the third burden: 
increased driving distances. After the 
closures, the number of women living more 
than 150 miles from a clinic rose from 86,000 
to 400,000, an increase of 350%. The number 
of women living more than 200 miles from a 
clinic increased from 10,000 to 290,000, an 
increase of 2,800%. The Court "recognize[d] 
that increased driving distances do not 
always constitute an 'undue burden,'"  but 
stacking that burden on top of the others, 
"when viewed in light of the virtual absence 
of any health benefit," supported the finding 
of an undue burden.  
The final burden was decreased capacity—
"fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and 
increased crowding." The Court used 
"common sense" to conclude that the 
remaining clinics could not expand their 
capacity fivefold to meet the demand for 
abortions. The remaining clinics would need 
to expand from providing 14,000 abortions 
per year to providing 60,000-72,000 per 
year. The Court found that to be unrealistic 
because of the capacity currently carried by 
existing clinics and the lack of evidence that 
expansion was feasible.  
III. 
Mirroring the fact-intensive review that the 
Supreme Court performed in WWH, we do 
the same in-depth analysis of the instant 
record, weighing both the benefits and the 
burdens of Act 620. Unlike Texas, Louisiana 
presents some evidence of a minimal benefit. 
And, unlike Texas, Louisiana presents far 
more detailed evidence of Act 620's impact 
on access to abortion. In light of the more 
developed record presented to the district 
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court and to us, the district court—albeit with 
the best of intentions and after diligent 
effort—clearly and reversibly erred. In 
contrast to Texas's H.B. 2, Louisiana's Act 
620 does not impose a substantial burden on 
a large fraction of women, so the facial 
challenge fails.  
A. 
The legislative history of Act 620 plainly 
evidences an intent to promote women's 
health. Specifically, the Act seeks to 
accomplish that goal by ensuring a higher 
level of physician competence and by 
requiring continuity of care. 
Texas presented no evidence that the 
credentialing function performed by 
hospitals differed from the credentialing 
performed by clinics. The record for 
Louisiana contains testimony from abortion 
providers themselves, explaining that the 
hospitals perform more rigorous and intense 
background checks than do the clinics. The 
record shows that clinics, beyond ensuring 
that the provider has a current medical 
license, do not appear to undertake any 
review of a provider's competency. The 
clinics, unlike hospitals, do not even appear 
to perform criminal background checks.  
Finally, Louisiana explains that the Act 
brings the requirements regarding outpatient 
abortion clinics into conformity with 
the preexisting requirement that physicians at 
ambulatory surgical centers ("ASCs") must 
have privileges at a hospital within the 
community. 48 LA. ADMIN. CODE § 
4535(E)(1). Procedures performed at ASCs 
include upper and lower GI endoscopies, 
injections into the spinal cord, and orthopedic 
procedures. 
Outpatient procedures such as dental 
surgeries and some D&C miscarriage-
management procedures do not require the 
same admitting privileges. Those are 
governed by Title 46 of the regulatory code, 
whereas outpatient abortion facilities and 
ASCs are under Title 48. Louisiana's expert, 
who was involved in the drafting of Act 620, 
testified that the differential treatment was 
because of that grouping and did not single 
out abortion providers from other outpatient 
surgery centers.  Thus, Louisiana was not 
attempting to target or single out abortion 
facilities. 
In fact, it was just the opposite—the purpose 
of the Act was to bring them "into the same 
set of standards that apply to physicians 
providing similar types of services in 
[ASCs]." The benefit from conformity was 
not presented in WWH, nor were the reasons 
behind the conformity—continuity of care, 
qualifications, communication, and 
preventing abandonment of patients—
directly addressed. Accordingly, unlike 
in WWH, the record here indicates that the 
admitting-privileges requirement performs a 
real, and previously unaddressed, 
credentialing function that promotes the 
wellbeing of women seeking abortion. 
Still, the benefits conferred by Act 620 are 
not huge. Though we credit Louisiana's more 
robust record on the benefits side of the 
ledger, the district court did not clearly err in 
finding that Act 620 provides minimal 
benefits, given the current standard of care in 
highly specialized hospital settings.  
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B. 
In WWH, the Court identified four obstacles 
erected by Texas's requirement of admitting 
privileges: closure of facilities, difficulty in 
obtaining privileges, driving distances, and 
clinic capacities. The Court decided not that 
any burden individually was sufficient but 
that the four dominoed to constitute a 
substantial burden. 
The near impossibility of obtaining privileges 
was the first domino to fall. Had that 
difficulty not loomed, there would have been 
no facility closures, no increased driving 
distances, and no issues regarding clinic 
capacities. Given the high minimum 
admissions requirement at most Texas 
hospitals, that first burden was unavoidable. 
Originally, Texas had 40 facilities and 
numerous abortion doctors. Because the 
doctors could not obtain privileges, the 
number of clinics fell from 40 to only 7 or 8. 
Those closures undoubtedly burdened almost 
all women seeking abortions in Texas as a 
result of capacity issues and increased 
driving distances. 
Thus, everything turns on whether the 
privileges requirement actually would 
prevent doctors from practicing in Louisiana. 
If that domino does not fall, no other burdens 
result. So we review the difficulty facing the 
abortion providers and trace them back to the 
patients to determine whether Act 620 
substantially burdens a large fraction of 
women seeking abortions. 
The paucity of abortion facilities and 
abortion providers in Louisiana allows for a 
more nuanced analysis of the causal 
connection between Act 620 and its burden 
on women than was possible in WWH. For 
one, we can examine each abortion doctor's 
efforts to comply with the requirements of 
Act 620. We also can look to the specific by-
laws of the hospitals to which each applied. 
This more intricate analysis yields a richer 
picture of the statute's true impact, the sort of 
obstacle it imposed. And this methodology 
allows us to scrutinize more closely whether 
June Medical has met its burden. 
We conclude that it has not. To the contrary, 
it has failed to establish a causal connection 
between the regulation and its burden—
namely, doctors' inability to obtain admitting 
privileges. Specifically, there is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that, had the doctors put 
forth a good-faith effort to comply with Act 
620, they would have been unable to obtain 
privileges. Instead, as discussed below, the 
vast majority largely sat on their hands, 
assuming that they would not qualify. Their 
inaction severs the chain of causation. 
The district court inquired whether the 
doctors had put forth a good-faith effort, 
without which June Medical cannot establish 
the requisite causation between Act 620 and 
a doctor's inability to obtain privileges. And, 
as WWH emphasized, it is June Medical's 
burden to put forth affirmative evidence of 
causation. Were we not to require such 
causation, the independent choice of a single 
physician could determine the 
constitutionality of a law. Using this 
methodology, we conclude, given the entire 
weight of the evidence, that the district court 
clearly erred in saying that all doctors had put 
forth a good-faith effort to obtain privileges. 
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Unlike the litigants in WWH, who presented 
only generalities concerning admitting 
privileges, the parties here provide the 
bylaws for the relevant hospitals. The 
situation differs from the circumstances 
in WWH in that the majority of hospitals do 
not have a minimum number of required 
admissions that a doctor must have to 
maintain privileges. Instead, most hospitals 
have a competency requirement. 
Competency is evaluated either by requesting 
the doctor to provide information about 
recent admissions at any other hospital or by 
having a provisional admittance period 
during which the hospital can personally 
observe and evaluate him. Although the grant 
of privileges remains discretionary, the death 
knell to Texas's H.B. 2 was the combination 
of discretion and minimum admission 
requirements—the latter of which is less 
prevalent in Louisiana. 
1. Doe 1 
The district court concluded that Doe 1 put 
forth a good-faith effort and could not obtain 
privileges. Doe 1 applied to three of four 
qualifying hospitals near Hope. WKBC has 
not responded. There appears to be an 
unresolved communication problem with 
Christus, so it is possible Doe 1 could obtain 
qualifying privileges there. The record is 
uncertain on this point, so we cannot say that 
the district court clearly erred in concluding 
that Doe 1 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe 
1 was definitively rejected by Minden for 
reasons other than credentials. The fourth 
hospital, University Health, requires an 
invitation to apply, and the hospital declined 
to extend an invitation because of department 
resistance to staffing an abortion provider. 
2. Doe 2 
The district court erroneously concluded that 
Doe 2 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe 2, 
now a back-up abortion doctor at Hope in 
Shreveport, inquired about privileges at two 
hospitals within thirty miles of Hope. He 
claims that University Health refused to 
extend an invitation because of his abortion 
practice. WKBC required he submit 
documentation of OB/GYN procedures on 
whether he supplied documentation. At the 
very least, he explained to WKBC that he 
"performed the procedures [he is] requesting 
privileges for several hundred times" at the 
Bossier clinic. WKBC responded that that did 
not suffice—but the record does not establish 
whether the deficiency was his email 
response or actual documentation of the 
Bossier cases. performed within the past 
twelve months. Doe 2's testimony was 
contradictory 
It is possible that Doe 2 could obtain 
privileges at Christus, though he has not 
applied. He previously had privileges there, 
and Doe 3 currently maintains privileges 
there. Thus, Doe 2's theory that a Catholic 
hospital would not staff an abortion provider 
is blatantly contradicted by the record. 
Opposite to what the district court found, 
Christus and Minden remain open options.  
3. Doe 3 
Doe 3 already has privileges at two hospitals 
within thirty miles of Hope. Thus, the Act is 
not burdensome on him. 
4. Doe 4 
 764 
In order to return to retirement, Doe 4 has 
stopped pursuing privileges and came out of 
retirement to cover for a sick doctor. There is 
no evidence of causation, so we need not 
evaluate whether he could obtain privileges. 
5. Doe 5 
The district court erroneously concluded that 
Doe 5 put forth a good-faith effort in 
obtaining privileges for his practice at Delta. 
For his abortion practice at Women's, Doe 5 
received admitting privileges at Touro, which 
is within thirty miles of Women's. 
For his practice at Delta, Doe 5 applied to 
three nearby hospitals. Two have not 
responded, but, according to Doe 5, Woman's 
Hospital will grant him privileges once he 
finds a covering doctor. He mentions asking 
only one doctor to serve as his covering 
physician. That doctor declined, and Doe 5 
provides no evidence that he has reached out, 
or intends to reach out, to other doctors. 
Though Woman's Hospital is awaiting Doe 
5's further action, he inexplicably states he is 
waiting on Woman's Hospital's further action 
before following up on his other two 
applications. The most logical explanation 
for Doe 5's delay is that he is awaiting the 
result of this litigation before he acts. 
As Doe 4 testified, finding a covering 
physician is not overly burdensome. Under 
the clear-error standard, looking to the entire 
weight of the evidence, we are left with the 
impression that Doe 5 is waiting for the 
outcome of this litigation to put forth an 
actual good-faith effort. That lackluster 
approach is insufficient for facial invalidation 
of the law. In light of Doe 5's failure to seek 
a covering physician, the district court clearly 
erred in finding that Doe 5 put forth a good-
faith effort and that his application at 
Woman's Hospital was de facto denied. The 
Act is not overly burdensome on Doe 5. 
6. Doe 6 
The district court erroneously concluded that 
Doe 6 put forth a good-faith effort. Doe 6 
applied to one hospital, EJGH, from which he 
has received no response. He was told by 
Tulane that his lack of recent admissions is 
likely a barrier, so he did not apply there. 
But there are nine qualifying hospitals in the 
area. Moreover, he has not applied to Touro, 
where Doe 5 was able to obtain qualifying 
privileges. That lack of effort demonstrates 
the district court's clear error in finding that 
Doe 6 put forth a good-faith effort. 
7. Conclusion 
Given the evidence, only Doe 1 has put forth 
a good-faith effort to get admitting privileges. 
Doe 2, Doe 5, and Doe 6 could likely obtain 
privileges. Doe 3 is definitively not 
burdened. 
At least three hospitals have proven willing 
to extend privileges. On the entire evidence, 
we are left with the definite and firm 
conviction that the district court erred in 
finding that only Doe 5 would be able to 
obtain privileges and that the application 
process creates particular hardships and 
obstacles for abortion providers in Louisiana. 
C. 
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In Texas, the admitting-privileges law caused 
32 of the 40 clinics to close. In dramatic 
contrast, under the record presented to us, 
there is no evidence that Louisiana facilities 
will close from Act 620. If the Act were to go 
into effect today, both Women's and Hope 
could remain open, though each would have 
only one qualified doctor. Delta would be the 
only clinic required to close, as its only 
Doctor, Doe 5, does not have admitting 
privileges within 30 miles. Because obtaining 
privileges is not overly burdensome, 
however, the fact that one clinic would have 
to close is not a substantial burden that can 
currently be attributed to Act 620 as 
distinguished from Doe 5's failure to put forth 
a good-faith effort. And, because Doe 5 has a 
pending offer and probably will be able to 
obtain privileges, the only permissible 
finding, under this record, is that no clinics 
will likely be forced to close on account of 
the Act. 
Doe 3 initially indicated that he would cease 
practicing if he is the only remaining abortion 
doctor in the entire state. Once it became 
clear that at least one other doctor (Doe 5) 
had obtained privileges and would continue 
practicing, Doe 3's story changed. He 
testified that he would now cease practicing 
were he the only remaining abortion provider 
in northern Louisiana. If he leaves the 
practice today, Hope would close because 
Doe 1 and Doe 2 do not currently have 
privileges. The closure, however, would also 
lack the requisite causation, as it rests on an 
independent personal choice. Doe 3's shifting 
preference as to the number of remaining 
abortion providers is entirely independent of 
the admitting-privileges requirement. 
The district court's contrary findings are 
clearly erroneous. To attribute a doctor's 
cessation of practice to Act 620, his 
retirement must be caused by a direct 
inability to meet the legal requirements of the 
bill. Doe 5's inaction and Doe 3's personal 
choice to stop practicing cannot be legally 
attributed to Act 620. Departure from the 
standard of direct causation leads to a line-
drawing problem that would allow unrelated 
decisions to inform the undue-burden 
inquiry. For the question of causation, 
although the "government may not place 
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of 
her freedom of choice, it need not remove 
those obstacles."  
In WWH, the majority rejected the dissent's 
theory that the clinic closures could be 
attributed to some other cause and not H.B. 2. 
It did so because there was no evidence of 
such alternative causes in the record; 
accordingly, the dissent's theories were mere 
"speculation." Here, by contrast, there was 
clear evidence in the record before the district 
court that various doctors failed to seek 
admitting privileges in good faith. Unlike 
in WWH, Act 620's impact was severed by an 
intervening cause: the doctors' failure to 
apply for privileges in a reasonable 
manner. Accordingly, there is an insufficient 
basis in the record to conclude that the law 
has prevented most of the doctors from 
gaining admitting privileges. Similarly, any 
clinic closures that result from the doctors' 
inaction cannot be attributed to Act 620. 
D. 
Although "increased driving distances do not 
always constitute an 'undue burden,'" they 
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can be, under the right facts, "one additional 
burden, which, when taken together with 
others . . . and when viewed in light of the 
virtual absence of any health benefit," can 
constitute an undue burden. Louisiana does 
not reflect such right facts. Because all three 
clinics could remain open, the Act will cause 
no increase in driving distance for any 
woman—an extremely important distinction 
from the record in Texas. 
E. 
Following the implementation of H.B. 2, the 
number of clinics in Texas decreased, as we 
have repeatedly noted, from 40 to only 7 or 
8. The WWH Court expressed concern that 
open facilities would not be able to "meet the 
demand of the entire State." In Texas, each 
open facility would have had to increase its 
abortions from 14,000 to 60,000 or 70,000—
"an increase by a factor of about five." The 
Court rejected the contention that facilities 
could expand to meet the demand absent 
facility-specific evidence.  In Louisiana, 
however, because no clinics would close, 
there would be no increased strain 
on available facilities, as no clinic will have 
to absorb another's capacity. 
Importantly, however, it will be nearly 
impossible for Doe 1 to obtain qualifying 
privileges. Therefore, we review the facts to 
determine whether the remaining abortion 
providers at Hope have the capacity to meet 
the demand Doe 1 currently satisfies. 
Doe 1 practices at Hope alongside Doe 2 and 
Doe 3. Doe 1 testified that he performs about 
2,100 abortions annually. Doe 2 fills in when 
Doe 1 or Doe 3 is unavailable. When Doe 2 
served as the primary provider at Causeway 
and Bossier, he performed 1,000 abortions 
per year. Doe 3 performs somewhere 
between 870 and 1,250 per year.  
If Doe 1 ceased performing abortions, Doe 2 
could likely step in, as that is his current 
arrangement. Assuming Doe 2 performs at 
his previous capacity, there would be a gap of 
about 1,100 abortions at the Hope clinic. Split 
between Doe 2 and Doe 3, that is an 
additional 550 procedures per doctor per 
year. That is not overly burdensome, 
especially given Doe 3's testimony that he has 
performed up to 60 procedures per week and 
regularly performs up to 30.  
To put that number in perspective, the Court 
in WWH found unduly burdensome the 
expectation that 8 clinics could absorb the 
work of 40. Each remaining Texas abortion 
provider would have had to increase his 
capacity by a factor of 5. A fivefold increase 
for Doe 3 would mean performing 100-150 
abortions per week instead of his usual 20-30. 
In contrast, the loss of Doe 1 would require 
Doe 3 to perform only 5 extra procedures 
each day he currently works (2 days per 
week). Instead of performing 20-30 abortions 
per week, he would perform 30-40. It 
necessarily follows that a gap of 1,100 
procedures per year—split between 2 
doctors—does not begin to approach the 
capacity problem in WWH and is not a 
substantial burden. 
Consider, for example, Doe 3's testimony that 
he can perform up to 6 abortions per hour. 
Using that number, adding 1,100 abortions 
would require 183.3 hours per year, which is 
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an extra 3.6 hours per week, or about 1.8 
hours per day, assuming a two-day work 
week for 50 weeks of work. Divided between 
two doctors, that is 54 minutes per day. Under 
that estimation based on the facts in the 
record, the extra 54 minutes of procedure 
time is unlikely to result in an undue burden 
on women. At the very least, June Medical 
did not produce sufficient evidence to evince 
such a burden. 
To put it another way, Doe 2 and Doe 3 will 
each need to perform an additional 550 
procedures per year. That amounts to six 
extra abortions each day that Doe 3 currently 
works. Using his testimony that he can 
perform six abortions an hour, that load 
would not result in a substantial increase in 
wait times. Common sense dictates that an 
hour cannot be a substantial burden. 
F. 
Though we have determined that no woman 
would be unduly and thus unconstitutionally 
burdened by Act 620, we additionally hold 
that the law does not burden a large fraction 
of women. To quantify the burden of 
eliminating Doe 1, the large-fraction standard 
requires us to determine what percentage of 
women seeking abortions in Louisiana would 
be affected by Act 620. 
As an initial matter, WWH is less than clear 
on how to delimit the numerator and 
denominator to define the relevant fraction. 
The Supreme Court has limited the 
denominator to only individuals whose 
abortion rights are burdened by the statute: It 
encompasses "those [women] for whom [the 
provision] is an actual rather than an 
irrelevant restriction."  
It is an open question whether the 
denominator is made up of those women who 
could potentially be burdened by the 
regulation or just those women who are 
actually burdened. Under the former, the 
numerator is then comprised of those women 
who are actually burdened by the regulation. 
Then we would review whether those women 
are substantially burdened and whether that 
fraction is large. Under the second 
interpretation, the numerator is comprised of 
those women who are substantially burdened 
by the regulation. And, then we would 
determine whether the resulting fraction is 
large. 
We need not decide which interpretation is 
proper because June Medical failed to 
demonstrate that a large fraction of women 
are substantially burdened under either 
analysis. 
1. 
We start with the first interpretation—the 
reading most favorable for June Medical. 
There are approximately 10,000 abortions 
performed annually in Louisiana, 3,000 of 
which are at Hope, where Doe 1 currently 
works. Thus, only 30% (or, less than one-
third) of women seeking an abortion would 
face even a potential burden of increased wait 
times were Doe 1 to cease practicing. 
The Supreme Court has not defined what 
constitutes a "large fraction," and the circuit 
courts have shed little light. The Sixth Circuit 
determined that 12% was insufficient and 
that the large-fraction requirement is "more 
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conceptual than mathematical." It concluded 
that "a large fraction exists when a statute 
renders it nearly impossible for the women 
actually affected by an abortion restriction to 
obtain an abortion." In other words, as 
"[o]ther circuits" have found, "a large 
fraction [exists only] when practically all of 
the affected women would face 
a substantial obstacle in obtaining an 
abortion."  
Thirty percent does not approach "practically 
all" women seeking abortions in Louisiana 
and cannot be deemed a large fraction for 
purposes of WWH or Act 620. A superficial 
reaction might be to think, to the contrary, 
that 30% is obviously large. A few easy 
examples show why that is not so. If 30% of 
a law school class failed the bar, we would 
say that is a large fraction. Conversely, if 
30% passed the bar, we would think that 
small. Again, if 30% of children had food to 
eat for lunch today, we would think that a 
small fraction. But if 30% were without food, 
we would think that large. Thus what 
constitutes a large fraction requires 
identifying the starting point. 
In every other area of the law, a facial 
challenge requires plaintiffs to establish a 
provision's unconstitutionality in every 
conceivable application. In other words, they 
must demonstrate an unconstitutional burden 
on 100% of those impacted. Plaintiffs 
asserting abortion rights, however, are 
excused from that demanding standard and 
must show a substantial burden in only a 
large fraction of cases. 
The shift from the usual standard to the large-
fraction standard was intended to ease the 
burden on abortion plaintiffs relative to 
plaintiffs who bring challenges to other sorts 
of laws. There is a difference, however, 
between cracking the door and holding it 
wide open. 
It cannot be that we force a plaintiff asserting 
his right to a fair trial, to freedom from 
unconstitutional searches and seizures, to 
associate freely, or to exercise his religion 
freely, to shoulder the burden of 
demonstrating that there is no 
possible constitutional application of a law, 
while allowing an abortion plaintiff to 
succeed on a showing that the law is 
unconstitutional in less than one of three 
cases. Bearing a burden of 30% compared to 
the typical burden of 100% is not large. To 
conclude otherwise eviscerates the 
restrictions on a successful facial challenge. 
Not only is 30% not a large fraction for 
purposes of WWH and Act 620, as already 
explained, any burden imposed by the Act is 
not substantial even on women within the 
30%. The burden is only potential: Doe 1's 
capacity can easily be absorbed by the 
remaining abortion doctors. Even were that 
potential burden of increased wait times to 
materialize, it would not be substantial. 
June Medical's challenge thus fails under this 
interpretation at both critical points. It first 
fails to establish that the women potentially 
impacted suffer an unconstitutional burden. 
And it further fails to show that this group of 
women constitutes a large fraction. Instead of 
demonstrating an undue burden on a large 
fraction of women, June Medical at most 
shows an insubstantial burden on a small 
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fraction of women. That falls far short of a 
successful facial challenge. 
2. 
Under the second interpretation, June 
Medical fares even worse. The denominator 
of women actually burdened is limited to 
those 3,000 women who seek abortions 
annually at Hope Clinic. The numerator is 
limited to those women substantially 
burdened. Since we have already concluded 
that Act 620 effects no constitutional 
deprivation, the numerator encompasses no 
one. In other words, the statute imposes an 
undue burden on 0% of women. By 
definition, zero percent is not large. Thus, 
June Medical cannot succeed on its facial 
challenge under this interpretation either. 
IV. 
We are bound to apply WWH, which is highly 
fact-bound, and the records from Texas and 
Louisiana diverge in all relevant respects. Act 
620 results in a potential increase of 54 
minutes at one of the state's clinics for at most 
30% of women. That is not a substantial 
burden at all, much less a substantial burden 
on a large fraction of women as is required to 
sustain a facial challenge. Despite its diligent 
effort to apply WWH faithfully, the district 
court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.  
The judgment is REVERSED, and a 
judgment of dismissal is RENDERED. 
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, 
dissenting:  
Twenty-six years ago, the Supreme Court 
laid down the now familiar metric: 
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion impose an undue burden" on the 
exercise of that right. Yet the majority today 
fails to meaningfully apply the undue burden 
test as articulated in Casey and clarified 
in Whole Woman's Health and fails to give 
the appropriate deference to the district 
court's opinion, essentially conducting a 
second trial of the facts on this cold appellate 
record. With respect, I must dissent. 
I. 
We are to "consider the burdens a law 
imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer." While the 
majority correctly rejects Louisiana's 
untenable position that WWH does not 
require balancing, it then misapplies that 
balancing. As I will detail, Act 620 will 
substantially burden women's access to 
abortion with no demonstrable medical 
benefit. In reaching a contrary conclusion, 
the majority accepts the district court's 
findings of a want of benefits but offers a 
starkly different view of the burdens 
imposed. 
On a robust trial record after conducting a 
six-day bench trial, the district court 
documented its findings of benefits and 
burdens in a lengthy and detailed opinion. 
The divergence between the findings of the 
district court and the majority is striking—a 
dissonance in findings of fact inexplicable to 
these eyes as I had not thought that abortion 
cases were an exception to the coda that 
appellate judges are not the triers of fact. It is 
 770 
apparent that when abortion comes on stage 
it shadows the role of settled judicial rules. 
A. 
While the majority correctly states that "the 
district court did not clearly err in finding that 
Act 620 provides minimal benefits," it also 
"credit[s] Louisiana's [claims of a] more 
robust record on the benefits side of the 
ledger" than the record of the Texas law's 
benefits in WWH. Louisiana contends that the 
purpose of the admitting privileges 
requirement is to facilitate care for women 
who experience complications during an 
abortion procedure that require admission to 
a hospital and to ensure the competence of 
physicians performing abortion procedures. 
The district court found that the law 
conferred no benefit and was "an inapt 
remedy for a problem that does not exist."  
The record provides ample evidence for the 
district court's findings that Act 620 "confers 
only minimal, at best, health benefits for 
women seeking abortions." Nationally, 
nearly one million abortions are performed 
each year, approximately 90% of which 
occur in the first trimester. There are two 
types of abortion procedures: surgical and 
medication abortion. Surgical abortion is 
minimally invasive and does not require an 
incision or the use of general anesthesia but 
instead uses only mild or moderate sedation 
and/or local anesthesia. Complications of 
surgical abortions are rare and can generally 
be managed in the clinic setting. Patients 
rarely suffer complications requiring direct 
transfer from the clinic to the hospital. 
Medication abortion involves the 
combination of two drugs and requires no 
anesthesia or sedation. 
The numbers are telling: the district court 
found that the prevalence of any 
complication in first trimester abortion in an 
outpatient setting is 0.8% and the prevalence 
of major complication requiring treatment in 
a hospital is 0.05%. The risk of complication 
requiring hospitalization in the second 
trimester is 1.0%. The district court made 
findings that the incidence of complications 
requiring direct transport to a hospital is 
similarly low at Louisiana clinics. At the 
Hope Clinic, which serves approximately 
3,000 patients a year, only four patients have 
required direct transfer to a hospital in the 
past 23 years. Between 2009 and mid-2014, 
the Bossier Clinic performed 4,171 abortions 
with only two patients requiring direct 
hospital transfer and the Causeway Clinic 
performed 10,836 abortions, with only one 
patient requiring direct hospital transfer. 
Among doctors involved in the litigation, the 
district court found that Doe 2 performed 
approximately 6,000 abortions between 2009 
and mid-2014, with only two patients 
requiring direct hospital transfer, Doe 5 has 
performed thousands of abortions at 
Women's Health and Delta Clinic in the past 
three years and has never had a patient 
requiring hospital transfer, and Doe 6 has 
performed thousands of abortions in the past 
ten years with only two patients requiring a 
direct hospital transfer. Summarizing the 
evidence, the district court concluded that 
hospital transport was required "far less than 
once a year, or less than one per several 
thousand patients." 
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Those findings mirror findings credited by 
the Supreme Court in WWH that "before the 
act's passage, abortion in Texas was 
extremely safe with particularly low rates of 
serious complications and virtually no deaths 
occurring on account of the procedure."  
The district court documents the protocol 
followed by physicians and clinics in the rare 
instances where direct transfer to a hospital is 
required. As the majority notes, the statutory 
scheme that was in place prior to Act 620's 
passage required abortion clinics to have "a 
written transfer agreement with a physician 
who has admitting privileges within the same 
town or city." There was testimony 
describing the process at the clinics for 
managing complications. For example, at 
Hope Clinic, if a physician determines that a 
patient needs direct transport to the hospital 
(a situation the district court found has 
presented for four patients in the past 23 
years), emergency transport is called, the 
Clinic ensures that the chart is complete and 
sent to the hospital, and the physician 
contacts the hospital to alert the attending 
physician that the patient will be arriving and 
provides information about the complication.  
The majority notes that Louisiana, in an 
attempt to emphasize the importance of 
continuity of care, highlights three instances 
where Doe 3, the one physician who had 
admitting privileges prior to the passage of 
Act 620, used those privileges to care for 
patients who experienced complications 
following abortion procedures. As the 
majority acknowledges, however, there is no 
evidence in the record that those patients 
would not have received proper treatment 
had Doe 3 lacked admitting privileges. It is 
significant that the record is devoid 
of any instance of a patient receiving 
substandard care or suffering any medical 
hardship after experiencing a complication 
requiring hospital transfer at the hands of a 
physician without admitting privileges. The 
majority concedes this lack of evidence, and 
aptly refuses to credit a purported health 
benefit. 
The majority does credit Act 620 with 
assisting in the credentialing of physicians. 
First, the majority contends that, unlike the 
Texas law at issue in WWH, Act 620 serves a 
credentialing function, filling a purported 
void created by the clinics' failure to perform 
a review of a provider's competency or to 
conduct criminal background checks. The 
district court made no such finding. Instead, 
the majority appears to rely on Doe 3's 
testimony that, as medical director at Hope, 
he was responsible for hiring new physicians 
for the clinic and, in that capacity, did not 
perform criminal background checks on two 
physicians he hired. In his testimony, Doe 3 
describes the differences between the hiring 
process at Hope Clinic and at hospitals where 
Doe 3 has previously been involved in hiring, 
including Bossier Medical Center, Willis-
Knighton Bossier, and Doctor's Hospital. 
Doe 3 testified that he sat on committees of 
those hospitals that approve admitting 
privileges requests and he answered 
affirmatively when asked if those committees 
consider the applying doctors' training, 
education, experience, and criminal 
backgrounds. In contrast, Doe 3 compared 
hiring at Hope Clinic to "setting up a private 
practice." He testified that there was no 
"committee" responsible for hiring because 
"there aren't that many physicians at Hope." 
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Doe 3 did not run background checks and was 
the only person to consider their 
qualifications because, as medical director, 
he had sole responsibility for hiring. There is 
no dispute that hiring at clinics functions 
differently than hiring or consideration of 
admitting privileges at hospitals. The 
majority ascribes a benefit to that difference, 
a finding not made by the district court and 
not evident in the record. Doe 3 
acknowledges that he trained the two 
physicians he hired to perform abortion 
procedures because they had previously 
practiced as an ophthalmologist and 
radiologist. The record is devoid of any 
finding that a single physician with a criminal 
history has been hired by Hope (or any of the 
other clinics providing abortion services in 
Louisiana), that any physician that has 
performed abortions was incompetent to 
provide such services, or that any patient has 
suffered for want of physician competence. 
On this record the "credentialing function" 
benefit is "a solution in search of a problem," 
one for which the majority is the main 
proponent.  
B. 
Having determined the absence of evidence 
that Act 620 will provide any benefit, we ask 
whether the burden imposed by the statute is 
"undue." It is beyond strange that it is 
necessary to remind that "[i]t is not our task 
to re-try the facts of the case; this is especially 
true where the lower court's findings are 
based on oral testimony and the trial judge 
has viewed the demeanor and judged the 
credibility of the witnesses." We cannot 
"reverse the findings of the trial judge simply 
because we are convinced that we would or 
could decide the case differently." Yet, on the 
burdens side of the ledger, it is apparent that 
the majority here swiftly retries the case 
failing to credit findings that were not 
"clearly erroneous." 
Louisiana disputes the district court's 
findings that two of the doctors would stop 
performing abortions if Act 620 went into 
effect. First, that the limited privileges Doe 2 
obtained from Tulane qualify under Act 620 
and the district court erred in concluding 
otherwise. Next, that the district court erred 
in finding that Doe 3 will no longer provide 
abortions in Louisiana if Act 620 takes effect 
because of a "well-founded concern for his 
personal safety" if he is the last remaining 
provider in either Louisiana or northern 
Louisiana, rejecting the district court's 
conclusion that Doe 3's "personal choice to 
stop practicing" can be legally attributed to 
Act 620. 
Louisiana does not appear to dispute that: (1) 
Does 1 and 6 were unable to obtain privileges 
despite their good-faith efforts to do so; (2) 
Doe 2 was unable to obtain 
privileges other than the limited privileges 
obtained from Tulane (which appellant 
argues qualify under Act 620); and (3) that 
Doe 5 was unable to obtain privileges at a 
hospital within 30 miles of Delta Clinic. The 
state did not challenge the district court's 
findings that Does 2, 5, and 6 each put in a 
good-faith effort to obtain admitting 
privileges—a plain waiver. Undeterred, the 
majority simply finds the opposite. 
1. Doe 1 
 773 
Doe 1 provides medication abortions through 
8 weeks and surgical abortions through 13 
weeks, six days at Hope Clinic in Shreveport, 
where he provides approximately 71% of the 
3,000 abortions performed each year. The 
district court found that Doe 1 had put forth a 
good-faith effort to secure admitting 
privileges, documenting his attempts to 
secure privileges at five different hospitals 
and his inability to do so for reasons unrelated 
to his competence. 
Doe 1 contacted the Family Medicine 
Department at University Health in 
Shreveport (where he had done his residency 
in family medicine) but was told by the 
department director that he would not be 
offered a position due to staff objections to 
his work at Hope Clinic. In another attempt 
to obtain privileges, Doe 1 applied to Minden 
Medical Center, but the staff coordinator 
rejected the application, stating "[s]ince we 
do not have a need for a satellite primary care 
physician at this time, I am returning your 
application and check." Hope's administrator 
contacted a third hospital, North Caddo, on 
Doe 1's behalf and was told they did not have 
the capacity to accommodate transfers. Doe 1 
applied to WKBC as an addiction medicine 
specialist because he has a board certification 
in addiction medicine and the hospital has an 
addiction recovery center. His application 
was denied because he had not undergone a 
residency program in addiction medicine (a 
program which did not exist at the time he 
received his board certification). He 
reapplied as a family practice specialist, at 
which time WKBC requested documentation 
of hospital admissions from the last 12 
months. Because abortion procedures rarely 
result in complications requiring 
hospitalization, he had not admitted any 
patients in that timeframe so instead provided 
information about his training and 
procedures. The application remained 
pending neither approved nor denied by the 
hospital and the district court found that, 
under those circumstances, the application 
was de facto denied. The district court 
concluded that a fifth application, to Christus, 
was also de facto denied. Doe 1 submitted his 
application to Christus in July 2014 and 
subsequently provided additional 
information to Christus on two occasions 
when it was requested. When the 
administrator for the Hope Clinic called to 
make an appointment for Doe 1 to get an ID 
badge (also a requirement of the application 
process), the administrator was told Doe 1 
had submitted the wrong type of application 
and needed to submit a "non-staff care giver" 
application (a type of privilege that would not 
qualify under Act 620). Doe 1 then received 
a letter stating that his application was 
incomplete for failing to obtain an ID badge, 
and would be deemed withdrawn. Doe 1 
reached out to the hospital, and was again 
told that he would need to apply for non-staff 
care giver privileges, which would not 
qualify under Act 620. 
The majority credits the district court's 
finding that Doe 1 has been unable to secure 
admitting privileges despite good-faith 
efforts to do so and agrees that Doe 1 will be 
required to stop providing abortions if Act 
620 goes into effect.  
2. Doe 2 
Doe 2 provides medication abortions through 
8 weeks and surgical abortions up to the legal 
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limit of 21 weeks, 6 days. In the year prior to 
trial, Doe 2 performed 550 abortions at 
Bossier Clinic and 450 abortions at 
Causeway Clinic, or a total of 1,000 
abortions. Since Bossier's closure, Doe 2 has 
entered into a working agreement with Hope 
to provide abortion services when Hope's 
primary physicians are unavailable to 
perform abortions. 
The district court found that Doe 2 has been 
unsuccessful in his good-faith efforts to 
obtain active admitting privileges within 30 
miles of the Bossier Clinic and that the 
limited privileges he obtained at Tulane were 
insufficient under Act 620 because those 
privileges did not allow him to "provide 
diagnostic and surgical services to [admitted 
patients]" consistent with the requirements of 
Act 620. 
The district court documents Doe 2's attempts 
to secure admitting privileges at three 
separate hospitals. Doe 2 previously had 
admitting privileges at University Health 
while he was on staff as an Assistant Clinical 
Professor of Medicine with a general 
OB/GYN practice. After leaving the staff in 
2004, Doe 2 maintained consulting privileges 
that did not allow him to admit patients. After 
the passage of Act 620, Doe 2 attempted to 
upgrade his privileges but was told by the 
head of the OB/GYN department that the 
hospital would not upgrade his privileges 
because of his abortion practice.  
Doe 2 also applied for privileges at WKBC in 
the summer of 2014. The OB/GYN 
department wrote to Doe 2 asking for more 
information including "operative notes and 
outcomes of cases performed within the last 
12 months for the specific procedures you are 
requesting on the privilege request form." In 
his testimony before the district court, Doe 2 
stated that it was impossible to submit 
information about procedures performed in 
hospitals because he had not "done any in-
hospital work in ten years, so there is no body 
of hospitalized patients that [he had] to draw 
from." Instead, Doe 2 testified that he 
submitted cases that he had done at the clinic 
in Bossier. At that point, WKBC sent a 
second letter, stating in relevant part: "The 
data submitted supports the procedures you 
perform, but does not support your request 
for hospital privileges. In order for the Panel 
to evaluate and make recommendations for 
hospital privileges they must evaluate patient 
admissions and management, consultations, 
and procedures performed. Without this 
information your application remains 
incomplete and cannot be processed." 
Doe 2 also applied for admitting privileges at 
Tulane, a qualifying hospital under Act 620 
within 30 miles of Causeway in Metairie. 
After a circuitous process, during which Doe 
2 was told by a doctor at Tulane that his 
request would need to be discussed with the 
hospital's lobbyists and that there were 
faculty who were concerned that having an 
abortion provider on staff would hurt their 
referrals, Doe 2 was granted limited 
privileges which would allow him to admit 
patients but not provide care for the patients. 
Louisiana contends that the limited privileges 
Doe 2 was granted by Tulane are sufficient 
under Act 620. The majority rejects that 
argument, agreeing with the district court that 
the Tulane privileges do not satisfy the 
unambiguous requirements of Act 620. 
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Louisiana does not argue on appeal that Doe 
2 failed to put forth a good-faith effort to 
secure privileges elsewhere, instead relying 
on its interpretation of the Tulane privileges 
to argue that his limited privileges are 
sufficient under Act 620. Despite the fact that 
the state never makes the argument, the 
majority concludes that Doe 2's efforts with 
respect to securing privileges elsewhere were 
insufficient and that the district court's 
conclusion that Doe 2 had put forth a good-
faith effort was clearly erroneous. 
The majority notes without comment that 
Doe 2 claims University Health refused to 
extend him an invitation to apply because of 
his abortion practice. With respect to WKBC, 
the majority states that "it remains unclear 
whether Doe 2 sent a list of cases." The 
majority continues, stating that the record 
does not establish whether WKBC found 
fault with the completeness of Doe 2's 
response to its inquiry or the actual 
documentation provided about cases at the 
Bossier Clinic. The majority's suggestion that 
Doe 2 was merely unresponsive to WKBC is 
belied by WKBC's own November letter to 
Doe 2—cited by the district court—stating 
that "the data submitted supports the 
procedures you perform, but does not support 
your request for hospital privileges." More 
importantly, Doe 2 testimony—supported by 
WKBC's letter—highlights the principal 
conundrum with his attempts to get admitting 
privileges: Doe 2 cannot provide 
documentation of in-patient procedures 
performed (information required by WKBC) 
because the nature of providing abortion 
services makes hospital admissions rare on 
account of the rarity of complications 
associated with the those services. To the 
extent the majority deems clearly erroneous 
the district court's finding that Doe 2 put forth 
a good-faith effort with respect to WKBC, it 
defies logic to suggest that Doe 2 could be 
awarded privileges if he had just "tried 
harder;" the hospital required information 
that did not exist. Furthermore, it is unclear 
how Doe 2's experience applying to WKBC 
differs from Doe 1's application to that 
hospital which the district court found to be 
de facto denied, a finding the majority 
appears to credit in one case, and reject in the 
other. 
The majority next suggests that, "opposite to 
what the district court found," it is possible 
that Doe 2 could obtain privileges at Christus 
or Minden. While the district court did not 
make specific findings as to Christus or 
Minden, the record indicates that Doe 2 did 
not apply to either hospital. With respect to 
Minden, Doe 2 testified that applying for 
admissions privileges was a "long, tedious 
and not inexpensive process and [he] wanted 
to . . . apply to hospitals that [he] knew had 
good care and that had a close geographic 
location to the clinic and where [he] knew 
people might feel more comfortable." He 
stated that he chose WKBC, for example, 
because it was a good hospital, close to the 
clinic, whereas Minden is a smaller hospital, 
very close to the 30-mile limit, and he did not 
know anyone there. There is nothing in the 
record that indicates Doe 2 would have 
received privileges at Minden or that the 
district court's finding that Doe 2 was putting 
forth a good-faith effort—despite not 
applying to Minden—was clearly erroneous.  
With respect to Christus, the majority 
concludes that it is possible that Doe 2 could 
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obtain privileges there because he previously 
had privileges there and Doe 3 currently 
maintains privileges there, "contradicting" 
Doe 2's theory that a Catholic hospital would 
not staff an abortion provider. The majority 
ignores the fact that Doe 3's privileges at 
Christus are contingent on his admitting at 
least 50 patients a year, a requirement he is 
able to meet only because of his OB/GYN 
practice. confirmed in his testimony that he 
previously had admitting privileges at 
Christus because of his OB/GYN practice 
and that those privileges were terminated 
after he ceased to have a private practice 
affiliation. There is no support in the record 
for the conclusion that Christus would 
potentially award Doe 2 privileges, 
especially where, like Minden, Doe 1's 
application to the hospital was de facto 
denied. Putting aside hostility abortion 
providers face in the state, basic economics 
make clear why hospitals have no incentive 
to grant and every disincentive to deny 
privileges to an abortion provider who does 
not maintain a separate OB/GYN practice: by 
virtue of the safety of the procedures 
performed at the clinics, abortion providers 
admit very few—if any—patients to a 
hospital and risks loss of business by doing 
so. That principle is consistent with the 
experience at Christus described by Does 2 
and 3, that privileges at Christus are 
contingent on a physician's ability admit a 
certain number of patients, which Does 2 and 
3 are (and were) only able to do by virtue of 
their general OB/GYN practice. 
3. Doe 3 
Doe 3 provides medication abortions through 
eight weeks and surgical abortions through 
16 weeks, six days. He performs 
approximately 20-30 abortions a week at 
Hope Clinic on Thursday afternoons and all 
day on Saturday and also maintains an active 
general OB/GYN practice. Doe 3 had 
privileges at Christus and WKBC before the 
passage of Act 620 because of his private 
OB/GYN practice. When asked if Doe 3 was 
able to increase his capacity of services 
provided at Hope, he stated that he could not. 
As Doe 3 points out, if he gave up his private 
practice to devote more time to Hope to 
compensate for the providers who would no 
longer be able to practice, ironically, he 
would "probably lose [his] admitting 
privileges" and would no longer be able to 
provide abortion services. 
The district court found that "[a]s a result of 
his fears of violence and harassment, Doe 3 
had credibly testified that if he is the last 
physician performing abortion in either the 
entire state or in the northern part of the state, 
he will not continue to perform abortions." 
The majority concludes that that finding was 
clearly erroneous because of Doe 3's "shifting 
story," at one point claiming he would stop 
practicing if he was the only provider left in 
Louisiana then, after Doe 5 obtained 
privileges in southern Louisiana, if he was 
the only provider left in northern Louisiana. 
In the majority's view, "Doe 3's shifting 
preference as to the number of remaining 
abortion providers is entirely independent of 
the admitting-privileges requirement," again 
a trial de novo finding by an appellate court. 
4. Doe 4 
Doe 4 performed abortions at Causeway 
Clinic in Metairie until January 2016, where 
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he provided approximately 75% of the total 
abortions at the clinic. Prior to Causeway's 
closure, Doe 4 applied for privileges at 
Ochsner, where he did not receive a response, 
and testified at his deposition that he did not 
apply for admitting privileges at Touro 
Infirmary or LSU New Orleans because he 
had been unable to find an OB/GYN to cover 
for him, a requirement of both hospitals. 
Causeway closed in January 2016. Because 
of Causeway's closure, Doe 4 is no longer 
pursuing privileges. 
5. Doe 5 
Doe 5 provides medication abortions through 
eight weeks and surgical abortions through 
16 weeks. He is one of two physicians 
providing abortion services at Women's 
Health in New Orleans, where he provides 
approximately 40% of the abortions, and the 
only physician at Delta Clinic in Baton 
Rouge. Since the passage of Act 620, Doe 5 
has obtained active admitting privileges 
within 30 miles of Women's Health, at Touro 
Infirmary, but not within 30 miles of Delta 
Clinic. 
The district court found that Doe 5 had put 
forth a good-faith effort to obtain admitting 
privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of 
Delta Clinic but was unable to do so for 
reasons unrelated to his competence. Doe 5 
applied for admitting privileges at three 
hospitals in Baton Rouge: Woman's Hospital, 
Lane Regional Medical Center, and Baton 
Rouge General Medical Center. None of the 
applications submitted by Doe 5 have been 
denied or granted and all remain technically 
"pending", leading the district court to 
conclude they had been de facto denied. In 
his declaration, Doe 5 states that, after Act 
620 was enacted, he reviewed bylaws and 
spoke to people in the medical communities 
in New Orleans and Baton Rouge to 
determine which hospitals would potentially 
grant him privileges. For example, Doe 5 
describes some hospitals that require a 
physician to admit a certain number of 
patients per year to obtain privileges which 
he is unable to do. Doe 5 chose, therefore, to 
apply to hospitals where "[he] believed that 
[he] had a realistic chance of obtaining 
admitting privileges" and did not apply to 
hospitals where he did not have a good shot, 
in part because of the adverse professional 
consequences of having an application for 
admitting privileges denied. Doe 5 states that 
Woman's Hospital has expressed concern 
that Doe 5 resides too far from the hospital to 
obtain privileges and mentions that a doctor 
he spoke with at Woman's Hospital—one of 
the doctors with whom Delta Clinic has a 
transfer agreement—declined to be Doe 5's 
covering physician for his Woman's Hospital 
application due to fear of threats and the 
possibility that protesters will picket outside 
of his private practice. 
The district court found that Doe 5 put forth 
a good-faith effort to obtain admitting 
privileges within 30 miles of Delta Clinic. 
The majority concludes that finding was 
clearly erroneous. It faults Doe 5 for failing 
to present evidence that he reached out to 
additional doctors after the physician at 
Woman's Hospital refused to act as a 
covering physician and attributes his lack of 
follow-up with those hospitals to foot-
dragging. The majority concludes from this 
that "[t]he most logical explanation for Doe 
5's delay is that he is awaiting the result of 
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this litigation before he acts." The majority 
also imports testimony from Doe 4 (who was 
also unable obtain privileges before 
Causeway's closure) which the majority 
paraphrases as Doe 4 stating "that finding a 
covering physician is not overly 
burdensome." Based on the absence in the 
record of evidence documenting follow-up 
by Doe 5 to the three hospitals to which he 
applied and the testimony of another doctor 
on the topic of covering physicians in the 
abstract, the majority concludes that the 
district court clearly erred in finding that Doe 
5 put forth a good-faith effort to obtain 
privileges at a qualifying hospital near Delta 
Clinic. 
6. Doe 6 
Doe 6 provides medication abortions and is 
one of the two clinic physicians at Women's 
Health. Doe 6 had admitting privileges at 
various hospitals in New Orleans from 1973 
until 2005, during which time he maintained 
an active OB/GYN practice. When Act 620 
passed, Doe 6 contacted Tulane to inquire 
about admitting privileges but was told he 
would not be granted privileges because he 
had not had admitting privileges at any 
hospital since 2005. Doe 6 also applied for 
privileges at East Jefferson Hospital in New 
Orleans and, shortly thereafter, provided 
additional information that the hospital had 
requested. Since that time, the hospital has 
taken no action on his application. The 
district court concluded that his application 
had been de facto denied. In his declaration, 
Doe 6 states that, after the passage of Act 
620, he researched hospitals and learned that 
many required that a physician admit a 
certain number of patients per year to obtain 
admitting privileges, which he could not do 
because the nature of his abortion practice. 
He applied at a hospital where he believed he 
had a realistic chance of obtaining privileges 
and knew that he was unlikely to obtain 
privileges at other hospitals that required a 
certain number of admitted patients.  
The majority concludes that the district 
court's finding that Doe 6 put forth a good-
faith effort to obtain privileges was clearly 
erroneous. It faults Doe 6 for not submitting 
more applications for admitting privileges, 
especially where there are 9 qualifying 
hospitals in the area including Touro, where 
Doe 5 was able to secure admitting 
privileges. The majority determines that Doe 
6's "lack of effort" makes the district court's 
finding clearly erroneous. The majority does 
not address Doe 6's statement in his 
declaration that he chose to apply to hospitals 
where he thought he had a "realistic chance" 
of obtaining privileges or his claim that he 
reviewed hospital bylaws and spoke with 
others in the medical community to 
determine where he could obtain admitting 
privileges without documentation of 
admitting patients since 2005. 
7. Summary of the Burdens 
After documenting the status of each of the 
six doctors who provided abortion services at 
the outset of the litigation, the district court 
made summary findings about the effects of 
Act 620. The court determined that Does 1, 2, 
4, and 6 would be unable to provide abortions 
in Louisiana because of their inability to 
obtain admitting privileges, despite their 
good-faith efforts to do so. As to Doe 5, the 
court determined that he would be unable to 
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provide abortion services at Delta in Baton 
Rouge because he was unable to obtain 
qualifying privileges at a hospital in that area, 
but would be able to provide abortions at 
Women's Health in New Orleans because he 
had obtained privileges there. With respect to 
Doe 3, the court found that he would be the 
only remaining provider in Northern 
Louisiana and, due to a well-founded concern 
for his safety, would no longer provide 
abortions in the state. 
In summary, the district court found that Doe 
5 would be the only remaining abortion 
provider in the state and only one clinic, 
Women's Health, would remain open. 
Because Doe 5 performed approximately 
2,950 abortions in 2013 at Delta and 
Women's, if he provided that number of 
abortions at Women's (the only clinic which 
would remain open on account of Doe 5 not 
obtaining privileges within 30 miles of 
Delta), approximately 70% of the 9,976 
women in Louisiana seeking an abortion 
annually would be unable to get one.  
The district court made alternative findings, 
determining that, "[e]ven if one were to 
conclude that Doe 3 will not quit or that his 
quitting is legally irrelevant, Act 620 will 
nonetheless result in a substantial number of 
Louisiana women being unable to obtain an 
abortion in this state." If Doe 3's decision to 
quit due to fear of providing abortions as the 
last remaining physician in northern 
Louisiana was not attributed to Act 620's 
passage, two clinics would remain open: 
Hope and Women's Health. Doe 3 sees 
approximately 20-30 abortion patients per 
week, or roughly 1,000-1,500 per year, and 
has testified that, because of his full-time 
OB/GYN practice, cannot expand his 
capacity to provide abortions. Assuming Doe 
3 and Doe 5 continue providing abortions, the 
district court found that approximately 5,500 
women in Louisiana seeking an abortion 
would be unable to get one. 
The district court notes that, although the 
closure of Causeway and Bossier has not 
been attributed to Act 620, the existence of 
two fewer abortion clinics (notwithstanding 
the court's finding that no doctor who was 
employed at those clinics was able to obtain 
admitting privileges) would amplify the 
burdens attributable to Act 620. Furthermore, 
the only physician who provides abortions up 
to the legal limit of 21 weeks, 6 days, Doe 2, 
will be unable to provide abortions, 
preventing any woman seeking an abortion at 
that stage from exercising her constitutional 
right to do so in Louisiana. The district court 
concluded that the burdens of Act 620 would 
fall most heavily on low-income women in 
the state, one of the poorest in the country, 
because of increased travel distances and 
associated cost. Finally, the court made the 
"commonsense inference" that increased wait 
times (on account of the decreased number of 
providers) would lead to women seeking 
abortions in later gestational ages, decreasing 
the number of women for whom medication 
abortion would be an option and making it 
difficult for women to obtain an appointment 
before 16 weeks. 
The majority reaches different conclusions. 
On its determination of the facts, only Doe 1 
has put forth a good-faith effort to get 
admitting privileges, Does 2, 5, and 6 "could 
likely obtain privileges," Doe 3 "is 
definitively not burdened," and all three 
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clinics could remain open. Because there was 
clear evidence in the record that doctors 
failed to seek admitting privileges in good 
faith, the majority says, any negative impact 
on women is attributable to an intervening 
cause: the inaction of the doctors rather than 
the statute. It proceeds to weigh the impact of 
what it determines to be the burden: the near 
impossibility of Doe 1 to obtain qualifying 
privileges. On that reading of the effects of 
Act 620, the majority concludes that the 
2,100 abortions that Doe 1 had performed 
annually could be covered by Does 2 and 3 
and, accordingly, no woman would be unduly 
burdened. From there, the majority concludes 
that there will not be a large fraction of 
women facing a substantial burden: at most, 
3,000 out of 10,000, or 30%, of women 
seeking abortions in Louisiana would be 
burdened by potentially longer wait times if 
Doe 1 was unable to practice, and that is only 
a potential burden because Doe 1's capacity 
will "easily be absorbed." 
In sum, the district court found that 70% of 
women seeking an abortion in Louisiana 
would be unable to obtain one and the 
majority found that a maximum of 30% of 
women would be burdened with increased 
wait times, but that the burden of increased 
wait times was only potential. The district 
court's findings are well-supported in the 
record and not clearly erroneous.  
II. 
I turn now to the application of 
the Casey standard to those facts. Numbers 
and calculations aside, the task is 
straightforward: we are to identify the stated 
justification of Act 620, determine the extent 
to which Act 620 advances that interest, and 
compare the benefits it provides with the 
burdens it imposes on abortion access. It is 
noted that Louisiana has a legitimate interest 
in ensuring the health and safety of patients 
seeking an abortion in the state. However, 
even a statute which furthers a valid state 
interest cannot be a permissible means of 
serving legitimate ends if that statute "has the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman's choice." At the same time, 
"[u]nnecessary health regulations that have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a 
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an 
abortion impose an undue burden" on the 
exercise of that right.  
At the outset, I fail to see how a statute with 
no medical benefit that is likely to restrict 
access to abortion can be considered anything 
but "undue." As I have explained, the 
majority draws conclusions for which there is 
no support in the record and rejects the 
district court's well-supported findings. The 
findings of the district court that Does 1, 2, 5 
(with respect to privileges near Delta), and 6 
were unable to obtain privileges despite 
good-faith efforts to do so, for reasons 
unrelated to their competence, is plausible 
and well-supported. Moreover, it is logical. 
The district court received evidence that 
many hospitals require doctors to admit a 
certain number of patients annually to 
maintain privileges or require documentation 
of admitted patients in the 12 months 
preceding an application to award privileges. 
At the most basic level, even where a hospital 
does not have an explicit requirement 
conditioning privileges on minimum annual 
admissions, hospitals have no incentives to 
offer privileges to a doctor who provides only 
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abortion services, because the doctor is 
unlikely to admit any patients or, in other 
words, to bring the hospital any business and, 
being associated with abortion brings the 
concomitant risk of losing business. Instead, 
the majority determines that the effort of the 
physicians was lackluster and that any 
burdens imposed would be a result of the 
physicians' mediocre efforts (or 
gamesmanship) rather than a direct result of 
the statute. 
The Court in WWH addressed causation 
head-on, there rejecting the dissent's 
suggestion that, because some of the clinics 
may have closed for reasons unrelated to the 
statute, they should not "count" the burdens 
resulting from those closures against the 
statute. The Court noted that the district court 
credited evidence of causation as well as 
"plausible inferences to be drawn from the 
timing of the clinic closures" and concluded 
from that evidence that the statute "in fact led 
to clinic closures." As in WWH, the district 
court here found that the statute will cause 
three doctors to cease providing abortions in 
Louisiana altogether because of their 
inability to get admitting privileges despite 
their good-faith efforts to do so, another 
doctor to limit his work to one clinic for the 
same reason, and a final doctor to stop 
performing abortions out of fear of practicing 
as the sole remaining provider in northern 
Louisiana. The majority here distorts the 
causation analysis by casting aside the 
district court's findings that the physicians 
made "good-faith efforts" to obtain 
privileges, concluding that an intervening 
cause—the physicians' lackluster efforts to 
obtain privileges—will be responsible for 
any burden, not the statute itself. But the 
majority in WWH did not require proof that 
every abortion provider in Texas had put in a 
good-faith effort to get privileges and had 
been unable to so. Instead, the majority 
credited the district court's findings that the 
requirements imposed by the statute led to 
clinic closures.  
There is no question that, if the statute went 
into effect today, Doe 3 and Doe 5 will be the 
only remaining providers. The other 
providers do not currently have admitting 
privileges. The effect of the statute would be 
to close one of the three remaining clinics 
(Hope), to prevent three of the remaining five 
doctors from practicing as abortion providers 
(Does 1, 2, and 6), and to prevent Doe 5 from 
practicing at one of the two clinics where he 
regularly works. The majority today 
essentially holds that, because private actors 
(the physicians) have not tried hard enough to 
mitigate the effects of the act (a conclusion 
contradicted by the district court's factual 
findings), those effects are not fairly 
attributable to the act. That position finds no 
support in WWH. 
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, the 
effect of the Act will be to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman's choice. 
Even setting aside the district court's finding 
that Doe 3 will stop practicing if he is the sole 
remaining provider in the northern part of the 
state, only two of the six doctors that 
previously provided abortions were able to 
obtain admitting privileges and one of the 
three remaining clinics will close. 
Numerically, Doe 5 provides approximately 
2,000 abortions at Delta and 950 abortions at 
Women's. Because he does not have 
privileges near Delta, Doe 5 will be restricted 
 782 
to providing abortions at Women's (and Delta 
will close). If he provides all 2,950 abortions 
he had previously provided at two clinics per 
year at Women's and Doe 3 continues to 
provide 1,500 abortions per year, they could 
cover approximately 4,450 abortions per 
year, or less than half of the total demand in 
the state. 
Because the effect of Act 620 is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's 
right to seek an abortion, without a 
discernable offsetting medical benefit, I 
would affirm the district court's 
determination that the burden is undue. 
Inherent in the concept of "undue" is the 
reality that where the medical grounds of a 
statute are weak (or nonexistent), the burden 
is more likely to be disproportionate. The 
Supreme Court has previously admonished 
this court for "imply[ing] that a trial court 
should not consider the existence or 
nonexistence of medical benefits when 
considering whether a regulation of abortion 
constitutes an undue burden." By failing to 
meaningfully balance the burdens and 
benefits here, the court repeats its mistakes 
and leaves the undue burden test devoid of 
meaning. 
A brief pause now on the majority's heralding 
of the Supreme Court's "large fraction" 
language. In WWH, the Court explained that, 
in Casey, the phrase "large fraction" was used 
"to refer to 'a large fraction of cases in which 
[the provision at issue] is relevant,' a class 
narrower than 'all women,' pregnant women,' 
or even 'the class of women seeking 
abortions identified by the state." In other 
words, "[t]he proper focus of the 
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom 
the law is a restriction, not the group for 
whom the law is irrelevant." The "large 
fraction" language does not require the court 
to engage in rote mathematical calculations 
but instead directs the court to focus its 
inquiry on those who will be actually 
restricted by the law and determine whether 
the law will operate as a substantial obstacle 
for that population. In other words, will the 
law pose a substantial obstacle to a woman's 
choice for a large fraction of those affected. 
The elaborate "mathematical" calculations 
attempted by the majority are improper. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected this 
court's attempt to require precise 
mathematical calculations in WWH. In that 
case, after weighing the benefits and burdens, 
the district court determined that a 
"significant, but ultimately unknowable" 
number of women would be unduly burdened 
by the challenged provisions. This court 
reversed, in part because the district court had 
not numerically calculated that a "large 
fraction" of women would be burdened. The 
Supreme Court rejected that approach, 
emphasizing that the district court had 
developed a sufficient record to support its 
finding that weighing the benefits and 
burdens demonstrated that the restrictions 
represented an undue burden. 
Neither Casey nor WWH calculated a 
numerical fraction of women who would be 
burdened before invalidating statutory 
provisions. Such a calculation is not required. 
The relevant question here is, for those 
women actually restricted by Act 620, will 
that restriction amount to a substantial 
obstacle for a significant number of women. 
For those actually restricted, there is no 
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question that the obstacle will be substantial. 
Over 5,000 women seeking abortions in 
Louisiana will be unable to obtain one within 
the state. Because Doe 2 has been unable to 
obtain privileges, no woman seeking to 
exercise her right to decide to seek an 
abortion after 16 weeks will be able to do so 
in Louisiana. 
Even accepting the majority's incorrect 
supposition that only Doe 1 will stop 
performing abortions and accepting 
their premise that the Supreme Court requires 
a numerical calculation of the fraction of 
women for whom the provision represents a 
substantial obstacle (which it does not), the 
calculations are flawed. If Act 620 causes 
only one doctor to stop performing abortions 
at Hope Clinic, then the women for whom the 
law is "an actual rather than irrelevant 
restriction" will be women seeking abortions 
at Hope Clinic. As was the case in Texas, 
those are the women who will be subjected to 
"fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and 
increased crowding." The question then 
becomes whether Act 620 will "operate as a 
substantial obstacle" to a large fraction 
of women seeking abortions at Hope Clinic. 
The majority's assumptions that (1) Doe 2 
will step in to be a full-time provider at Hope 
and (2) Doe 3 will have the capacity to 
increase his patient load are unsupported (and 
in the case of Doe 3, contradicted) by the 
record. Even if Doe 1 were the only provider 
to stop performing abortions, it would create 
a substantial obstacle for women seeking 
abortions at Hope in the form of increased 
wait times and the inability for some women 
to get an appointment before they passed the 
appropriate gestational stage. In short, even 
accepting the majority's requirement of 
precise numerical calculations on its own 
terms—and I do not—the calculations are 
flawed. 
III. 
I disagree with the majority's application of 
the undue burden test. Act 620 will have the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking to exercise their 
constitutional right. Its significant burdens 
are not counteracted by any discernable 
health benefit and the majority errs in holding 
otherwise. But perhaps the more fundamental 
misstep here is that the majority fails to 
respect its role as an appellate court and the 
role of our district courts. These roles are 
structural, that is, case neutral. 
There remains another fundamental flaw in 
Louisiana's joining with Texas and other 
states in regulating abortion services, one that 
also requires that the judgment of the district 
court be affirmed. Although it is enough 
under Casey to find an undue burden where 
Act 620 will have the effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women 
seeking abortions in the state, that is also the 
law's purpose. If courts continue to brush past 
the purpose prong of Casey, that prong will 
cease to have meaning. Casey directs us to 
examine the means chosen by the state to 
further its interest and warns that those means 
must be calculated to further that interest, not 
hinder it. As in other areas of constitutional 
law, courts are capable of determining 
whether the means chosen by the state match 
the legitimate ends. Indeed, it remains central 
to much of our constitutional doctrine. While 
motive of a legislative body cannot for 
pragmatic reasons index the legitimacy of its 
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work, legislative purpose can. At that level of 
abstraction, there can be little disagreement. 
Despite judicial struggle with Casey, it must 
be acknowledged that the Court redefined, 
but did not abandon those basic principles. It 
moved away from the analytical construct of 
tiered scrutiny to "undue burden" but left 
intact examination of purpose by deploy of 
the familiar doctrinal tool of ends and means, 
allowing courts to identify legislative efforts 
to frustrate a woman's autonomy—her right 
to choose. As the misfit of means and ends 
grows so also does the permissible inference 
that the state's invocation of legitimate ends 
is disingenuous, that the statute is instead 
"designed to strike at the right itself." While 
everyone agrees that promoting women's 
health is a legitimate goal, Act 620 does not 
further that purpose. Here the means need not 
be judged normatively, but rather present as 
a practice the efficacy of which is 
determinable empirically: the data make 
plain that the requirement of admitting 
privileges to the end of women's health 
cannot be defended. For as the claimed 
benefits of Act 620 are objectively 
determinable to be virtually nil, so the 
burdens are determined to be undue. In the 
absence of fit between the means (requiring 
admitting privileges) and the ends (ensuring 
women's health), I am left to conclude that, 
viewed objectively, there is an invidious 
purpose at play. I recall these familiar 
principles to make plain that while the effects 
prong of "undue burden" does the work here, 
an examination of Casey's legislative 
purpose reaches the same end. Act 620 was 
enacted to frustrate a woman's right to 
choose. 
That the Supreme Court found it necessary so 
recently to remind this court that a rational 
basis test, appropriate in review of state 
economic regulation, cannot be deployed to 
review regulation of a protected personal 
liberty is only confirming that when abortion 
shows up, application of the rules of law 
grows opaque, a phenomenon not unique to 
this court. Today's case is not a close call by 
either path offered by Casey. The opinion of 



























“Supreme Court on 5-to-4 vote blocks restrictive Louisiana abortion law” 
 
 
The Washington Post  
 
Robert Barnes  
 
February 7, 2019 
 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joined with 
the Supreme Court’s liberals Thursday night 
to block a Louisiana law that opponents say 
would close most of the state’s abortion 
clinics and leave it with only one doctor 
eligible to perform the procedure. 
The justices may yet consider whether the 
2014 law — requiring doctors at abortion 
clinics to have admitting privileges at nearby 
hospitals — unduly burdens women’s access 
to abortion. The Louisiana law has never 
been enforced, and the Supreme Court in 
2016 found a nearly identical Texas law to be 
unconstitutional. 
“The Supreme Court has stepped in under the 
wire to protect the rights of Louisiana 
women,” said Nancy Northup, president and 
CEO of the Center for Reproductive Rights, 
which represented the law’s challengers. 
“The three clinics left in Louisiana can stay 
open while we ask the Supreme Court to hear 
our case. This should be an easy case — all 
that’s needed is a straightforward application 
of the court’s own precedent.” 
The court’s four most conservative 
members would have allowed the law to take 
effect. Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh said there 
was a dispute about whether the doctors 
could obtain admitting privileges, and that a 
45-day grace period would have given time 
to settle that question. 
“The parties have offered, in essence, 
competing predictions” about whether 
several doctors can obtain privileges, 
Kavanaugh wrote. 
 “If we denied the stay, that question could be 
readily and quickly answered without 
disturbing the status quo or causing harm to 
the parties or the affected women, and 
without this court’s further involvement.” 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito 
Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch would have allowed 
the law to go into effect, but they did not join 
Kavanaugh’s dissent. 
But the abortion providers in their briefs had 
said just the prospect that the law would go 
into effect was already affecting services. 
“Scheduled medical procedures are being 
cancelled, physicians and clinic staff are 
preparing to be out of work, and patients 
seeking to exercise their constitutional right 
to abortion are being turned away or sent to 
other states,” their brief stated. 
The majority, as is custom, did not give a 
reason for granting the stay. But it seems 
likely the full court will now grant the case a 
full briefing and review, and perhaps 
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reexamine its earlier decision, which was 
made by a very different Supreme Court. 
In the court’s 2016 decision, it said the 
admitting-privileges requirement “provides 
few, if any, health benefits for women, poses 
a substantial obstacle to women seeking 
abortions, and constitutes an ‘undue burden’ 
on their constitutional right to do so.” 
Hospitalization after an abortion is rare, all 
sides agree, and the lack of admitting 
privileges by the doctor who performed the 
procedure is not a bar to the woman getting 
needed medical care. 
But last fall, a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 5th Circuit upheld the 
Louisiana law in a 2-to-1 vote, finding factual 
distinctions between how the restriction 
played out in Texas and Louisiana. The full 
court, considered one of the most 
conservative of the regional appeals courts, 
voted not to reconsider the panel’s decision. 
Dissenting judges said their colleagues in the 
majority ignored requirements set out in the 
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision and seemed 
intent on giving the high court reason to 
reconsider that precedent, called Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision was the 
court’s most important one on abortion in a 
quarter-century. But it was decided by an 
eight-member Supreme Court in the wake of 
conservative Justice Antonin Scalia’s death. 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the 
court’s liberals to strike down the Texas 
provisions. Roberts, Thomas and Alito 
dissented. 
Those three have been joined by President 
Trump’s choices, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, 
both of whom were supported by antiabortion 
activists who said they hoped that the court’s 
new conservative majority might one day 
overturn the fundamental right to abortion the 
court advanced in Roe v. Wade. 
The doctors and clinics who challenged the 
Louisiana law said allowing it to go into 
effect would provide a way for states to 
undermine the right to abortion without 
overturning Roe. 
At stake “is not just the constitutional rights 
of Louisiana women to abortion access,” 
wrote Julie Rikelman and Travis J. Tu of the 
Center for Reproductive Rights. 
“The Fifth Circuit panel majority’s decision 
undermines the rule of law by flouting 
binding precedent from this Court. Such a 
ruling has implications for the country and 
the judicial system as a whole.” 
Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the two-
member appeals court majority, said that the 
court complied with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Whole Woman’s Health by taking 
a painstakingly close look at the details. 
“Unlike in Texas, the [Louisiana law] does 
not impose a substantial burden on a large 
fraction of women,” he concluded. 
He said the closing of some clinics in 
Louisiana, as opposed to Texas, would not 
dramatically increase driving distances, and 
that it was easier for doctors in Louisiana to 
obtain admitting privileges. The “vast 
majority” of the six doctors who performed 
abortions in Louisiana “largely sat on their 
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hands” instead of working hard to procure the 
credential, Smith wrote. 
He concluded that “at most, only 30 percent 
of women” seeking abortions in Louisiana 
would be affected. 
“The record here indicates that the admitting-
privileges requirement performs a real, and 
previously unaddressed, credentialing 
function that promotes the well-being of 
women seeking abortion,” Smith wrote. 
Still, he acknowledged, the benefits are “not 
huge.” In a footnote, Smith wrote that “the 
state did not provide any instance in which a 
worse result occurred because the patient’s 
abortion doctor did not possess admitting 
privileges.” 
Dissenting judges and the challengers said it 
was a fundamental mistake to approve a law 
that imposes any burden on a woman’s right 
to an abortion when it provides no 
corresponding benefit for the woman’s 
health. 
Hospitalization occurs in only 0.05 percent of 
abortions in the first trimester and 
approximately 1 percent in the second 
trimester, the challengers said. Hospital care, 
when needed, is provided regardless of 
whether the doctor performing the abortion 
has admitting privileges. 
The appeals court rejected a district judge’s 
finding that the law would affect about 70 
percent of women seeking abortions in the 
state. After a trial, that judge found that two 
of the remaining three abortion clinics in the 
state would have to close because they would 
not have a doctor who could obtain admitting 
privileges. 
The only remaining clinic with an eligible 
doctor would be in New Orleans, the district 
court said, and would be incapable of 
meeting the demand of approximately 10,000 
abortions. 
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February 7, 2019 
The Supreme Court on Thursday blocked a 
Louisiana law that its opponents say could 
have left the state with only one doctor in a 
single clinic authorized to provide abortions.  
The vote was 5 to 4, with Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts Jr. joining the court’s four-
member liberal wing to form a majority. That 
coalition underscored the pivotal position the 
chief justice has assumed after the departure 
last year of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
who used to hold the crucial vote in many 
closely divided cases, including ones 
concerning abortion.  
The court’s brief order gave no reasons, and 
its action — a temporary stay — did not end 
the case. The court is likely to hear a 
challenge to the law on the merits in its next 
term, which starts in October.  
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito 
Jr., Neil M. Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh 
said they would have denied the stay. Only 
Justice Kavanaugh published a dissent, 
taking a middle position that acknowledged 
the key precedent and said he would have 
preferred more information on the precise 
effect of the law.  
For Chief Justice Roberts, it was something 
of a turnaround, at least for now. He dissented 
in the court’s last major abortion case in 
2016, voting to uphold a Texas law 
essentially identical to the one at issue in 
Thursday’s case.  
Abortion rights advocates welcomed the 
court’s order, which came around 9:30 p.m., 
only hours before the law was to go into 
effect.  
“The Supreme Court has stepped in under the 
wire to protect the rights of Louisiana 
women,” Nancy Northup, the president of the 
Center for Reproductive Rights, said in a 
statement. “The three clinics left in Louisiana 
can stay open while we ask the Supreme 
Court to hear our case. This should be an easy 
case — all that’s needed is a straightforward 
application of the court’s own precedent.”  
Chief Justice Roberts’s overall voting record 
has been conservative, and this was not the 
first time in recent months he has 
disappointed some of his usual allies. In 
December, he joined the court’s four-
member liberal wing — Justices Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — to reject a 
request from the Trump administration in a 
case that could upend decades of asylum 
policy.  
That same month, he drew sharp criticism 
from three conservative colleagues for voting 
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to deny review in two cases on efforts to stop 
payments to Planned Parenthood. But Chief 
Justice Roberts joined the court’s four 
conservative members on Thursday night in 
a 5-to-4 ruling allowing the execution of a 
Muslim inmate in Alabama whose request for 
his imam to be present was denied by prison 
officials.  
Chief Justice Roberts has voted to sustain 
other laws restricting abortion. And his vote 
to grant a stay on Thursday, in other words, 
does not mean he will vote to strike down the 
Louisiana law when the case returns to the 
court.  
The court is likely to confront other abortion 
cases, too, as several state legislatures have 
recently enacted laws that seem calculated to 
try to force the Supreme Court to consider 
overruling Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision 
that established a constitutional right to 
abortion.  
The Louisiana law, enacted in 2014, requires 
doctors performing abortions to have 
admitting privileges at nearby hospitals. In 
2017, Judge John W. deGravelles of the 
Federal District Court in Baton Rouge struck 
down the law, saying that such doctors were 
often unable to obtain admitting privileges 
for reasons unrelated to their competence and 
that the law created an undue burden on 
women’s constitutional right to abortion.  
The law, Judge deGravelles ruled, was 
essentially identical to one from Texas that 
the Supreme Court struck down in a 2016 
decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt. Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority in that decision, said courts must 
consider whether the claimed benefits of laws 
putting restrictions on abortion outweigh the 
burdens they placed on the constitutional 
right to the procedure.  
There was no evidence that the Texas law’s 
admitting-privileges requirement “would 
have helped even one woman obtain better 
treatment,” Justice Breyer wrote. But there 
was good evidence, he added, that the 
requirement caused the number of abortion 
clinics in Texas to drop to 20 from 40.  
The vote in the 2016 decision was 5 to 3, with 
Justice Kennedy in the majority. The case 
was decided by an eight-member court after 
the death of Justice Antonin Scalia that 
February.  
Justice Kavanaugh replaced Justice Kennedy 
last fall, shifting the Supreme Court to the 
right. Around the same time, a divided three-
judge panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, 
reversed Judge deGravelles’s decision and 
upheld the Louisiana law, saying its benefits 
outweighed the burdens it imposed.  
“Unlike Texas, Louisiana presents some 
evidence of a minimal benefit,” Judge Jerry 
E. Smith wrote for the majority. In particular, 
he wrote, “the admitting-privileges 
requirement performs a real, and previously 
unaddressed, credentialing function that 
promotes the well-being of women seeking 
abortion.”  
He added that the Louisiana law “does not 
impose a substantial burden on a large 
fraction of women.” Judge Smith faulted 
doctors seeking to provide abortions in the 
state for not trying hard enough to obtain 
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admitting privileges and said abortions would 
remain available after the law went into 
effect.  
In dissent, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham 
wrote that the majority’s ruling was 
impossible to reconcile with the Supreme 
Court’s 2016 decision in the Texas case and 
with its landmark 1992 ruling in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, which banned states 
from placing an “undue burden” on the 
constitutional right to abortion.  
“I fail to see,” Judge Higginbotham wrote, 
“how a statute with no medical benefit that is 
likely to restrict access to abortion can be 
considered anything but ʻundue.’”  
The full Fifth Circuit refused to rehear the 
case by a 9-to-6 vote. In dissent, Judge 
Stephen A. Higginson wrote that the 
Louisiana law was “equivalent in structure, 
purpose and effect to the Texas law” 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2016.  
“I am unconvinced that any justice of the 
Supreme Court who decided Whole 
Woman’s Health would endorse our 
opinion,” Judge Higginson wrote. “The 
majority would not, and I respectfully 
suggest that the dissenters might not either.”  
The clinic and doctors challenging the law 
filed an emergency application in the 
Supreme Court asking it to block the law 
while they pursued an appeal.  
“Louisiana is poised to deny women their 
constitutional right to access safe and legal 
abortion with an admitting- privileges 
requirement that every judge in the 
proceedings below — the District Court, the 
panel majority and the dissenters — agrees is 
medically unnecessary,” the challengers 
wrote in their application in the case, June 
Medical Services v. Gee, No. 18A774.  
One doctor at one clinic cannot possibly meet 
the needs of approximately 10,000 women 
who seek abortion services in Louisiana each 
year,” they wrote. “Some of these women 
will attempt self-managed abortions, seek out 
unlicensed or unsafe abortions or be 
compelled to carry an unwanted pregnancy to 
term.”  
Lawyers for the state responded that the law 
would be administered in a cautious way, 
with no immediate changes. The challengers 
were wrong, the state said, to assert that 
“Louisiana abortion providers will 
immediately be forced to cease operations, 
with dire consequences.” The law will take 
effect, the state’s lawyers said, as part of “a 
sensitive regulatory process that should begin 
in an orderly way.”  
The challengers disputed that, saying that 
doctors without admitting privileges would 
risk immediate civil, criminal and 
professional liability if they performed 
abortions after the law became effective.  
“Given the number and severity of the law’s 
penalties, no clinic or doctor without 
admitting privileges will continue to provide 
abortions” once the law becomes 
enforceable, they wrote. “Irreparable harm to 
women in Louisiana, therefore, is imminent.”  
In his dissent on Thursday, Justice 
Kavanaugh said he would have provisionally 
denied the stay to let the factual questions be 
sorted out. Notably, he said that the Texas 
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decision was “the governing precedent for 
purposes of this stay application.”  
The Fifth Circuit, he wrote, had predicted that 
the four doctors who provide abortions at 
three clinics could obtain admitting 
privileges. There was no dispute as to one of 
the doctors, he wrote, leaving questions about 
three of them.  
If those doctors can obtain privileges, Justice 
Kavanaugh wrote, “the new law would not 
impose an undue burden” under the Texas 
decision.  
“By contrast, if the three doctors cannot 
obtain admitting privileges,” Justice 
Kavanaugh wrote, “then one or two of the 
three clinics would not be able to continue 
providing abortions. If so, then even the state 
acknowledges that the new law might be 
deemed to impose an undue burden for 
purposes of Whole Woman’s Health.”  
The right solution, he wrote, would have been 
to deny the stay and let the challengers return 
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Abortion providers in Louisiana have asked 
the Supreme Court for an emergency stay of 
a state law they say would leave only one 
doctor eligible to perform the procedure, an 
unexpectedly quick test on the issue for the 
court’s strengthened conservative majority. 
The Louisiana law — passed in 2014 but 
never allowed to go into effect — requires 
any physician providing abortion services to 
have admitting privileges at a hospital within 
30 miles of the procedure. 
Even Louisiana acknowledges that the 
requirement is virtually identical to a Texas 
law that the Supreme Court voted 5 to 3 to 
strike down in 2016. The court said the 
admitting privilege requirement, along with 
additional standards for clinics, “provides 
few, if any, health benefits for women, poses 
a substantial obstacle to women seeking 
abortions, and constitutes an ‘undue burden’ 
on their constitutional right to do so.” 
But a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 5th Circuit upheld the Louisiana law in a 
2-to-1 vote, finding factual distinctions 
between how the restriction played out in 
Texas and Louisiana. The full court, 
considered one of the most conservative of 
the regional appeals courts, voted not to 
reconsider that decision. 
Dissenting judges practically accused their 
colleagues of trying to set up the Supreme 
Court to reconsider its Texas decision, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt , with one 
saying the appeals court relied on “strength in 
numbers rather than sound legal principles in 
order to reach their desired result in this 
specific case.” 
Another said the majority had simply ignored 
the Supreme Court precedent. 
“I am unconvinced that any justice of the 
Supreme Court who decided Whole Woman’s 
Health would endorse our opinion,” Judge 
Stephen A. Higginson wrote in his dissent. 
“The majority would not, and I respectfully 
suggest that the dissenters might not either. 
As Justice [Clarence] Thomas wrote, ‘unless 
the Court abides by one set of rules to 
adjudicate constitutional rights, it will 
continue reducing constitutional law to 
policy-driven value judgments until the last 
shreds of its legitimacy disappear.’ ” 
Higginson’s theory will be put to the test 
quickly. The law is scheduled to go into 
effect Feb. 4 unless the Supreme Court 
intervenes. 
The Whole Woman’s Health decision was the 
court’s most important one on abortion in a 
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quarter-century. But it was decided by a very 
different Supreme Court, in the wake of the 
death of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia. 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the 
court’s liberals to strike down the Texas 
provisions. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Thomas were 
in dissent. 
But those three have since been joined by 
President Trump’s choices, Justice Neil M. 
Gorsuch and Brett M. Kavanaugh, both of 
whom were supported by antiabortion 
activists who said they hoped that the new 
court majority might one day overturn the 
fundamental right to abortion the court 
advanced in Roe v. Wade. 
Jennifer Dalven, director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union’s Reproductive 
Freedom Project, said laws like Louisiana’s 
provide a way to sharply limit the availability 
of abortion without taking on the precedent 
of Roe. 
“If the Supreme Court lets a law like this take 
effect, it sends a very dangerous signal to 
state legislators” that the way to limit 
abortion is to pass restrictive laws on the 
operation of clinics and doctors who provide 
the service. 
But Louisiana tells the Supreme Court that 
the challengers have not pointed to any 
mistakes in the fact-specific majority 
opinion, and that allowing the law to go into 
effect would not create an emergency that 
warrants the high court’s intervention. 
“All of Plaintiffs’ claims of irreparable harm 
rest on the premise that Louisiana will move 
aggressively to enforce the challenged law, 
potentially shutting down abortion clinics 
overnight,” Louisiana Attorney General Jeff 
Landry wrote. “But that is not correct. 
Louisiana envisions a regulatory process that 
begins, logically, with collecting information 
from Louisiana’s abortion clinics and their 
doctors.” 
Judge Jerry E. Smith, writing for the two-
member appeals court majority, said that he 
was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Whole Woman’s Health, but that included 
taking a painstaking look at the details. 
“Unlike in Texas, the [Louisiana law] does 
not impose a substantial burden on a large 
fraction of women,” he concluded. 
He said the closing of some clinics in 
Louisiana, as opposed to Texas, would not 
dramatically increase driving distances, and 
that it was easier for doctors in Louisiana to 
procure admitting privileges. He said that “at 
most, only 30 percent of women” seeking 
abortions in Louisiana would be affected. 
“The record here indicates that the admitting-
privileges requirement performs a real, and 
previously unaddressed, credentialing 
function that promotes the wellbeing of 
women seeking abortion,” he wrote. 
Still, he acknowledged, the benefits are “not 
huge.” In a footnote, he wrote that “the state 
did not provide any instance in which a worse 
result occurred because the patient’s abortion 
doctor did not possess admitting privileges.” 
Challengers of the law contend that is 
because abortions performed in Louisiana 
clinics seldom result in hospitalization: only 
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0.05 percent for abortions in the first 
trimester and approximately 1 percent in the 
second trimester. Hospital care when needed 
is provided regardless of whether the doctor 
performing the abortion has admitting 
privileges. 
The panel rejected a lower court’s finding 
that the law would affect about 70 percent of 
women seeking abortions in the state. After a 
trial, that judge found that two of the 
remaining three abortion clinics in the state 
would have to close because they would not 
have a doctor who could obtain admitting 
privileges. 
The only remaining clinic would “be unable 
to meet the annual demand for roughly 
10,000 abortions in the state.” 
“The 5th Circuit brazenly ignored recent U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent squarely on point,” 
said Nancy Northup, president and CEO of 
the Center for Reproductive Rights, which is 
representing the challengers and also 
successfully fought the Texas law. “There is 
no way this law can stand under the Supreme 
Court ruling in Whole Woman’s Health.” 
The Supreme Court seems to have taken a 
low-key approach to this term, after an 
unwelcome moment in the political spotlight 
during the partisan brawl over Kavanaugh’s 
nomination. 
But cases such as this one often forces its 
hand. The court is not being asked to consider 
the merits of the case just now, but whether 
the law should be put in place while it is 
appealed. 
What it decides about the stay will be closely 
watched by both sides. Abortion rights 
supporters will view a decision to allow the 
law to go into effect, as Northup indicated, as 
a troubling sign that the court is no longer 
willing to stand by its precedent in the Texas 
case, decided less than three years ago. 
Those opposed to abortion, on the other hand, 
would be disappointed by a Supreme Court 
reinforced with conservatives stepping in to 
stop a law that an appeals court has approved. 
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Late Thursday night, the Court put a 
Louisiana abortion statute on hold. The 5–4 
order in June Medical Services v. Gee has 
been perceived as a victory for abortion 
rights—but I’m not sure it is. The stay is 
purely to allow the Court to decide whether 
to hear the case. And the Court’s four solid 
conservatives voted to allow the law to take 
effect right away, even though it runs directly 
contrary to the Court’s most recent abortion 
decision. Chief Justice John Roberts voted to 
stay the law; but this does not mean he will 
vote to strike it down. 
If Thursday’s order was a win for abortion 
rights at all, it was a minor and probably 
temporary one. 
June Medical Services is a challenge to 
Louisiana Act 620, which requires abortion 
providers in the state to have “admitting 
privileges” at a licensed hospital within 30 
miles of the clinic at which they practice. 
That precise requirement in a Texas statute 
had been struck down in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt. In that 2016 case, a 
district court found that the “privileges” 
requirement provided no genuine health 
benefit to pregnant women. However, 
combined with a strict set of physical 
regulations for clinics, it would in fact cause 
the closure of most of the state’s licensed 
abortion clinics; thus, it constituted an 
“undue burden” on a pregnant woman’s 
constitutional right to have an abortion. 
A federal district court in Louisiana 
considered the Louisiana law in light of 
the Hellerstedt decision, and struck it down. 
In seven pages of Kafkaesque factual 
findings, the court detailed the current 
providers’ futile efforts to get admitting 
privileges—which were blocked for reasons 
that had little to do with competency and 
much to do with deep-red Louisiana’s 
opposition to abortions. Of the six current 
providers, it found, Act 620 would put four 
completely out of business, and restrict one 
to performing abortions at only one of the two 
locations where he currently practices. The 
sixth doctor, the court found, would simply 
stop performing abortions if that happened, 
out of “a well-founded concern for his 
personal safety.” If Act 620 took effect, the 
court concluded, “approximately 70 percent 
of the women in Louisiana seeking an 
abortion” would be unable to get one in the 
state. 
But then a strange thing happened: The U.S. 
Court of Appeals decided that the district 
judge just didn’t understand the facts, and 
ruled that Act 620 could go into effect. 
The court-of-appeals decision is one of the 
most remarkable federal opinions I have ever 
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read. To understand why, let’s look at the 
basic rules for the federal court system. The 
system has three levels. District courts 
conduct trials, hear testimony, sift evidence, 
and “find” facts. Then they apply court-of-
appeals and Supreme Court precedent to 
those facts, and render a judgment. Courts of 
appeals, except in very unusual 
circumstances, do not “find” facts. Instead, 
they ask whether the trial court correctly 
applied the law to the facts it found. To 
decide that, they apply Supreme Court 
precedent, and, if there is none, precedent 
from the appeals courts. After the appeals 
court decides, the Supreme Court can step in 
if it thinks the lower courts got it wrong. 
To repeat: Trial courts “find” the facts; 
appeals courts primarily decide the law. 
Appeals courts cannot set aside factual 
findings unless the trial judge committed 
“clear error.” Even if an appeals panel is 
“convinced that had it been sitting as the trier 
of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently,’’ the Supreme Court has said, it 
should not second-guess the trial judge unless 
it has “a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.” 
But the Fifth Circuit in essence decided that 
the trial judge had been wrong about virtually 
every factual question in the case. Whatever 
might have been the case in Texas, in 
Louisiana there were hitherto unsuspected 
benefits to the “admitting privileges” 
requirement. As for the doctors who hadn’t 
gotten admitting privileges, they were lying. 
They had, the appeals court decided, “sat on 
their hands” and probably really could get 
admitting privileges somewhere, if they just 
got off their lazy behind and gave it a real try. 
And even if some of the doctors were 
eliminated, the others could just work a few 
more hours a week and everything would be 
tickety-boo for the women seeking abortions. 
As a result, the Fifth Circuit said, the case 
in June Medical Services is totes different 
from the identical case of Hellerstedt. And 
thus it is totes constitutional too. 
It’s hard to believe that the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion was even intended to pass the 
straight-face test. There are two reasons for 
that suspicion. First, the Fifth Circuit 
decision was written by Judge Jerry E. Smith. 
Smith, a Ronald Reagan appointee, during 
his three decades on the bench has displayed 
some tendencies toward assuming an 
authority not strictly warranted by his 
commission. 
Smith was the author of a 1996 affirmative-
action case called Hopwood v. University of 
Texas. In that case, he wrote for a majority 
that a previous Supreme Court case, Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke, was 
no longer binding in the Fifth Circuit. The 
Supreme Court had not said so, but Smith 
thought the decision was a bad one; he didn’t 
think the Supreme Court liked it either and 
thought it was about time the high court 
reversed it. (The Supreme Court, in fact, later 
reaffirmed Bakke.) Smith’s self-confidence 
verged on megalomania in 2012 when he 
ordered the attorney general of the United 
States to write him a letter explaining 
political comments by President Barack 
Obama about a case that was not before 
Smith’s court, and to which Obama was not a 
party. 
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So we might call Smith’s judicial philosophy 
freewheeling—or, to be more precise, 
lawless. In his June Medical 
Services opinion, he in essence overruled the 
Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hellerstedt. That level of hubris is 
probably explained by the true difference 
between Hellerstedt and June Medical 
Services. 
The facts on the ground in Louisiana and 
Texas are roughly the same, but the facts on 
the ground of the Supreme Court are not. 
That is to say: Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
who provided the fifth vote in Hellerstedt, is 
no longer on the Court. His seat is now filled 
by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. 
The message of the Smith opinion is: We’ve 
got the votes now. Hellerstedt, and 
then Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and then 
Roe v. Wade, are finished. I can write any 
nonsense in this opinion and you can’t do 
anything about it. 
Is he right? Kavanaugh’s dissent may be the 
real news here. He notes the supposed factual 
discrepancy and suggests that the court 
should just allow the law to go into effect. 
The lazy doctors could try again to get 
admitting privileges. The state has promised 
not to enforce Act 620 “aggressively,” he 
says, so no one will be hurt. 
His argument, in essence, is: Trust a 
government regulator with your rights. What 
could go wrong? This is, let’s say, an 
uncharacteristic argument for a conservative. 
After the temporary stay of Act 620, the 
Court has a few choices. It could issue an 
unsigned opinion saying that Hellerstedt—
only three years old—is still the law. It could 
also grant full-scale review and ask the 
parties to argue whether it should 
reconsider Hellerstedt. That would suggest a 
cavalier view of precedent, but at least the 
Court would be leveling with the country. 
The worst choice would be to engage with 
Smith’s claim that Act 620 is somehow 
different from the Texas law. Finely parsing 
nonsense leads to nonsensical law. But I 
suspect that Kavanaugh is not the only 
conservative on the Court who would like to 
take that route. Bogus factual distinctions 
offer an appealing way of getting rid 
of Hellerstedt—and then Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, and then Roe v. Wade. 
The key vote on Thursday’s order was that of 
Roberts. He dissented in Hellerstedt, 
which suggests that he believes admitting-
privilege requirements are fine, regardless of 
their impact. Does he respect precedent 
enough to, in effect, rule against his beliefs? 
More likely, his inner struggle is only about 
expediency and timing. Is this a politic time 
for the Court to reconsider its precedents 
frankly? Would it be better for the Court to 
stand by its precedents for a decent interval 
before making the foreordained assault 
on Roe and Casey? Or should the Court take 
the easy route suggested by Kavanaugh, and 
undo abortion rights while pretending it’s 
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No, I wasn’t surprised last week, as most 
people apparently were, when Chief Justice 
John Roberts cast the deciding fifth vote to 
preserve access to abortion in Louisiana for 
at least a little while longer. In fact, I had 
predicted it (and I have witnesses). 
Why? Not because I think the chief justice 
has developed a soft spot in his heart for the 
right to abortion. He has not. Not because he 
wants to minimize the Supreme Court’s role 
as a combatant in the culture wars. I think he 
does, but that’s not the point. 
Rather, circumstances compelled the chief 
justice to stand up to a stunning act of judicial 
defiance. 
The phrase summons the image of Gov. 
George Wallace standing in the schoolhouse 
door. What Chief Justice Roberts had on his 
hands was something less tangible but 
equally threatening to the rule of law: not 
defiance of judges but defiance by judges. 
The voluminous commentary on what 
happened at the court last week has for the 
most part not fully conveyed the blatant 
nature of the lower court’s decision, on which 
the Supreme Court put a temporary hold to 
afford the plaintiffs — an abortion clinic and 
its doctors — the chance to file a formal 
appeal. 
The court is the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, based in New 
Orleans and covering Texas and Mississippi 
along with Louisiana. Not surprisingly given 
its territory, it has been the location of 
numerous legal battles over abortion. The 
Trump administration has been spectacularly 
successful in filling seats on the Fifth Circuit. 
Five of the 16 active judges are Trump 
appointees. That places the Fifth Circuit at 
the leading edge of the coming wave 
of Trump judges (sorry, Chief Justice 
Roberts, I’m afraid that’s what they are), so 
it’s important to understand what is going on 
there. 
The Louisiana law at issue, June Medical 
Services v. Gee, was enacted in 2014 as the 
Unsafe Abortion Protection Act. It requires 
doctors who perform abortions to have 
admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 
miles of the location where they practice. 
If this sounds familiar, it’s because it is. 
Texas had passed the same law, part of the 
legislative arsenal amassed by a leading anti-
abortion organization, Americans United for 
Life. These laws are enacted with the 
knowledge that doctors who perform 
abortions can almost never get admitting 
privileges, either because of objections to 
abortion by the hospital or the surrounding 
community or because so few abortion 
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patients ever need hospitalization that the 
doctors can’t meet the minimum number of 
hospital admissions that some credentialing 
committees require. (It’s 50 per year in the 
case of one Louisiana hospital, while the 
doctors involved in the case went years 
without needing to hospitalize a single 
abortion patient.) The whole point of these 
laws is to destroy the abortion infrastructure 
— in the name of protecting women’s health. 
The Texas law, upheld by the Fifth 
Circuit, succeeded in closing half the 
abortion clinics in the state before the 
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
decided in June 2016 by a vote of 5 to 
3. While the Louisiana law was being 
drafted, one anti-abortion leader in the state 
observed in an email to the bill’s sponsor that 
the Texas law was having “tremendous 
success in closing abortion clinics and 
restricting abortion access.” In signing the 
bill into law, Gov. Bobby Jindal declared it 
part of the effort “to make Louisiana the most 
pro-life state in the nation.” 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion in 
Whole Woman’s Health was a pointed 
rebuke to the Fifth Circuit for failing to 
subject the Texas law to adequate scrutiny. 
The appeals court had simply deferred to the 
Legislature’s claimed objective of protecting 
women’s health and had in fact barred any 
consideration of whether the law would 
actually do so. In fact, Justice Breyer wrote, 
the law conveyed minimal if any health 
benefit and would actually harm women by 
forcing longer waits and more crowded 
conditions in the remaining clinics that could 
meet the needless admitting privileges 
requirement. 
Judge John W. deGravelles of Federal 
District Court in Baton Rouge applied the 
reasoning of Whole Woman’s Health in 
issuing a permanent injunction against 
Louisiana’s identical law. His ruling 
followed a six-day trial at which he took 
testimony on the sustained but fruitless 
efforts by the doctors to get admitting 
privileges; evidence on this point takes up 14 
of the 63 pages of his opinion, issued in April 
2017. Observing that it “provides no benefits 
to women and is an inapt remedy for a 
problem that does not exist,” Judge 
deGravelles concluded that this law, like the 
Texas law, placed an undue burden on 
women’s access to abortion. 
The Fifth Circuit’s 2-to-1 decision 
overturning that ruling is a breathtaking piece 
of work. “We are of course bound by Whole 
Woman’s Health’s holdings, announced in a 
case with a substantially similar statute but 
greatly dissimilar facts and geography,” 
Judge Jerry Smith wrote for himself and 
Judge Edith Clement. What can that sentence 
— indeed, that premise — possibly mean? 
That Whole Woman’s Health concerned 
Texas while this case was about Louisiana? 
That’s like saying that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, recognizing a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage, applied only to male 
couples and not to lesbians because it was a 
male couple who brought the case. (It’s worth 
noting that in the immediate aftermath of 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Alabama 
attorney general dropped the state’s appeal of 
its admitting privileges law, which had been 
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struck down in Federal District Court. “While 
I disagree with the high court’s decision, 
there is no good faith argument that 
Alabama’s law remains constitutional in light 
of the Supreme Court ruling,” was the state’s 
lawyer’s honest appraisal of the situation.) 
The Fifth Circuit’s contorted explanation for 
why the Supreme Court’s “close fact-bound 
balancing analysis” in Whole Woman’s 
Health wasn’t relevant to Louisiana 
succeeded only in showing that Louisiana 
women would in fact be worse off than the 
women in Texas, where most major cities 
still have at least one abortion clinic (many 
Texas clinics did not reopen after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling). The two judges 
who formed the Fifth Circuit majority also 
tried to show that the doctors could have 
obtained admitting privileges if only they had 
tried harder, a conclusion flatly refuted by the 
findings at trial but embraced by Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh in his opinion last week, 
dissenting from the Supreme Court’s vote to 
grant a stay of the Fifth Circuit’s decision. 
Justice Kavanaugh said the doctors should 
keep trying. 
The dissenter on the Fifth Circuit panel, 
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, dissected the 
majority’s opinion and said the appeals court 
was repeating the very mistakes for which the 
Supreme Court had called it out in the Texas 
case. When the full Fifth Circuit took up the 
question of whether to rehear the case as a 
full court, six judges said yes and nine said 
no. Four of the nine were recent Trump 
appointees (the fifth Trump appointee on the 
court, Kyle Duncan, was recused). The law 
was scheduled to take effect last week. It will 
remain on hold for some months, as least, as 
the plaintiffs, represented by the Center for 
Reproductive Rights, file their formal 
Supreme Court appeal and the state gets the 
chance to respond. 
While it takes the votes of five justices, a 
majority of the court, to grant a stay, as it did 
in this instance, adding a case to the court’s 
docket for a decision on the merits requires 
only four votes. It’s highly likely the court 
will grant review; if it doesn’t, the stay 
dissolves automatically and the law takes 
effect. 
How will the Supreme Court decide the case? 
Despite my boast at the start of this column, 
I don’t claim omniscience about what comes 
next. The chief justice voted to grant the stay, 
in my estimation, because to have silently let 
the Louisiana law take effect without 
Supreme Court intervention would have been 
to reward the defiance that I’ve described 
here. When it comes to a full review on the 
merits, it’s a different game. 
Chief Justice Roberts was in dissent in Whole 
Woman’s Health, along with Justices Samuel 
Alito and Clarence Thomas (Justice Antonin 
Scalia having died four months before). The 
deciding vote in the majority was cast by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Justice Kennedy’s 
successor, Justice Kavanaugh, chose sides 
last week. He might have provided some 
cover for the chief justice, but chose not to. 
We now know all we need to know about 
him. 
We still don’t know all we would like to 
know about John Roberts, who remains an 
ambiguous figure after more than 13 years at 
the head of the American judicial system. 
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With the lower courts moving rapidly even to 
his right, and the Trump administration 
beating at the Supreme Court’s door in one 
high-profile case after another, Chief Justice 
Roberts is entering a time of great testing, 
both of himself and of the institution he 
heads. Maybe his vote last week was a 
harbinger. Maybe it will come to be seen as 
an anomaly. In the space between those two 
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The Supreme Court handed down its first 
abortion decision of the year on Tuesday, 
with a mixed result that clearly signaled the 
conservative majority is not ready to 
reconsider the right to abortion set in Roe vs. 
Wade. 
By a 7-2 vote, the justices upheld an unusual 
provision of an Indiana law that requires 
clinics to bury or cremate the remains of a 
fetus. This mostly symbolic rule does not 
violate a woman’s right to choose abortion or 
put an “undue burden” on those who do so, 
the justices said in a brief, unsigned opinion. 
At the same time, the court, without a dissent, 
rejected the state’s effort to revive a 
significant restriction on abortion. The 
justices left in place lower court rulings that 
blocked an Indiana law that would make it 
illegal for women to end a pregnancy because 
of the race or gender of the fetus or if they 
received a diagnosis of Down syndrome. 
Since Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh won 
confirmation, social conservatives have 
hoped -- and many liberals have feared — 
that the high court with two appointees of 
President Trump would move to overturn the 
1973 Roe decision, or at least significantly 
limit abortion rights. With their eyes on that 
possibility, Republican lawmakers in at least 
a half-dozen conservative states have enacted 
abortion bans this year. 
But Tuesday’s outcome, after weeks of 
internal debate, suggests that the justices are 
inclined to move slowly and cautiously on the 
abortion issue and that Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. and his fellow conservatives 
are not ready to directly confront abortion 
rights, at least during a presidential election 
year. Had the high court agreed to hear the 
Indiana case, it would have been argued in 
the fall and decided by June 2020. 
The decision not to hear Indiana’s appeal 
provides further evidence that the justices 
will not be eager to consider the even 
more sweeping abortion bans recently 
adopted by Alabama and other conservative 
states. 
The spotlight has been on Kavanaugh. He 
replaced Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who 
had joined with the court’s liberals, starting 
in 1992, to uphold the right to abortion. 
Neither Kavanaugh nor Justice Neil M. 
Gorsuch wrote separately on Tuesday in 
favor of hearing the Indiana case. 
Social conservatives suffered a second 
setback on Tuesday, on another controversial 
issue — the treatment of transgender 
individuals. The justices refused to hear a 
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right-to-privacy challenge to the decision by 
a Pennsylvania school district that allowed a 
transgender student to use the boys’ locker 
room. Lawyers for the Alliance Defending 
Freedom sued on behalf of a high school boy 
who said he “felt embarrassed” about 
possibly seeing the other student in his 
underwear. 
Two lower courts rejected the suit, and the 
justices said they would not hear the case of 
Doe vs. Boyertown Area School District. 
Asaf Orr, an attorney for the Transgender 
Youth Project, called the court’s action “a 
major victory for transgender youth and their 
families.” 
“The vast majority of people in this country 
support equal treatment of all students, 
including those who are transgender,” Orr 
said. 
Since early January, the justices had debated 
Indiana’s appeal in Box vs. Planned 
Parenthood during their weekly conferences. 
Only four justices would have needed to vote 
to grant review of Indiana’s appeal for the 
court to hear arguments on it. Instead, the 
justices denied the state’s case with no 
registered dissents. 
At the same time, the justices voted 7-2 to 
uphold the fetal-remains part of Indiana’s 
law, an issue they had not previously ruled 
on. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia 
Sotomayor dissented. 
In upholding that portion of the law, the 
justices in the majority said that states can 
legitimately regulate the burial of fetal 
remains. But they noted that their ruling did 
not alter previous decisions on whether state 
efforts to limit abortion itself amount to an 
“undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose 
to end a pregnancy. 
The fetal-remains law “does not implicate 
our cases applying the undue burden test to 
abortion regulations,” they wrote. 
Lower courts had struck down Indiana’s law 
as unconstitutional under Roe vs. Wade. 
Under that decision, a woman and her doctor, 
not the state, have the right to choose whether 
to end an early or midterm pregnancy. 
The Indiana law, adopted in 2016 and signed 
by then-Gov. Mike Pence, sought to prohibit 
abortions entirely in some situations. 
Its “non-discrimination” provision said 
“Indiana does not allow a fetus to be aborted 
solely because of the fetus’s race, color, 
national origin, ancestry, sex, or diagnosis or 
potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down 
syndrome or any other disability.” 
The law had a narrow exemption for a lethal 
condition that “will with reasonable certainty 
result in the death of the child not more than 
three months after the child’s birth.” 
A federal judge in Indiana and the U.S. 7th 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago blocked 
the entire law from taking effect and ruled it 
was unconstitutional, saying that the 
“nondiscrimination” provision violated Roe 
vs. Wade and that the fetal-remains part of 
the law had no legitimate purpose. 
Last year, the 7th Circuit split 4-4 on whether 
to reconsider that ruling. The dissenters 
included Judges Amy Coney Barrett from 
Indiana and Diane Sykes from Wisconsin, 
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both of whom were considered by Trump for 
a Supreme Court nomination. 
Indiana appealed to the Supreme Court in 
October, a week after Kavanaugh was sworn 
in. 
In siding with the the lower courts on the 
main part of the law, the justices wrote that 
the decision not to hear Indiana’s appeal 
“expresses no view on the merits” of the 
issue, “whether Indiana may prohibit the 
knowing provision of sex-, race- and 
disability-selective abortions by abortion 
providers.” 
That issue has so far only been considered by 
one appellate court, the 7th Circuit, and the 
justices said they would wait until other 
appeals courts have looked at similar laws 
before jumping in to consider it. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for himself, 
said in a 20-page opinion that the court “will 
soon need to confront the constitutionality of 
laws like Indiana’s” because of “the potential 
for abortion to become a tool of eugenic 
manipulation.” 
“From the beginning, birth control and 
abortion were promoted as a means of 
effectuating eugenics,” he wrote, in an 
unusual, lengthy attack on early supporters of 
women’s access to contraception and 
abortion. 
ACLU lawyers who had sued to block the 
Indiana law called the outcome a “mixed 
ruling.” 
The high court “let another unwarranted 
restriction on abortion stand. While the ruling 
is limited, the law is part of a larger trend of 
state laws designed to stigmatize and drive 
abortion care of out of reach,” said Jennifer 
Dalven, director of the ACLU’s 
Reproductive Freedom Project. 
An antiabortion group, Students for Life of 
America, said the court got it “half-right” in 
the Indiana case. 
“The justices got it right that aborted infants 
need to be buried and cremated respectfully 
as they are human beings, not trash,” said 
Kristan Hawkins, the group’s president. 
Carol Tobias, president of the National Right 
to Life Committee, said her group “applauds 
Justice Thomas for using this opportunity to 
expose Planned Parenthood’s eugenic legacy 
and for highlighting the need to protect 
unborn children from being exterminated 
based on their race, sex or level of disability.” 
The justices are still likely to consider some 
aspects of abortion law in the months ahead. 
This month, the court has been considering 
another appeal from Indiana. This one seeks 
to revive a regulation that would require 
women to undergo an ultrasound test and 
then wait at least 18 hours before having an 
abortion. 
The 7th Circuit blocked that law on the 
grounds it would put an undue burden on 
low-income women who had to travel hours 
to reach an abortion facility and stay there for 
two days. 
The justices are likely to take up a Louisiana 
law that would require abortion facilities to 
have a doctor on their staff who has admitting 
privileges at a nearby hospital. In February, 
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the court, with Chief Justice Roberts in the 
majority, issued a 5-4 order to block that law 
from taking effect while the high court 
weighs an appeal. 
The justices seem likely not to grant review 
of that case, June Medical Services vs. Gee, 
until the fall. That, in turn, means a decision 















































October 8, 2018  
 
Enforcement of new anti-abortion 
restrictions will have to wait as the physicians 
who challenged Act 620’s constitutionality 
asked for a review of an appellate court 
decision upholding the law. 
The doctors argue in June Medical Services, 
et al., v. Dr. Rebekah Gee, et al., that 
requiring them to have admitting privileges at 
a hospital within 30 miles of the abortion 
clinic would likely require two of the state's 
three facilities to close and leave only one 
doctor with the proper credentials to perform 
the medical procedure that ends pregnancies. 
They want the 16 members of the 5th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals to review the split 
decision by a three-judge panel before 
allowing the state to enforce the law. 
Two of three 5th Circuit judges on the panel 
– Jerry Smith, of Houston, and Edith Brown 
Clement, of New Orleans – found Sept. 26 
that Louisiana's Unsafe Abortion Protection 
Act, Act 620 of 2014, didn’t cause an undue 
burden on women largely because the 
physicians didn’t try too hard to get hospital 
admitting privileges. 
The third judge, Patrick Higginbotham of 
Austin, scolded his colleagues for retrying 
the facts of the case and essentially 
overturning a 2016 U.S. Supreme Court 
finding that a virtually identical Texas law 
had unconstitutionally created a “substantial 
obstacle” to the right of abortion. 
Wednesday was the deadline for the five 
doctors in the challenge to request a 
rehearing, which stops the state from 
enforcing the law beginning Oct. 18. 
“Our priority here is to keep clinics open,” 
T.J. Tu, who recently took over the legal team 
representing the Louisiana doctors, said in an 
interview last week while the lawyers for the 
New York-based Center for Reproductive 
Rights were considering their options. 
“A woman’s constitutional right to access 
abortion is on the verge of extinction and 
that's not hyperbole. That is a reality,” he 
said. 
The Center claims the 2-1 panel’s decision 
violated Supreme Court precedent. 
State officials, who last week weren’t sure 
how to go about applying the law, won’t have 
to worry about enforcement for many months 
more. 
The Louisiana Department of Health is 
responsible for licensing facilities and 
ensuring compliance. Generally, physicians 
with admitting privileges must submit a letter 
from the hospital saying so. 
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Is that what would happen in this case? 
“The procedure will be determined by the 
lawyers with the A.G., who have been 
involved in the litigation,” LDH press office 
wrote in an email. 
Over at the Attorney General’s Office, the 
press office in an email pointed to Attorney 
General Jeff Landry’s earlier statement 
praising the 5th Circuit’s decision and stating 
that administering the law is up to the 
Louisiana Department of Health. 
State Rep. Katrina Jackson, D-Monroe, 
introduced the bill that would become Act 
620 as a way of protecting women’s health by 
ensuring if anything went wrong during the 
termination procedure, a hospital would be 
on call. “If you are going to perform 
abortions in the state of Louisiana, you’re 
going to do so in a safe environment and in a 
safe manner that offers women the optimal 
protection and care of their bodies,” she said 
in March 2014. 
The legislation largely tracked the wording of 
a bill that Texas made a law in 2013. 
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 
Texas law in June 2016 because so many 
Lone Star doctors couldn’t obtain admitting 
privileges that all but eight of 40 clinics 
closed. The difficulty obtaining privileges, 
long drives and long wait times at the 
remaining clinics created an undue burden, 
the high court ruled in what many called the 
most significant abortion decision in a 
generation. 
After a six-day trial in 2017, U.S. District 
Judge John deGravelles, of Baton Rouge, 
followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning to 
find the Louisiana law likewise was 
unconstitutional. 
But Louisiana is not Texas, Smith wrote in 
his 45-page majority opinion. 
When Act 620 was signed by then Gov. 
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana had five abortion 
clinics and six doctors. Two of the clinics 
have since closed. 
Because of the numbers – three abortion 
clinics and about five physicians – the panel’s 
majority felt they could drill down into the 
difficulties each physician had in obtaining 
privileges, which is at the heart of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
What they said they found was that the 
process wasn’t that onerous. Only one doctor 
“put forth a good-faith effort.” Three others 
likely could have obtained the privileges had 
they not “largely sat on their hands,” Smith 
wrote. 
Higginbotham wrote in his dissent that the 
panel majority had no business retrying the 
facts of the case – that’s the job of the district 
court. Appellate courts decide if the law was 
applied accurately. 
“The divergence between the findings of the 
district court and the majority is striking—a 
dissonance in findings of fact inexplicable to 
these eyes as I had not thought that abortion 
cases were an exception to the coda that 
appellate judges are not the triers of fact,” 
Higginbotham wrote. 
He also noted that abortions are a safe 
procedure that require hospital care in less 
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than 1 percent of the more complicated 
pregnancies and nearly none at all when the 
terminations happen early, as most do. 
All three of the panel judges were nominated 
by Republican presidents, are in their 70s, 
and have often been mentioned during their 
long careers as candidates when openings 
occurred on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Five of the 16 members of the 5th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals were appointed by 
Democrats. Among the other 11 is a judge, 
Kyle Duncan of Baton Rouge, who when in 



































 “Supreme Court Will Not Hear Bid to Revive Alabama Abortion Ban”  
 
 
The New York Times  
 
Adam Liptak  
 
June 28, 2019 
 
The Supreme Court on Friday turned down 
an appeal asking it to revive an Alabama law 
that would have banned the procedure used in 
the vast majority of second-trimester 
abortions.  
As is their custom, the justices gave no 
reasons for declining to hear the case. Justice 
Clarence Thomas issued a concurring 
opinion that called the procedure gruesome 
and unconstitutional. “This case serves as a 
stark reminder,” he wrote, “that our abortion 
jurisprudence has spiraled out of control.”  
The procedure, known as dilation and 
extraction, involves dilating the woman’s 
cervix and removing the fetus in pieces. 
Opponents of abortion call it 
“dismemberment abortion.”  
Justice Thomas adopted that terminology. 
“The notion that anything in the Constitution 
prevents states from passing laws prohibiting 
the dismembering of a living child is 
implausible,” he wrote.  
The Alabama law, enacted in 2016, was 
blocked by lower courts. It would have 
affected 99 percent of abortions performed in 
the state after 15 weeks.  
In defending the law, Alabama officials said 
it fell short of a complete prohibition.  
“Although the law is a procedure ʻban,’” the 
state told the Supreme Court, “its only 
practical requirement is that a doctor kill the 
unborn child through a medically appropriate 
procedure before removing the unborn 
child’s body from the woman.”  
The state proposed three methods of 
terminating fetal life before extraction: 
injecting potassium chloride into the fetus’s 
heart, cutting the umbilical cord and injecting 
digoxin, a heart-failure drug, into the 
amniotic fluid. Lower courts ruled that these 
methods were not safe, effective or available, 
and they struck down the law as inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.  
Quoting a 2016 Supreme Court decision, 
Chief Judge Ed Carnes of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in 
Atlanta, said problems with “the fetal demise 
methods — their attendant risks; their 
technical difficulty; their untested nature; the 
time and cost associated with performing 
them; the lack of training opportunities; and 
the inability to recruit experienced 
practitioners to perform them — support the 
conclusion that the act would ʻplace a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.’ ”  
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“So does the fact,” he added, “that every 
court to consider the issue has ruled that laws 
banning dismemberment abortions are 
invalid and that fetal demise methods are not 
a suitable workaround.”  
Chief Judge Carnes’s opinion was notable for 
its reluctance.  
“Some Supreme Court justices have been of 
the view that there is constitutional law and 
then there is the aberration of constitutional 
law relating to abortion,” Chief Judge Carnes 
wrote for the majority. “If so, what we must 
apply here is the aberration.”  
Eight other states have similar laws, Alabama 
said in its brief seeking Supreme Court 
review of the case, Harris v. West Alabama 
Women’s Center, No. 18-837.  
In another development on Friday, the court 
agreed to decide whether Montana is free to 
exclude religious schools from a state 
scholarship program.  
The state’s constitution bars using 
government money to aid schools affiliated 
with churches. Three mothers who sought 
scholarships from the state program to send 
their children to a Christian school sued, 
saying the state constitution violated 
provisions of the United States Constitution 
on religious freedom and equal protection.  
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the 
challenge and shut down the entire 
scholarship program.  
The case, Espinoza v. Montana Department 
of Revenue, No. 18-1195, will give the 
United States Supreme Court an opportunity 
to explore the limits of its 2017 decision in 
Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer. That 
decision said Missouri could not exclude 
religious institutions from a state program to 
make playgrounds safer even though the 
state’s Constitution called for strict 
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The Supreme Court on Tuesday sidestepped 
part of a major abortion case, a new sign that 
the court is not yet moving aggressively to 
test the constitutional right to abortion 
established in Roe v. Wade.  
In an apparent compromise in a case from 
Indiana, the justices turned down an appeal 
that asked the court to reinstate a state law 
banning abortions sought solely because of 
the sex or disability of a fetus. But the court 
upheld part of the same law requiring 
abortion providers to bury or cremate fetal 
remains.  
The case, Box v. Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana and Kentucky, No. 18-483, had been 
closely watched because it could have given 
the Supreme Court its first chance to consider 
the constitutionality of a state law restricting 
abortion since Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh 
replaced Justice Anthony M. Kennedy last 
year.  
Justice Kennedy had been a cautious 
supporter of abortion rights, while Justice 
Kavanaugh’s limited record on the subject as 
an appeals court judge suggested some 
skepticism.  
The modest move on Tuesday left for another 
day the consideration of state laws limiting 
abortion that were enacted, at least partly, to 
challenge Roe v. Wade. Such laws are being 
enacted at a brisk pace, including one in 
Alabama banning almost all abortions in the 
state, without exceptions for rape and incest, 
and others that bar the procedure after doctors 
can detect what the measures call a “fetal 
heartbeat,” which happens around six weeks 
of pregnancy.  
The new laws are intended to give the 
Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider 
Roe.  
The court’s decision on Tuesday, issued 
without briefing on the merits or oral 
arguments, was unsigned and just three pages 
long. The court stressed that its decision on 
fetal remains was not a ruling about abortion 
rights.  
In declining to hear an appeal on the law 
banning abortions sought for specific 
reasons, the court said it was expressing no 
views on the constitutionality of such laws. A 
split among lower courts is ordinarily 
required for Supreme Court review, and in 
this case, the court noted, there was no such 
disagreement.  
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia 
Sotomayor said they would have denied 
review of both issues in the case.  
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The Indiana law was enacted in 2016 and 
signed by Gov. Mike Pence, now the vice 
president. It prohibited all abortions, at any 
time during a pregnancy, solely sought based 
on the fetus’s sex, or because it had been 
diagnosed with Down syndrome or “any 
another disability,” listing conditions like 
scoliosis, albinism, dwarfism and “physical 
or mental disease.” The law also barred 
abortions sought because of characteristics 
like race or national origin.  
The state law also imposed limits on the 
disposal of fetal remains, though it allowed 
mass cremations and did not impose any 
restrictions on women who disposed of the 
remains themselves.  
A statement issued by Mr. Pence’s office on 
Tuesday said he “commends the Supreme 
Court for upholding a portion of Indiana law 
that safeguards the sanctity of human life by 
requiring that remains of aborted babies be 
treated with respect and dignity.”  
“We remain hopeful,” the statement said, 
“that at a later date the Supreme Court will 
review one of numerous state laws across the 
U.S. that bar abortion based on sex, race or 
disability.”  
A three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
Chicago, unanimously struck down the 
provision limiting permissible reasons for 
having an abortion, though one judge said he 
did so reluctantly and only because he was 
bound by Supreme Court precedent.  
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court ruled that states may not 
prohibit abortions or place substantial 
obstacles in the way of women seeking them 
before fetal viability. Judge William J. Bauer, 
writing for the majority on the Seventh 
Circuit, said that ruling doomed the law’s 
restrictions.  
“These provisions are far greater than a 
substantial obstacle; they are absolute 
prohibitions on abortions prior to viability, 
which the Supreme Court has clearly held 
cannot be imposed by the state,” he wrote in 
the decision issued by the appeals panel.  
Judge Daniel A. Manion voted with the 
majority in that case, but did not adopt its 
reasoning. “Indiana has a compelling interest 
in attempting to prevent this type of private 
eugenics,” he wrote. “But the fact remains 
that Casey has plainly established an absolute 
right to have an abortion before viability.”  
“That today’s outcome is compelled begs for 
the Supreme Court to reconsider Roe and 
Casey,” he wrote.  
The Seventh Circuit panel had divided 2 to 1 
on the part of the law concerning fetal 
remains. Judge Bauer, writing for the 
majority in that decision, said the distinctions 
in the law were not rational, noting that it 
allowed women to dispose of remains as they 
saw fit but required abortion providers to 
treat them largely as they did other human 
remains.  
In dissent, Judge Manion wrote that Indiana 
was entitled to insist on “the dignified and 
humane disposal of the remains of unborn 
children.”  
The full Seventh Circuit initially agreed to 
rehear the panel’s ruling on the fetal remains 
 813 
provision but later announced that it had 
deadlocked after a judge recused himself.  
Dissenting from the full court’s decision not 
to rehear the case, Judge Frank H. 
Easterbrook, joined by three other judges, 
wrote that both parts of the panel’s decision 
were misguided.  
“Casey and other decisions hold that, until a 
fetus is viable, a woman is entitled to decide 
whether to bear a child,” he wrote of the 
provision on permissible reasons. “But there 
is a difference between ʻI don’t want a child’ 
and ʻI want a child, but only a male’ or ʻI 
want only children whose genes predict 
success in life.’”  
As for the fetal remains law, Judge 
Easterbrook wrote that “the panel has held 
invalid a statute that would be sustained had 
it concerned the remains of cats or gerbils.”  
In urging the Supreme Court to hear the case, 
lawyers for the state said fetal remains were 
worthy of respectful treatment.  
“The fetal disposition provision expands on 
long-established legal and cultural traditions 
of recognizing the dignity and humanity of 
the fetus,” the state’s brief said. It added that 
advances in genetic testing and concerns 
about sex-selective abortions justified the 
provision restricting permissible reasons for 
the procedure.  
Lawyers for Planned Parenthood said the 
provision governing fetal remains was not 
rational.  
“Indiana claimed that it sought to treat 
embryonic and fetal tissue like human 
remains,” the group’s brief said. “But the 
challenged statute permits a woman to 
dispose of the tissue in whatever way she 
chooses, so long as she takes it from the 
medical facility when she departs.”  
In a 20-page concurring opinion on Tuesday, 
Justice Clarence Thomas echoed and 
amplified Judge Easterbrook’s dissent. The 
Indiana law, Justice Thomas wrote, furthered 
the state’s “compelling interest in preventing 
abortion from becoming a tool of modern-
day eugenics.”  
“Whatever else might be said about Casey,” 
Justice Thomas wrote, “it did not decide 
whether the Constitution requires states to 
allow eugenic abortions.”  
In its brief opposing Supreme Court review, 
Planned Parenthood said the restrictions on 
permissible reasons also made no sense. 
“Indiana’s view would lead to perverse 
results,” the group’s brief said. “It would 
mean that even though states cannot compel 
a woman to continue a healthy pregnancy, it 
could compel her against her will to continue 
a pregnancy where it is virtually certain that 
the child will die in infancy.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
